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wonderful, you motivated me to work a little bit harder. I confess that my time in Turkey
was the most productive time in my life. I appreciate the focus you give me and I hope I
can do the same for you.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 The Price of Deception: A Finer Measure of Manipulability . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Minimal Dishonesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Contributions of this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Chapter 2: Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1 The Game of Deception in Social Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 The Price of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 Minimal Dishonesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.4 The Price of Anarchy and The Price of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4.1 Games of Anarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 The Obstacle to Reducing Deception to Anarchy . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4.3 Reducing Anarchy to Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Chapter 3: Price of Deception in the Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
vi
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.1.1 Lexicographic Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.1.2 Random Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.1.3 Price of Deception’s Response to Indifference . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1.4 Serial Dictatorship and Aversion to Lying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.3 The Price of Deception with Lexicographic Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.1 [0, 1] Max Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.3.2 [δ, 1] Max Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3.3 [0, 1] Min Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.4 [δ, 1] Min Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.3.5 Integral Max Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.3.6 Integral Min Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4 The Price of Deception with Random Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.1 [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.4.2 [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.4.3 Integral Max Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.4.4 Integral Min Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Chapter 4: Price of Deception in Spatial Voting and Facility Location . . . . . . 66
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1.1 Facility Location in R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.1.2 Facility Location in Rk for k ≥ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vii
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 Strategic Facility Location Without Refinement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Prices of Deception for Facility Location Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.1 1-Median Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.2 1-Mean Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4.3 Minimizing L2 Norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Chapter 5: Price of Deception in Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1.1 Lexicographic Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1.2 Random Tie-Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.3 Strategic Voting Equilibria without Minimal Dishonesty . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.3.1 Dynamic Cournot Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3.2 Minimally Dishonest Voting and the Price of Deception . . . . . . . 112
5.4 Prices of Deception for Voting Rules with Lexicographic-Tie Breaking . . . 114
5.4.1 Dictatorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.2 Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.4.3 Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.4.4 Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.4.5 Majority Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.4.6 α-Copeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.4.7 Plurality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
viii
5.5 Prices of Deception for Voting Rules with Random-Tie Breaking . . . . . . 127
5.5.1 Valuation of Risk and the Price of Deception . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5.2 Random Dictator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.5.3 Veto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5.4 Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5.5 Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.5.6 Majority Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5.7 α-Copeland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.5.8 Plurality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.6 Additional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.6.1 Borda Count . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Chapter 6: Strategic Stable Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
6.1.1 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms . . 151
6.1.2 Extensions to Student Placement and College Admissions . . . . . 152
6.1.3 Other Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.1.4 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
6.3 Equilibria of the Strategic Stable Marriage Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
6.3.1 Minimal Dishonesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.4 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms . . . . . . 180
6.4.1 Gale-Shapley Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
ix
6.4.2 Never-One-Sided Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.5.1 College Admissions Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.5.2 Truth-Tellers and the Student Placement Problem . . . . . . . . . . 188
6.5.3 Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
6.5.4 Locally Minimal Dishonesty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.6 Additional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.6.1 Equilibria of the Strategic Stable Marriage Game . . . . . . . . . . 193
6.6.2 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms . . 197
6.6.3 Truth-Tellers and the Student Assignment Problem . . . . . . . . . 201
x
LIST OF TABLES
3.1 Price of Deceptions for Various Assignment Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Prices of Deception of the Facility Location Problem in R. . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2 Prices of Deception of the Facility Location Problem in Rk for k ≥ 2. . . . 70
5.1 Prices of Deception for Various Voting Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.2 Prices of Deception May Vary Depending on how Ties are Broken.
∗ Assumes Society is Risk-Neutral. † Denotes Normalized Price of Decep-
tion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6.1 Set of Stable Marriages With Respect to Π1 and Π2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
xi
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 Augmenting Cycles for Case 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Augmenting Cycles for Case 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3 Cycle for Case 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Augmenting Cycle for Case 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Cycle for Case 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6 Augmenting Cycle for Case 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.7 Augmenting Cycle for Case 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.1 Sincere Preferences for Example 4.2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Putative Preferences for Example 4.2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.3 Individuals’ Sincere Locations for Example 4.4.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.4 First Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2. . . . . . . 77
4.5 Second Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2. . . . . . 77
4.6 Third Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2. . . . . . . 78
4.7 Determining a Best Response is not Separable in the 1-Median Problem. . . 87
4.8 Preferences Showing the Price of Deception is∞ for the λ-1-Median Prob-
lem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.9 Preferences Showing the Price of Deception is∞ for the 1-Median Problem
with Random Tie-Breaking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
xii
4.10 Preferences for Theorem 4.4.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.11 Possible Locations for r([Π̄−2, π̄′2]) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.12 Voters’ Sincere Locations and Some Limiting Directions for Example 4.4.23. 94
xiii
SUMMARY
Most social choice algorithms rely on private data from individuals to maximize a social
utility. However, many algorithms are manipulable – an individual can manipulate her
reported data to obtain an outcome she prefers often at the cost of social good. Literature
addresses this by declaring an algorithm as “manipulable” or “strategy-proof”. However,
for many decisions we are forced to either use a manipulable algorithm or an algorithm with
negative properties; for instance, a dictatorship is the only strategy-proof way to decide an
election. Thus, we view it as unwise to take an all-or-nothing approach to manipulation
since we so often have to settle for nothing.
In this dissertation, we focus on algorithmic design with strategic behavior in mind.
Specifically, we develop the framework to examine the effect of manipulation on social
choice using a game theoretic model. We show that the standard Nash equlibria solution
concept is insufficient to capture human behavior as it relates to deception. The combi-
natorial nature of many problems results in Nash equilibria where individuals are lying to
their own detriment. To remove these absurd equilibria and better capture human behavior,
we introduce the Minimal Dishonesty refinement. In our model each individual tells the
smallest possible lie to obtain the best possible result and therefore if the individual tries
to be more honest then they will get a worse outcome. Our model for human behavior is
supported by a vast amount of experimental evidence in psychology and economics and
allows us to better understand the likely outcomes of strategic behavior.
We also introduce a measure of manipulation – the Price of Deception – that quanti-
fies the impact of strategic behavior. Specifically, the Price of Deception is the worst-case
ratio between the social utility when each individual is sincere, and the social utility at a
Nash equilibrium. With Minimal Dishonesty and the Price of Deception we are able to
identify algorithms that are negligibly impacted by manipulation, algorithms where strate-
gic behavior leads to arbitrarily poor outcomes, and anything in-between. We demonstrate
xiv
the power of Minimal Dishonesty and the Price of Deception by answering open problems
in assignments, facility location, elections, and stable marriages including a 28-year open
problem by Gusfield and Irving. Our results demonstrate that the Price of Deception, like
computational complexity, provides finer distinctions of manipulability than between “yes”
and “no”.
Assignments: We calculate the Price of Deception of various assignment procedures.
We show that manipulation has significantly different impacts on different procedures. We
find the Price of Deception tends to be larger when minimizing social costs than when max-
imizing social welfare – manipulation has a larger impact on minimization problems. We
also find that the Price of Deception is significantly lower when ties are broken randomly.
This indicates that even a small change to a decision mechanism, such as a tie-breaking
rule, can have a large effect on the impact of manipulation.
Facility Location: We calculate the Price of Deception for standard facility location
algorithms, including 1-Median and 1-Mean, and find significant differences among them.
We also find that the Price of Deception can increase significantly as the structure of al-
lowed facility locations deviates from a hyper-rectangle. Although some algorithms have
high Prices of Deception, we do give a family of fair tie-breaking rules for the 1-Median
Problem for which the Price of Deception is as low as possible – the algorithm remains
manipulable, but manipulation has no impact on social utility.
Elections: We calculate the Price of Deception for several standard voting rules, in-
cluding Borda count, Copeland, veto, plurality, and approval voting, and find significant
differences among them. In general, the more information a voting rule requires, the higher
its Price of Deception. However, plurality voting has the largest Price of Deception despite
using little information. Furthermore, we observe that tie-breaking rules in an election can
have a significant impact on the Price of Deception. For instance, breaking ties randomly
with Majority Judgment leads to better outcomes than lexicographic tie-breaking whereas
lexicographic tie-breaking is better for plurality elections.
xv
Stable Marriage: We show that for all marriage algorithms representable by a mono-
tonic and INS function, every minimally dishonest equilibrium yields a sincerely stable
marriage. This result supports the use of algorithms less biased than the (Gale-Shapley)
man-optimal, which we prove yields the woman-optimal marriage in every minimally dis-
honest equilibrium. However, bias cannot be totally eliminated, in the sense that no mono-
tonic INS-representable stable marriage algorithm is certain to yield the egalitarian mar-
riage in a minimally dishonest equilibrium, thus answering a 28-year old open question of
Gusfield and Irving’s in the negative. Finally, we show that these results extend to the Stu-
dent Placement Problem, where women are polygamous and honest, but not to the College
Admissions Problem, where women are both polygamous and strategic. Specifically, we




In this thesis we examine the impact of manipulation in the assignment problem, facility
location procedures, election schemes and stable marriage mechanisms. We make signif-
icant contributions to each of these areas and highlight them more in Section 1.3. More
importantly however, we establish the necessary framework to understand the impact of
manipulation for any algorithm that relies on private information. Specifically, we in-
troduce a model of manipulation to represent human behavior that we justify inuitively,
theoretically, and experimentally in Section 2.3. We introduce a measure, the Price of De-
ception, that quantifies, not categorizes, the effect of manipulation. Our studies of the four
aforementioned areas demonstrate the power of the measure to understand the impact of
manipulation for any algorithm. The methods we present in this dissertation can readily be
extended to any decision problem that relies on private information including allocating a
limited capacity of goods within a network, truck-load sharing, and scheduling based on
consumer constraints.
1.1 The Price of Deception: A Finer Measure of Manipulability
The literature on strategic behavior in algorithmic design primarily labels algorithms as
“manipulable” or “strategy-proof”. Yet we know that strategy-proofness is often unob-
tainable: Zhou [69] tells us that no symmetric, pareto optimal assignment procedure is
strategy-proof; The Gibbard-Satterthwaite [28, 65], Gardenfors [27] and related theorems
tell us that every election rule that one would consider to be reasonable is manipulable
by a strategic voter; Roth [60] tells us any matching algorithm that guarantees stability is
also manipuable. Therefore, we always sacrifice non-manipulability in lieu of other prop-
erties. But is it wise to take such an all-or-nothing position with respect to manipulability,
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especially since we almost always settle for nothing?
We introduce a measure of how much strategic behavior can alter the outcome of an
algorithm. We call this measure the Price of Deception. For example, let the sincere
Borda count of a candidate in a strategic Borda election be his Borda count with respect to
the sincere voter preferences. Let a sincere Borda winner be a candidate with largest sincere
Borda count, i.e. a candidate who would win were all voters non-strategic. Suppose that
the sincere Borda count of a sincere Borda winner could not be more than twice the sincere
Borda count of the winner of a strategic Borda election. Then the Price of Deception of
Borda voting would be at most 2. As another example, suppose that approval voting had
an infinitely large Price of Deception. Then it might be that a candidate sincerely approved
by the fewest voters could win an approval vote election when voters are strategic.
We propose that the Price of Deception should be one of the criteria by which an algo-
rithm is assessed. In general, any algorithm can be represented as a maximizer of some util-
ity function. If the utility function has an intrinsic correspondence to the quality of the out-
come, then the Price of Deception has a correspondence to the capability of an algorithm’s
ability to select a quality outcome. Like the computational complexity of manipulation [9,
48] the Price of Deception offers finer distinctions than simply between “manipulable” and
“non-manipulable.”
1.2 Minimal Dishonesty
The standard complete-normal form game and the Nash equilibrium solution concept [24]
used to analyze games give absurd outcomes for “Games of Deception” for combinatorial
problems. For instance, consider a majority election betweenA andB where all individuals
sincerely prefer A to B. Suppose instead that everyone indicates they prefer to B to A.
Since the election is decided by majority, no single individual could alter their submitted
preferences to change the outcome of the election. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium solution
concept labels this as possible outcome despite its obvious absurdity.
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In Section 2.3, we introduce our refinement. We assume that individuals are minimally
dishonest – individuals will be dishonest enough to obtain a better result but will not be
more dishonest than necessary. We provide logical reasons for minimal dishonesty; lying
causes guilt and it is cognitively easier to be somewhat truthful than it is to lie spuriously.
We prove (Theorem 2.3.3) that our minimal dishonesty refinement is consistent with the
current literature’s assumptions regarding strategy-proof algorithms. Most importantly, we
show that our model to explain human behavior is backed by a myriad of evidence in
psychology and experimental economics.
Re-examine the majority election where everyone sincerely prefersA toB but indicates
that they preferB toA. As mentioned, the Nash equilibrium solution concept indicates that
this is a possible outcome despite its absurdity. Once we apply the minimal dishonesty re-
finement, the result changes; if any individual tries to alter their preferences and instead
honestly report they prefer A to B, then the outcome of the election will not change but
the individual will be more honest. Therefore the individual is not minimally dishonest
and we do not consider everyone voting B a reasonable outcome. For this particular exam-
ple, everyone honestly reporting that they prefer A to B in the only minimally dishonest
equilibrium which is precisely what we would expect.
Our model of minimal dishonesty allows us to make significant strides in understanding
the effects of manipulation in assignment problems, facility location procedures, election
schemes and stable marriage mechanisms as highlighted in the next section. Moreover,
minimal dishonesty establishes the necessary framework to understand the impact of ma-
nipulation in algorithms that rely on private information.
1.3 Contributions of this Thesis
The most important contribution of this thesis is the Price of Deception measure of the
impact of manipulation and the minimal dishonesty model to represent strategic behav-
ior. We demonstrate the power of these two concepts by making significant progress in
3
understanding the effect of manipulation in various settings.
In Chapter 3 we examine the Assignment Problem and find that algorithms that min-
imize social cost are more heavily impacted by manipulation (they have higher Prices of
Deception) than algorithms that maximize social welfare. Moreover, we establish that
small changes to an algorithm can have significant effects on the impact of manipulation –
on the Price of Deception. We find that a randomized tie-breaking rule in this settings has
a significantly lower Price of Deception than a deterministic tie-breaking rule.
However, when examining the Facility Location Problem in Chapter 4 we establish that
deterministic tie-breaking rules yield good societal outcomes despite manipulation while
randomized tie-breaking can lead to poor outcomes. Something as seemingly minor as a
tie-breaking rule can have a significant impact on the effect of manipulation and that effect
can be drastically different in different problem settings. In addition, we give a determin-
istic and fair variant of the 1-Median Problem that is not strategy-proof but manipulation
has no impact on social utility; strategic behavior may cause the outcome of the algorithm
to change but the quality of the outcome is unaffected by manipulation.
In Chapter 5 when studying election schemes we again observe that randomized and
deterministic tie-breaking rules yield different Prices of Deception. Moreover, for some
election schemes randomized tie-breaking is better than lexicographic and in other schemes
lexicographic tie-breaking is better. We prove this by determining the Price of Deception
for an array of popular voting schemes. Typically, the more information a voter provides
to the algorithm the higher the Price the Deception – the more strategic behavior impacts
the quality of the outcome. This seems intuitive as more information gives a voter more
opportunities to manipulate the system. However, it is not a universal truth; Plurality elec-
tions have the largest Price of Deception despite voters only providing a single piece of
information to the algorithm – their most preferred candidate.
Chapters 3-5 prove that the Price of Deception is able to discriminate between different
algorithms based on the impact of strategic behavior. Our results show that the impact of
4
manipulation varies greatly between algorithms and is sensitive to small changes such as a
tie-breaking rule. Moreover, we show that the effect of these sensitivities can vary drasti-
cally depending on the setting. The Price of Deception captures this behavior. Therefore
we propose that the Price of Deception, like computational complexity of manipulation,
should be one of the criteria used to access an algorithm.
Finally in Chapter 6, we study the Stable Marriage Problem. Using the minimal dis-
honesty solution concept, we answer a 28-year open problem by Gusfield and Irving by
showing that every reasonable stable marriage algorithm will guarantee stability even when
individuals are strategic. We also extend these results to the Student Placement Problem.
This result supports the use of less biased algorithms than the (Gale-Shapley) man-optimal
algorithm, the only algorithm currently known to guarantee stability when individuals are
strategic. Moreover we show that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is biased because it guar-
antees the best solution for women and the worst solution for men when individuals are
strategic. However, we also show that no reasonable algorithm can guarantee the fairest




2.1 The Game of Deception in Social Choice
In this chapter, we introduce the necessary definitions and solution concepts that will be
used throughout this dissertation. Each subsequent chapter addresses Games of Deception
where a central decision mechanism (algorithm, procedure, or rule) makes a social choice
(selects a winning candidate, allocates items, etc.) after receiving information (preferences
over candidates, valuations for items, etc.) from each individual (voter, bidder, etc.). Our
central decision mechanisms tend to have nice properties; we may guarantee an “equitable”
allocation, or a “stable” marriage, or a “facility location” that maximizes social utility.
However, to guarantee such properties we often must assume that individuals truthfully
reveal their information. We introduce many of the necessary concepts for this dissertation
in the context of the Fair Division Problem.
Definition 2.1.1. The Fair Division Problem consists of n individuals and m divisible
goods where individual i has an integer value of πij ∈ [0, cm] for item j. The integer
value c is a parameter of the Fair Division Problem. Furthermore,
∑m
j=1 πij = cm for each
individual i. A central decision maker in the Fair Division Problem assigns xij of item j to
individual i where
∑n
i=1 xij = 1.
The set of feasible allocations in the Fair Division Problem is a polytope. Specifically,
an allocation is feasible if it satisfies the following linear constraints:
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, ...,m (2.1)
xij ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, ...,m ∀i = 1, ..., n (2.2)
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Therefore if the central decision maker maximizes a concave utility function to deter-
mine the division of goods, then an allocation can be found quickly.
Example 2.1.2. Maximizing the Minimum Utility in Fair Division.
In this example, we have a decision maker who seeks to maximize the minimum utility for each
individual. Let c = 40, n = 2 and m = 3. Individual i assigns item j a value πij ∈ [0, cm] =
[0, 120]. Furthermore, for each i, the sum of πij is cm = 120. Individuals’ values for the items are
given by Π below.
(Π)
π11 = 50 π12 = 50 π13 = 20 (2.3)
π21 = 10 π22 = 10 π23 = 100 (2.4)
If we assign Xi = {xi1, xi2, ..., xim} to individual i, then individual i receives a utility of∑m










πijxij ≥ z ∀i = 1, ..., n (2.6)
n∑
i=1
xij ≤ 1 ∀j = 1, ...,m (2.7)
xij ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, ...,m ∀i = 1, ..., n (2.8)
Thus, to maximize the minimum of each individuals’ utility, the central decision maker selects
the assignment x11 = x12 = x23 = 1 assigning items 1 and 2 to individual 1 and item 3 to
individual 2. With this assignment, each individual receives a utility of 100.
Each chapter addresses specific Games of Deception. In each game each individual
player has information, usually consisting of preference data. Ideally, individual i truth-
fully reveals their information πi to the centralized decision mechanism. If the mechanism
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selects an outcome deterministically, the central mechanism selects some outcome r(Π)
and individual i’s utility ui(πi, r(Π)) depends on the selected outcome.
In the Fair Division Problem individual i’s preferences are given by πi = (πi1, πi2, ..., πim).
The central decision mechanism assigns xij of item j in individual i. Therefore the out-
come is given by X = r(Π) according to (2.5)-(2.8) and individual i’s utility is given by
ui(πi, r(Π)) = πi ·Xi.
If individuals truthfully report Π to the central decision mechanism, then we can often
guarantee desirable properties. For instance, when maximizing the minimum utility in the
Fair Division Problem, the Maximin Problem guarantees a solution that Pareto dominates
all equitable outcomes. Furthermore if πij > 0 for all i and j, then the outcome is equitable.
Definition 2.1.3. An outcome r is equitable if ui(πi, r) = uj(πj, r) for each i and j.
However, these guarantees rely on the assumption of honesty. Regrettably, honesty is
not a realistic assumption.
Example 2.1.4. Individuals can have an incentive to be dishonest.
We continue Example 2.1.2. If each individual truthfully reveals their preferences as given in Π
in Example 2.1.2, then individual 1 will be assigned items 1 and 2 and individual 2 will be assigned
item 3. Furthermore, the allocation is equitable as each person has utility 100. However, individual
1 can get a strictly better outcome.
(Π̄)
π̄11 = 20 π̄12 = 20 π̄13 = 80 (2.9)
π̄21 = π21 = 10 π̄22 = π22 = 10 π̄23 = π23 = 100 (2.10)
If individual 1 alters her submitted preferences according to Π̄, then the outcome changes. Us-
ing the linear program described by Equations 2.5-2.8, we determine that individual 1 still receives
all of item 1 and item 2, but now also receives 13 of item 3. With respect to the putative preferences
Π̄, each individual receives a utility of 2003 ≈ 67 and the central decision maker believes that it has
selected an equitable outcome. However, with respect to the sincere preferences Π, individual 1 re-
ceives a utility of 50+50+ 203 =
320




Since individual 1 receives a utility of 107 > 100, individual 1 has incentive to misrepresent her
preferences.
Example 2.1.4 not only shows individuals may have incentive to lie, it highlights the
disturbing possibility that we cannot guarantee desirable properties when individuals be-
have strategically. As discussed in Section 1.1, existing literature acknowledges that mech-
anisms can be manipulable. However, much of the literature focuses on simply labeling a
mechanism as “manipulable” or “strategy-proof”. We have already described the pitfalls
of such labels in Section 1.1. Instead, in this dissertation we will focus on the outcomes
obtained when individuals behave strategically by using game theoretic techniques to ana-
lyze Games of Deception. We generalize the earlier notation to allow for games that select
outcomes randomly.
The Game of Deception G(N,P ,Π, r, u,Ω, µ)
• Each individual i has information πi ∈ Pi describing their preferences. The collec-
tion of all information is the (sincere) profile Π = {πi}ni=1 where |N | = n.
• To play the game, individual i submits putative preference data π̄i ∈ Pi. The collec-
tion of all submitted data is denoted Π̄ = {π̄i}ni=1.
• It is common knowledge that a central decision mechanism will select outcome
r(Π̄, ω) when given input Π̄ and random event ω.
• The random event ω ∈ Ω is selected according to µ. We denote r(Π̄) as the distribu-
tion of outcomes according to Ω and µ.
• Individual i evaluates r(Π̄) according to i’s sincere preferences πi. Specifically, in-
dividual i’s utility of the set of outcomes r(Π̄) is ui(πi, r(Π̄)).
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If the decision mechanism always selects the outcome deterministically, then we sim-
ply refer to the Game of Deception as G(N,P ,Π, r, u). In many settings, u is either equal
to Π or can be deduced from Π and the game can be further reduced to G(N,P ,Π, r).
For instance, in an election voter v’s preferences πv typically are an ordering of the candi-
dates. In this case, v prefers candidate A to candidate B (with respect to πv) if and only if
uv(πv, A) > uv(πv, B). In the Fair Division setting, an individual i’s information is pre-
cisely their values for each object (i.e. i’s utility of the allocationXi is ui(πi, Xi) = πi ·Xi).
We remark that ui is not necessarily unique and may be an uncountably large set of data.
Since individual i submits πi and not ui to the central decision mechanism, the complexity
of ui is irrelevant when computing the social outcome r(Π). The utility ui is a parameter
of a game used to determine the information π̄i that individual i is likely to submit. The
complexity of ui does not impede our ability to predict ui when we assume some properties
of the individual utility functions. For instance, in the Facility Location Problem where
individual i submits a preferred location πi, we assume i has a utility of ui(πi, x) = ||πi −
x||pi of the facilty location x for some pi ∈ (0,∞).
While there are many ways to analyze games, in this dissertation we focus on the most
common approach – the Nash equilibrium solution concept for normal-form games under
complete information [24].
Definition 2.1.5. The preference profile [Π̄−i, π̄′i] if obtained from Π̄ by replacing π̄i with
π̄′i.
Definition 2.1.6. The preference profile Π̄ ∈ P is a Nash equilibrium forG(n,P ,Π, r, u,Ω, µ)
if ui(πi, r(Π̄)) ≥ ui(πi, r([Π̄−i, π̄′i])) for each individual i and π̄′i ∈ Pi.
Example 2.1.7. A Nash Equilibrium of the Fair Division Game
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We continue Examples 2.1.2 and 2.1.4. The sincere preference profile Π is given again below.
π1 = (50, 50, 20) (2.11)
π2 = (10, 10, 100) (2.12)
Recall from Example 2.1.2, that if everyone is honest then the assignment r(Π) gives all of items
1 and 2 to individual 1 and gives item 3 to individual 2.
Example 2.1.2 shows that individual 1 has incentive to lie by updating her preference list to
π̄1 = (20, 20, 80) and therefore Π is not a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore the preferences given in
Example 2.1.4 are not a Nash equilibrium since individual 2 could obtain a strictly better result by
submitting π̄′2 = (19, 19, 82). With respect to the new preferences, the assignment gives all of items
1 and 2 and 42162 of item 3 to player 1 and
120
162 of item 3 to individual 2.
We now might ask if {π̄1, π̄′2} forms a Nash equilibrium. The answer depends on how the
decision mechanism breaks ties. If individual 2 instead submits π̄2 = (20, 20, 80) there are a
variety of optimal allocations with respect to the sincere preferences. For this example, we assume
the decision mechanism break ties by assigning the lowest indexed individual the most of the lowest
indexed good as possible (i.e. decision mechanism prioritizes assigning item 1 to individual 1, then
item 2 to individual 1,..., then item 1 to individual 2,..., item m to individual 2,..., item m to individual
n). Therefore if both individuals submit (20, 20, 80) then individual 1 is assigned items 1 and 2 and
1
4 of item 3.
With this tie breaking rule, Π̄ = {π̄1, π̄2} is a Nash equilibrium. We begin by showing that
individual 1 cannot obtain an better outcome. Let (a, b, c) denote any allocation where individual
1 is assigned a, b, and c of items 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Individual 2 then receives 1 − a, 1 − b,





an allocation where both individuals receive a utility of cmn = 60 implying that individual 2 must
receive a utility of at least 60 with respect to π̄2 if (a, b, c) is the result of the decision mechanism.
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Therefore we know that
π̄21 · (1− a) + π̄22 · (1− b) + π̄23 · (1− c) ≥ 60 (2.13)
⇒ 20a+ 20b+ 80c ≤ 60 (2.14)
⇒ 5a+ 5b+ 20c ≤ 15 (2.15)
for any allocation (a, b, c) assigned when π̄2 is submitted. Suppose individual 1 alters her prefer-
ences to get a different outcome (a, b, c). We know that a and b are at most 1 implying 45a ≤ 45
and 45b ≤ 45. Combining these two inequalities with (2.15) we have
π1 · (a, b, c) = 50a+ 50b+ 20c ≤ 105 (2.16)
implying that no matter how individual 1 alters her preferences she will not receive a utility more
than 105. When she submits π̄1 = (20, 20, 80) then she receives a utility of π1 · (1, 1, 14) =
(50, 50, 20) · (1, 1, 14) = 105 and therefore π̄1 is a best response. Therefore individual 1 cannot
alter her preferences to get a better outcome.
Similarly, we show that individual 2 is reporting a best response with the inequalities 54(20a+
20b+ 80c) ≤ 5460, −15a ≤ 0, and −15b ≤ 0, to get π1 · (a, b, c) = 10a+ 10b+ 100c ≤ 75. This
implies that individual 2 can obtain a utility of at most 75, which is precisely the value he gets when
submitting π̄2. Therefore Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 The Price of Deception
A centralized mechanism makes a decision that optimizes a measure of societal benefit
based on private information submitted by individuals. However, the individuals have their
own valuations of each possible decision. Therefore, there is a Game of Deception in which
they provide possibly untruthful information, and experience outcomes in accordance with
their own true valuations of the centralized decision that is made based on the information
they provide. As a result of this game, social benefit may decrease. The Price of Deception
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is the worst-case ratio between the optimum possible overall benefit and the expected over-
all benefit resulting from a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. If the mechanism
minimizes a societal cost the Price of Deception is defined as the reciprocal of that ratio, so
that its value is always at least 1.
We remark that the revelation principle [49, 50] is irrelevant to the Price of Deception.
This is because revelation elicits sincere information only by yielding the same outcome
that strategic information would yield. The revelation principle can be a powerful tool for
analyzing outcomes. But for our purposes, the elicitation of sincere preference information
is not an end in itself.
The Price of Deception is similar to a concept known in the computer science commu-
nity as the “Price of Anarchy” [62]. However, the two concepts are not equivalent. The
Price of Anarchy measures the difference between the social values of an optimal solution
selected by a central coordinator and an equilibrium solution when all agents act selfishly.
As we discuss in Section 2.4, one can view the Price of Deception as a Price of Anarchy
only by assuming that a central coordinator can force individuals to be truthful, thus negat-
ing the existence of private information. Also, the term “anarchy” is a singularly inapt
descriptor of a democratic process. Although the Price of Deception is not a type of Price
of Anarchy, the converse turns out to be true. In Section 2.4 we show that, in a formal
sense, one can view any Price of Anarchy as a Price of Deception. We proceed to the
formal definition of Price of Deception.
Every Game of Deception, G(N,P ,Π, r, u,Ω, µ), can be modeled such that r is the
maximizer of some social utility function U while respecting some constraints. For in-
stance, in Examples 2.1.2-2.3.1,








xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ [m]
}
(2.17)
Therefore a social utility that represents the mechanism isU(Π̄, X) = mini∈[n] ui(π̄i, X).
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In the earlier examples, we established that r(Π) is not always the same as r(Π̄) even when
Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore there is a disquieting possibility that U(Π, r(Π̄)) <
U(Π, r(Π) and social utility may decrease when individuals act strategically. The majority
of this dissertation focuses on quantifying how much manipulation impacts social utility.
Notably, another social utility that represents the mechanism is
U ′(Π̄, X) =

1 if X ∈ r(Π̄)
0 otherwise
(2.18)
With respect to the definition of U ′, manipulation impacts social utility if and only if the
outcome changes. Any analysis using U ′ is equivalent to simply labeling a system as ma-
nipulable or strategy-proof. Therefore, to describe how much manipulation impacts social
utility, it is important we work with a social utility that has a meaningful interpretation.
Fortunately, many mechanisms either have a well defined social utility function given by
the literature or are naturally defined by their social utilities.
Definition 2.2.1. For the Game of Deception G(N,P ,Π, r, u,Ω, µ) the set of Nash equi-
libria for the sincere preference Π is NE(Π) ⊆ P .
When analyzing a specific mechanism, ideally NE(Π) = Π or at least r(Π) = r(Π̄)
for all Π̄ ∈ NE(Π) and manipulation does not impact the social outcome. However, this
is often not the case. Next, we would hope that the social utility does not change (i.e.
U(Π, r(Π)) = U(Π, r(Π̄)) for all Π̄ ∈ NE(Π)). But in this dissertation we find very few
mechanisms where this is true. Thus we are left hoping that U(Π, r(Π̄)) is at least close to
U(Π, r(Π)).
Definition 2.2.2. Given an instance of preferences Π, the Price of Deception of the game
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is the expected utility of r(Π̄) given Ω and µ. By definition,
U(Π, x) = U(Π, y) for all x, y ∈ r(Π) and therefore we simply write U(Π, r(Π)) for
the numerator.
If the Price of Deception of an instance is 100, then manipulation can cause the social
utility to decrease by a factor of 100. But if the Price of Deception is 2, then the social
utility of the Nash equilibrium is always within a factor of 2 of the social utility when
everyone is honest. If the Price of Deception is 1 then manipulation does not negatively
impact social utility! If the mechanism uses costs instead of utilities, then we define the
Price of Deception using the reciprocal of (2.19).
Example 2.2.3. The Price of Deception for Two Instances of the Fair Division Problem.
We continue with the Fair Division Problem using U(Π̄, X) = mini∈[n] ui(π̄i, X) while break-
ing ties lexicographically as in Example 2.3.1. For the first instance, individuals’ utilities given by
Pi below.
π11 = 50 π12 = 50 (2.20)
π21 = 0 π22 = 100 (2.21)
If both individuals are honest, then individual 1 receives all of item 1 and 13 of item 2 while
individual 2 receives all of item 2. Both individuals would receive a utility of 2003 ≈ 66.7.
Computing the Price of Deception for this instance now requires finding a tight lower bound
l on the social utility of an equilibrium. This requires (i) a proof that the social utility cannot be
below l and (ii) an example (or family of examples) to show the bound is tight (asymptotically tight).
We begin with (i).
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A feasible allocation for this problem is xij = 1n for all i = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m. Further-








n . Since the
mechanism maximizes the minimum utility, if an individual is honest then they must receive a utility
of at least cmn . In this example, c = 50, m = 2 and n = 2 implying each individual most receive a
utility of at least 50 in every Nash equilibrium. Therefore the Price of Deception for this instance is
at most 200/350 =
4
3 .
Next, we must produce an example showing this bound is tight (ii). Consider the submitted
preferences Π̄ below.
π̄11 = 0 π̄12 = 100 (2.22)
π̄21 = 0 π̄22 = 100 (2.23)
These submitted preferences correspond to a Nash equilibrium. With these submitted prefer-
ences, individual 1 receives all of item 1 and half of item 2. Therefore with respect to the sincere
preferences, individual 1 receives a utility of 75 while individual 2 only has a utility of 50. Fur-
thermore if individual 1 increases their submitted preference for item 1, then they still receive all
of item 1 but less of item 2. Similarly, if individual 2 increases their submitted preference for item
1, then they receive all of item 1 and less of item 2. Therefore, for both individuals, altering their
preferences results in a worse solution and therefore the preference profile in Table Π̄ is a Nash





3 . Combined with the previous bound, we conclude the Price of Deception of this
instance is 43 – it is possible that manipulation causes the social utility to decrease by a factor of
4
3 ≈ 1.33.
We also consider a second set of sincere preferences given in the Π′ below. With respect to
these preferences, individual 1 is assigned all of item 1 and 16 of item 2. Both individuals receive
a utility of 2503 ≈ 83.33. Similar to the first instance, the preferences given by Π̄ above are a
Nash equilibrium with social utility of 50 (with respect to the sincere preferences). As before, at
every Nash equilibrium every individual must have a utility of at least 50 and therefore the Price of
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π′11 = 80 π
′
12 = 20 (2.24)
π21 = 0 π22 = 100 (2.25)
In Example 2.2.3, we see that the Price of Deception of an instance can vary for differ-
ent sincere preference profiles. As mechanism designers, we only see individuals submitted
preferences. Therefore, if individuals submit the preferences given by Π̄, we cannot deter-
mine if their sincere preferences are given by Π or Π′ or something else and we cannot
conclude how close we are to the intended result. However, we can bound the Price of
Deception of an instance by conducting a worse-case analysis over all sincere preference
profiles.















where the expectation is taken with respect to Ω and µ.
If the mechanism uses costs instead of utilities, then we define the Price of Deception
using the reciprocal of (2.26).
Theorem 2.2.5. The Price of Deception for the Fair Division Problem with n individuals





→ n as c→
∞ and n.
For small c The Price of Deception may be slightly less than n. However, as c grows
large the problem approaches the continuous version of the Fair Division Problem and the
Price of Deception grows slightly. Fortunately the Price of Deception is bounded by n
instead of going to∞.
17
Proof of Theorem 2.2.5. As with Example 2.2.3, we must (i) show that the Price of Decep-











and (ii) the Price of Deception is at most n (i.e. for every sincere Π ∈ P and every Nash
equilibrium Π̄ ∈ NE(Π), the utility of r(Π) is at most n times more than the utility of
r(Π̄).





sincere preferences below with m = n objects where person i most prefers object i:
πii = cn− 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n− 1 (2.27)
πin = 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n− 1 (2.28)
πnn = cn (2.29)
πij = 0 ∀ other i, j (2.30)
It may also be easier to consider the preferences in the form
Π =

cn− 1 0 ... 0 1
0 cn− 1 ... 0 1
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 ... cn− 1 1
0 0 ... 0 cn

(2.31)
When individual i is assigned object i then everyone receives utility of at least cn − 1.
The optimal choice is to give all of object i and 1
1+cn(n−1) of object n to individual i for
i ≤ n−1, and 1− n−1
1+cn(n−1) of object n to individual n for a social utility of U(Π, r(Π)) =
18
cn− 1 + 1
1+cn(n−1) . The following putative preferences are a Nash equilibrium for Π:
π̄ii = 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n− 1 (2.32)
π̄in = cn− 1 ∀i = 1, ..., n− 1 (2.33)
π̄n1 = 1 (2.34)
π̄nn = cn− 1 (2.35)




1 0 ... 0 cn− 1
0 1 ... 0 cn− 1
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 ... 1 cn− 1
1 0 ... 0 cn− 1

(2.37)
With respect to these preferences, since ties are broken lexicographically individual i















of object n. With respect to the sincere preferences Π, individual





for i ≤ n−1 – slightly
more than the cn−1+ 1
1+cn(n−1) received when everyone was honest – and individual n has a
sincere utility of only un(πn, r(Π̄)) = c+ cn−ccn−1 – significantly less than the cn−1+
1
1+cn(n−1)
received when everyone was honest. The social utility of this outcome with respect to the
sincere preferences is U(Π, r(Π̄)) = c+ cn−c
cn−1 . If Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium, then the Price of










It remains to show that Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium. We first examine individual i 6= n.
Let π̄′i ∈ Pi a set of weights that i can submit. To determine that Π is a Nash equilibrium
we must show that ui(πi, r(Π̄)) ≥ ui(πi, r([Π̄−i, π̄′i])). Let π̄′i be such that individual i
gets a utility of at least ui(πi, r(Π̄)). We conclude π̄′ii ≥ 1 since otherwise individual 1 is
assigned item i (if i = 1 then individual n is assigned item 1) and this corresponds to a
strictly worse outcome for player i. Next we claim π̄′in ≥ cn − 1. If this is not the case,
then either π̄ii > 1 which results in i receiving all of i and less of item n, or π̄ij > 1 for
some j /∈ {i, n} and individual i receives item j and less of item n. Both outcomes are
worse than i and therefore π̄i = π̄′i. The argument to show that individual n is giving a best
response is similar implying Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
(ii) The Price of Deception of the Fair Division Problem is at most n: As in Exam-






. Therefore for every sincere profile Π and equilibrium Π̄ ∈ NE(Π),
U(Π, r(Π̄)) = mini∈N ui(πi, r(Π)) ≥ cmn . Furthermore, since an individual can receive a
utility of at most
∑m
j=1 vij = cm, the social utility of r(Π̄) is
U(Π, r(Π̄)) = min
i∈N
ui(πi, r(Π̄)) ≤ cm. (2.39)
















Anaylzing of “Games of Deception” is by no means novel [28, 65, 27, 64, 31, 53, 43,
13]. Yet the solution concept is neglected in many areas as researchers still simply label
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mechanisms as “manipulable” or “strategy-proof”. While we make no attempt to describe
the beliefs or intentions of other researchers, we believe there is a good reason to neglect
the Nash equilibrium solution concept as we have described it; the outcomes of Games of
Deception often make little sense.
Example 2.3.1. Games of Deception May Lead to Absurd Outcomes.
We continue with the Fair Division Problem. Once again we will maximize the minimum utility
with respect to the submitted preferences while breaking ties by assigning the lowest indexed indi-
vidual the most of the lowest indexed good as possible. Consider the sincere preference profile Π
given by Π below.
π11 = 100 π12 = 0 (2.41)
π21 = 0 π22 = 100 (2.42)
As a decision maker, these are the best preferences we can possibly hope for. We can give each
individual everything they want! The optimal allocation gives item i to individual i with a utility
of 100. The sincere preference profile Π is even a Nash equilibrium. Regrettably, it is not the only
Nash equilibrium.
π̄11 = 0 π̄12 = 100 (2.43)
π̄21 = 0 π̄22 = 100 (2.44)
Given the submitted preference profile Π̄, the central decision mechanism assigns item 1 to
individual 1 and evenly splits item 2 between individuals 1 and 2. With respect to the submitted
preferences, the central decision mechanism believes that each individual obtains a utility of 50.
However, with respect to the sincere preferences, individual 1 has a utility of 100 and individual
2 has a utility of 50. Moreover, Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium since neither individual can alter their
preferences to get a strictly better outcome.
Nash equilibria are meant to describe or predict the outcome of events [24]. However,
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the outcome in Example 2.3.1 is absurd; individual 1 is lying spuriously. The absurdity
shown in Example 2.3.1 is fairly tame compared to the others we mention in this disserta-
tion. If individual 1’s sincere preferences were slightly different, then the lie observed in
2.3.1 makes sense; if π1 = (99, 1) then individual 1 lied to receive half of item 2 and all
of item 1 which would be a strict improvement for individual 1. Moreover, individual 1’s
lie is not self-detrimental even though it negatively impacts others. This is not true in all
settings.
Consider a majority election between two candidates A and B and suppose every in-
dividual prefers A to B. Then obviously A should win the election. However, the Nash
equilibrium solution concept tells us something different. If everyone lies and indicates
they prefer B to A, then B wins the election. Furthermore, since the election is determined
by majority rule, if any single individual alters their submitted preferences thenB still wins
the election. Therefore there is a Nash equilibrium where B wins the election.
We believe these absurd equilibria are the biggest obstacle to
understanding the effects of strategic behavior.
To overcome this obstacle, we introduce the minimal dishonesty refinement to the Game
of Deception.
Definition 2.3.2. Let the putative preferences Π̄ be a Nash equilibrium for the sincere
preferences Π in the Game of Deception G(N,P ,Π, r, u,Ω, µ). Player i is minimally
dishonest if ui(πi, r([Π̄−i, π̄′i])) < ui(πi, r(Π̄)) for each π̄
′
i ∈ Pi that is more consistent
with πi than π̄i. In other words, if player i is minimally dishonest, then being more honest
should yield a worse outcome for i. A Nash equilibrium Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash
equilibrium if each player is minimally dishonest.
We provide an intuitive definition of minimial dishonesty, show it is consistent with
the current literature and provide a large amount of experimental evidence backing our
refinement. If individual i can be more honest and get at least as good a result, then the
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individual would do so because lying causes guilt and because being somewhat truthful is
cognitively easier than lying spuriously. Thus, there is some “utility” associated with being
more honest. Therefore an individual is not minimally dishonest and is not acting in their
best interest. Hence, we view minimally dishonest Nash equilibria as the set of reasonable
outcomes in a Game of Deception.
The assumption of minimal dishonesty is also consistent with the current literature’s
assumptions of “strategy-proof” or “non-manipulable” mechanisms. Current literature as-
sumes that if a mechanism is strategy-proof then every individual will be honest. But to
be strategy-proof mechanism only requires that the sincere profile Π be at least one of the
Nash equilibria. It does not require Π to be the only Nash equilibrium. The set of Nash
equilibria predicts the outcome of events, yet the literature ignores all other equilibria when
the mechanism is strategy-proof. This is reasonable because it makes little sense for people
to lie when there is not an incentive to do so. Minimal dishonesty captures this behavior.
Furthermore, if individuals are minimally dishonest, then being honest is the only Nash
equilibrium for a strategy-proof mechanism.
Theorem 2.3.3. A mechanism is strategy proof if and only if the sincere profile Π is the
only minimally dishonest equilibrium for all Π ∈ P .
Proof. The second direction follows by definition; if Π is a minimally dishonest Nash
equilibrium then it is also a Nash equilibrium and therefore the mechanism is strategy-
proof.
For the first direction, since the mechanism is strategy-proof, Π is a Nash equilibrium
for Π. Certainly individual v is minimally dishonest since v is completely honest and Π
is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. Now we need to show there can be no other
minimally dishonest equilibria. Suppose Π̄ 6= Π is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium
and let v be such that π̄v 6= πv. Since the mechanism is strategy proof, individual gets at
least as good an outcome if they submit the more honest πv. Therefore Π̄ is not a minimally
dishonest Nash equilibrium and the theorem statement holds.
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We’ve argued that minimal dishonesty is logically intuitive and that it explains the as-
sumptions researchers make when using strategy-proof mechanisms. Most importantly,
our hypothesis is supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence from the experi-
mental economics and psychology literatures that people are averse to lying. Gneezy [29]
experimentally finds that people do not lie unless there is a benefit. Hurkens and Kartik
[32] perform additional experiments that confirm an aversion to lying, and show their and
Gneezy’s data to be consistent with the assumption that some people never lie and others
always lie if it is to their benefit. Charness and Dufwenberg [14] experimentally find an
aversion to lying and show that it is consistent with guilt avoidance. Battigalli [10] experi-
mentally find some contexts in which guilt is insufficient to explain aversion to deception.
Several papers report evidence of a “pure” i.e., context-independent, aversion to lying [42,
15, 29, 32] that is significant but not sufficient to fully explain experimental data.
The set of research results we have cited here is by no means exhaustive. Two additional
ones are of particular relevance to our concept of minimal dishonesty. Mazar et al. [46] find
that “people behave dishonestly enough to profit but honestly enough to delude themselves
of their own integrity.” Lundquist et al. [44] find that people have an aversion to lying
which increases with the size of the lie. Both of these studies support our hypothesis that
people will not lie more than is necessary to achieve a desirable outcome.
Some experimental evidence is less confirmatory of our hypothesis. Several studies,
beginning with [29], have found an aversion to lying if doing so would disbenefit someone
else substantially more than the benefit one would accrue.
2.4 The Price of Anarchy and The Price of Deception
Let us now elaborate on the differences between the Price of Deception and the Price of An-
archy. The latter measure was initially employed in [19] and then [8], later aptly named by
[40, 52], and now is widely employed in computer science. It is defined as the worst-case
ratio between the maximum overall benefit achievable by a theoretical centralized author-
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ity and the overall benefit that would be achieved if all agents behaved autonomously to
maximize their individual utilities. For example, each packet traversing the internet might
“selfishly” route itself to arrive as quickly as possible, slowed by other packets utilizing the
same communication links, but without regard for the overall performance of the internet
[63]. The overall internet performance with selfish autonomous packets would be com-
pared with the overall performance if a centralized authority routed each packet. Thus, the
Price of Anarchy measures the decrease in benefit motivated by differences among individ-
ual utility functions that is enabled by individual control of actions. The Price of Deception
is the decrease in benefit motivated by differences among individual utility functions that
is enabled by individual control of information. The submission of preference information
can be viewed as an action, but the Price of Deception cannot be viewed as a Price of Anar-
chy unless we deny the existence of private information, because the centralized authority
would have to know each voter’s sincere preferences. However, one can view a Price of
Anarchy as a Price of Deception through a valid transformation.
2.4.1 Games of Anarchy
A Game of Anarchy, GA(N,S, µ), consists of
N := a set of n players.
Si := the set of actions player i can commit.
S = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S1 × ...× Sn = S := set of actions committed by all players.
µi(S) := individual i’s value of S.
W (S) := society’s value for S.
Eq := set of S ′ ∈ S that form a Nash equilibrium.
In a Game of Anarchy, individual i decides to commit an action si ∈ Si. Individ-
ual i then receives a utility of µi(S) and society receives a utility of W (S). If instead a
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centralized coordinator controlled the actions of others, society would receive a utility of
maxS′∈SW (S
′). The set of equilibria Eq are the set of S ′ ∈ S where no individual i can
alter s′i in order to increase the value of µi(S
′). The Price of Anarchy is the worst case ratio
between the societal value obtained with a centralized coordinator and the societal value at








The Price of Anarchy naturally occurs when information is public but each individual
has control of his actions.
2.4.2 The Obstacle to Reducing Deception to Anarchy
The Price of Anarchy arises naturally in settings where information is public but control of
actions is determined in private whereas the Price of Deception arises naturally in settings
where information is private but control of actions is determined by the public. Concep-
tually, Price of Anarchy and Price of Deception are very different despite their similarity
of mathematical form. We now attempt to reduce the latter to the former. Given a de-
terministic Game of Deception , GD(N,P ,Π, r, u) one can define a Game of Anarchy
GA,Π(N,S, µ) that has the same set of equilibria. Let S ∈ P correspond to the action
of submitting information S to the decision mechanism. The set of all possible combi-
nations of information that the players can submit is S := P . Individual i’s utility is
µi(S) = ui(Π, r(S)) and society receives a utility of W (S) = U(Π, r(S)). If there were
a centralized coordinator that could control the information that each player submits, the
coordinator would force each player to be honest and society would receive a utility of









GA,Π(N,P , u(Π, ·))
)
(2.46)
However, this reduction only yields the Price of Deception of a decision mechanism for
a specific set of sincere preferences Π. To obtain the Price of Deception of the decision
mechanism, we would have to take the supremum of the Price of Anarchy of a family of
games of anarchy. This may be problematic, but it is not the primary obstacle blocking
the reduction of Price of Deception to Price of Anarchy. The primary obstacle is that the
transformation we have sketched from Price of Deception to Price of Anarchy violates the
premise of Price of Deception. The central coordinator required in the Game of Anarchy to
obtain an optimal outcome for society would have to force individuals to be honest, which
is impossible since a central coordinator would need access to private information to verify
that players are honest. Furthermore, there is still a central decision mechanism embedded
in the individual’s utility functions in the game with anarchy – the Game of Anarchy lacks
anarchy.
2.4.3 Reducing Anarchy to Deception
In contrast, Price of Anarchy can reduce to Price of Deception. Given a Game of Anarchy,
GA(N,S, µ), we define a Game of Deception, GD(N,P ,Π, r, u), that has the same set of
equilibria. Let S∗ ∈ argmaxS∈SW (S). Individual i’s private information πi corresponds
to the action that individual i should take in order to maximize society’s utility (i.e. πi =
s∗i ). However, individual i may act strategically and may tell the decision mechanism that
π̄i ∈ Si is the action that i should take in order to maximize society’s utility (i.e. P = S).
The central decision mechanism then selects the outcome r(Π̄) where each individual must
complete the action described by Π̄. Individual i receives utility ui(S∗i , r(Π̄)) = µ(Π̄) and
society receives a utility of U(S∗, r(Π̄)) = W (Π̄). If each individual were honest, then
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the central mechanism would assign individual i the action described by S∗i . The set of







GD(N,S, S∗, r, u)
)
(2.47)
Whereas our attempted reduction from Price of Deception to Price of Anarchy violates
the existence of private information that is a premise of the Price of Deception, reducing
Price of Anarchy to Price of Deception can be easily explained by a traveling consultant
and a lazy or incompetent central coordinator.
Suppose we have a lazy or incompetent central coordinator who simply lets everyone
act on their own. Further suppose that one day a traveling consultant visits, analyzes the
system, informs each individual what task they should perform to optimize society’s utility
and leaves forever. Upon hearing of the consultant’s visit, the central coordinator wishes to
make everyone act in the optimal way. However, the task an individual should complete is
private information known only by the individual. Thus, the coordinator asks every indi-
vidual to report their private information and instructs each individual to do their reported
task. Individuals interested in their own self-gain may strategically alter their information
to be assigned any task that they desire.
We view the reduction just given as artificial, despite its logical validity. Hence we
prefer to view Price of Anarchy and Price of Deception as distinct concepts.
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3
PRICE OF DECEPTION IN THE ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study algorithms that assign indivisible jobs to individuals based on the
individuals’ valuations of tasks. Some authors have observed that when there are many
individuals, each individual’s contribution to the problem is small and hence there is no
incentive to be dishonest [33]. These assumptions cannot be valid since it is well known
that no assignment algorithm satisfies symmetry, pareto optimality, and strategy-proofness
[69]. Therefore the use (and analysis) of manipulable assignment algorithms is necessary.
We consider two common models for submitting preference individuals. In the first,
individuals submit valuations for each task. The values come from the continuous domain
[0, 1]. Second, we consider ordinal based information where individuals rank each task.
This corresponds to each individual assigning a unique integer value in {1, ..., n} to each
job. In both variants we find that minimization problems have higher Prices of Deception
than maximization problems. We also consider both lexicographic and randomized tie-
breaking rules. For this setting, we find that the tie-breaking rule can lead to significant
changes in the Price of Deception. Specifically for the Max Benefit Assignment Problem
with continuous valuations, the Price of Deception with lexicographic tie-breaking is Θ(n2)
while random tie-breaking has a Price of Deception of only O(n
2
3 ). These analyses prove
that manipulable mechanisms may suffer from manipulation in different ways. Moreover,
the Price of Deception captures this behavior and is an essential tool for evaluating the
quality of a decision mechanism.
All mechanisms we analyze yield Pareto optimal solutions when individuals are sin-
cere. Moreover, when ties are broken randomly, the mechanisms are also symmetric and
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therefore not strategy-proof. We also consider manipulable non-symmetric lexicographic
tie-breaking rules. The results of our analyses are in Table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Price of Deceptions for Various Assignment Procedures.
Lexicographic Random








[0, 1] Min Assignment ∞ ≥ n
Integral Max Assignment 2n−1
n
< 4





The two Prices of Deception that stand out most in Table 3.1 are [0, 1] Min Assignments
with lexicographic tie-breaking and Integral Max Assignments. With a Price of Deception
of∞, the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem is heavily impacted by manipulation – strategic
behavior can lead to results that are arbitrarily poor relative to the sincere solution. On the
other end of the spectrum, the Integral Max Assignment Problem, while still impacted by
manipulation, has a constant sized Price of Deception – strategic behavior will never cause
the social utility to change by more than a factor of two.
The minimization problems have worse Prices of Deceptions than maximization prob-
lems. When individuals submit ordinal data (Integral Min/Mas Assignments) there is a
simple reason for this: Both variants can have a solution with value anywhere in the in-
terval of [n, n2]. Moreover, in the worst-case equilibrium for both variants, the value of






is approximately the same
distance from n and n2, it is of a different magnitude of n (the best-case value for the Min
Assignment Problem) whereas it is the same magnitude as n2 (the best-case value for the
Max Assignment Problem). Hence why we see that one Price of Deception is approxi-
mately n
2
while the other is 2. While this difference is significant for measuring how close
we remain to the desired outcome, it may be seen as somewhat artificial.
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However in the [0, 1] variant, the differences between the Prices of Deception are caused
by something more significant than an affine scaling of utilities. We show in Theorem 3.3.3
that in the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem with lexicographic tie-breaking that the kth in-
dividual will receive one of her k favorite jobs which heavily restricts what an equilibrium
solution can look like. But when we analyze the Min Assignment Problem with lexico-
graphic tie-breaking, we can only guarantee that the kth individual can avoid one of her k
least favorite jobs. This places almost no restrictions on the set of equilibria and manipula-
tion can lead to very poor results.
3.1.2 Random Tie-Breaking
In the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem where lexicographic tie-breaking yields a Price of
Deception of n2 − n + 1 where as random tie-breaking yields a Price of Deception of
only at most n
2
3 – an improvement of n
4
3 . Something as small as a tie-breaking rule can
significantly decrease the impact of manipulation. This seems intuitive; lexicographic tie-
breaking is by definition unfair and gives lower indexed individuals additional power to
manipulate the system. However, we will see in later chapters that random tie-breaking
can actually lead to worse outcomes than lexicographic tie-breaking. This means we must
be careful when selecting a tie-breaking rule – it seems unlikely that there is a single tie-
breaking rule that is always best.
In the remaining algorithms we examine, it is unclear whether random tie-breaking is
better or worse than lexicographic tie-breaking. We conjecture that the Prices of Deception
of the three remaining mechanisms when breaking ties randomly are lower than when ties
are broken lexicographically. We have, however, proved that manipulation still impacts
the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem more than the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem and that
manipulation has a relatively small impact on the Integral Max Assignment Problem – once
again it has a constant sized Price of Deception.
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3.1.3 Price of Deception’s Response to Indifference
The Price of Deception of ∞ of the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem with lexicographic
tie-breaking does not tell the full story of the effect of manipulation. The proof of Theo-
rem 3.3.7 provides a family of instances where the value of the sincere optimal solutions
converge to zero while the value of the strategic solution is always at least some constant
c. The value of the constant c is important.
Suppose we have two mechanisms with Prices of Deceptions of∞. For the first mech-
anism suppose that c = 1 meaning that as the cost of the sincere solution approaches zero,
the cost of the strategic solution is 1. For the second mechanism, suppose c = n. The
second mechanism is n times as bad even though they have the same Prices of Deception.
To capture the difference, we artificially bound each valuation of each job to be at least
δ
n
for some δ < 1. This implies that the cost of the sincere solution is bounded below by
δ. Therefore for the first mechanism mentioned above, the Price of Deception is 1
δ
while
the second mechanism has a Price of Deception of n
δ
. Thus we are able to distinguish
between the two. When we apply this concept to the the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem,
we determine that the Price of Deception is Θ(n
δ
) (Theorem 3.3.8) which is the worst Price
of Deception any of our assignment procedures can have.
The process of bounding valuations has another important property; it measures how
much individual preferences vary between jobs. Since every valuation sums to 1 (i.e.∑n
j=1 πij = 1), we know that if all valuations are at least
δ
n
, then all valuations are also
at most 1 − n−1
n
δ. This implies that the difference in valuations of an individuals most
preferred and least preferred tasks is at most 1 − δ. Thus, we can think of δ as a quanti-
tative measure of indifference; δ approaching 1 is equivalent to individuals being almost
indifferent between all jobs.
In the context of the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem, the Price of Deception can still be
large (n
δ
even when individuals are mostly indifferent between jobs). However, the Price
of Deception of the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem is highly impacted by indifference.
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Specifically, if each individual has a value of at least δ
n
on each job, then the Price of
Deception is at most n
2−n−1+(n−1)2δ
1+(n−1)δ implying that as individuals become more indifferent
between jobs (as 1−δ becomes small), the Price of Deception converges to 1 at a relatively
quick rate; that is to say that if people are almost indifferent, then manipulation has little
impact on the quality of the outcome.
3.1.4 Serial Dictatorship and Aversion to Lying
In Theorem 3.3.3 and Corollary 3.3.12 we show that if individuals are strategic in the [0, 1]
Max, Integral Max, and Integral Min Assignment Problems with lexicographic tie-breaking
then the kth individual is guaranteed one of their top k ranked jobs; specifically we show
that if each individual is strategic then each algorithm is equivalent to individuals iteratively
picking their most preferred job. This process is referred to as Serial Dictatorship. Notably
in [69], Zhou gives the Serial Dictatorship algorithm as an example of a pareto optimal,
strategy-proof algorithm.
Since the outcomes of all three manipulable algorithms are equivalent to the outcome
of Serial Dictatorship and since Serial Dictatorship is strategy-proof it may seem an im-
provement to just use Serial Dictatorship. However, we claim that running Serial Dicta-
torship does not guarantee the same results as [0, 1] Max, Integral Max, and Integral Min
algorithms; recall from Section 2.3 that some individuals act strategically but minimally
dishonesty while other individuals have a pure aversion to lying. When some individuals
are truthful, Theorem 3.3.3 and Corollary 3.3.12 only extend to strategic individuals; i.e. if
the kth individual is strategic, she is guaranteed one of her top k ranked jobs. Therefore if
our objective is the Integral Max Assignment, then it will still obtain better outcomes than
Serial Dictatorship as long as we have some truthful individuals.
We also remark that opting to use Serial Dictatorship, like the revelation principle (see
Section 2.2), does not truly remove the impact of manipulation even when all individuals
are strategic; while we manage to induce individuals to be honest, if our goal is the outcome
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of the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem, then, by using Serial Dictatorship, we may still end
up with a solution that is worse by a factor of n2 − n+ 1.
3.2 The Model
We begin by reinforcing many of the definitions from Chapter 2 by presenting them in
context of the Assignment Problem.
Definition 3.2.1. An instance of the Assignment Problem consists of
• Sets V = {v1, ..., vn} and J = {j1, ..., jn} of people and jobs, respectively.
• For each i ∈ V , a set of values or costs πi where πij is where j is the ith person’s
value (cost respectively) of job j for each j ∈ J . Individual i’s utility of j, ui(j) is
not necessarily equal to πij but ui(j) > ui(j′) if and only if πij > πij′ .
• Denote by Pi the set of possible preferences player i can submit.
• Denote by Π the collection of πi over all i ∈ V . Π ∈ P is called the preference
profile.
• The profile Π is submitted to a publicly known matching procedure r. The outcome
r(Π) corresponds to a perfect matching between people and jobs or a distribution
over the set of perfect matchings (for randomized matching procedures).
A mechanism r may impose restrictions on how an individual may report their prefer-
ences. For instance, in the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem, πij corresponds to the value
person i places on job j. Utilities are normalized such that
∑
j∈J πij = 1 for each individual





Let M be a perfect matching between V and J . A matching procedure r selects assign-
ment(s) r(Π) ⊆ argmaxM U(Π,M) where U(Π,M) =
∑
{i,j}∈M πij is society’s value of
the assignment M . If Π instead refers to costs, then replace argmax with argmin. The set
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∑
{i,j}∈M πij is not necessarily a singleton and therefore we must determine how to break
ties to find an assignment of jobs to individuals. We consider two tie-breaking rules: lex-
icographic tie-breaking – assigning the lowest indexed individual their most valued task
– and random tie-breaking – randomly re-indexing individuals and then using the lexico-
graphic tie-breaking rule. When a random tie-breaking rule is used, we assume individuals
and society are risk neutral when evaluating the quality of the outcome r(Π).
Unfortunately, there is no a priori guarantee that individuals will be honest; individual
i may falsely report a strategic π̄i 6= πi to obtain a better outcome. Therefore the submitted
preferences Π̄ may be significantly different than the sincere preferences Π. Not only
does this mean the outcome may change when individuals act strategically (i.e. r(Π) 6=
r(Π̄)), but the social of utility of the outcome may drastically decrease (i.e. U(Π, r(Π̄)) <
U(Π, r(Π))). To understand the effect of manipulation of various assignment procedures,
we analyze the Strategic Assignment Game.
Strategic Assignment Game
• Each individual i has information πi ∈ Pi describing their preferences. The collec-
tion of all information is the (sincere) profile Π = {πi}ni=1.
• To play the game, individual i submits putative preference data π̄i ∈ Pi. The collec-
tion of all submitted data is denoted Π̄ = {π̄i}ni=1.
• It is common knowledge that a central decision mechanism will select assignment
r(Π̄, ω) when given input Π̄ and random event ω.
• The random event ω ∈ Ω is selected according to µ. We denote r(Π̄) as the distribu-
tion of outcomes according to Ω and µ.
• Individual i evaluates r(Π̄) according to i’s sincere preferences πi. Specifically, in-
dividual i’s utility of the set of outcomes r(Π̄) is ui(πi, r(Π̄)).
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By the definition of the Strategic Assignment Game, a set of submitted preferences Π̄
forms a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if no individual i would obtain an outcome they
sincerely prefer to r(Π̄) (with respect to πi) by altering π̄i.
Example 3.2.2. A Nash equilibrium of the Strategic Assignment Game.
Consider the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem where
∑
j∈J πij = 1 and we seek a matching that
maximizes
∑
{i,j}∈M πij . In the event of more than one such matching, we break ties lexicograph-
ically by assigning the lowest index individual their most preferred task. Consider the following
sincere preferences:
π1 = (.30, .20, .40, .10) (3.1)
π2 = (.24, .24, .25, .23) (3.2)
π3 = (.50, .20, .10, .20) (3.3)
π4 = (.20, .10, .60, .10) (3.4)
When individuals are honest, we obtain the assignment r(Π) = {{1, 2}, {2, 4}, {3, 1}, {4, 3}}
indicating that individual 1 is assigned job 2, individual 2 is assigned job 4, etc. With respect to the
sincere preferences, the social utility of this outcome is U(Π, r(Π)) = π12+π24+π31+π43 = 1.53.
However, honesty is not the best policy for each of these individuals. For instance, if individual
1 instead submits π̄1 = (1, 0, 0, 0) then he will be assigned job 1, a job she prefers. A Nash
equilibrium is given below:
π̄1 = (0, 0, 1, 0) (3.5)
π̄2 = (.24, .24, .25, .23) (3.6)
π̄3 = (1, 0, 0, 0) (3.7)
π̄4 = (.20, .10, .60, .10) (3.8)
When individuals submit the putative Π̄, the outcome is r(Π̄) = {{1, 3}, {2, 2}, {3, 1}, {4, 4}}.
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Society believes it has selected an outcome with utility U(Π̄, r(Π̄)) = π̄13 + π̄22 + π̄31 + π̄44 = 2.84.
But society’s true utility is defined with respect to Π and is U(Π, r(Π̄)) = π13 + π22 + π31 + π44 =
1.24 and therefore social utility decreased as a result of strategic behavior.
To establish that Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium, consider each person individually. Neither individual
1 nor 3 can alter their preferences to get a better result since they already have their most preferred
outcome. Individual 2 only prefers job 3 but since π̄1 = (0, 0, 1, 0) individual 1 will always be
assigned job 3 by the lexicographic tie-breaking rule regardless of the other preferences. Similarly,
individual 4 can not alter her preferences to obtain job 1 or 3, the only jobs she prefers to her
current assignment. Therefore Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium and strategic behavior not only changes the
outcome, it decreases social utility from 1.53 to 1.24
Example 3.2.2 shows an instance where the social utility decrease from 1.53 to 1.24;
manipulation resulted in an outcome that is 1.53
1.24
≈ 1.234 times as bad. For the remainder
of the chapter, we focus on finding a bound, the Price of Deception (see Section 2.2), on
how much manipulation impacts social utility of various assignment procedures.
Definition 3.2.3 (Price of Deception for Strategic Assignment Games). Let r be the an
assignment procedure. Let U be an associated real-valued function that, given a profile Π
of individual preferences over J , outputs for each assignment M a societal utility (or cost)
U(Π,M) of assignment M with respect to Π. The function r must be such that for all Π,
r(Π) ⊆ argmaxM U(Π,M) (respectively argmin). LetNE(Π) denote the set of equilibria








If U corresponds to a cost, the Price of Deception is instead the reciprocal of (3.9).
Based on Example 3.2.2, we know the Price of Deception of the [0, 1] Max Assignment
Problem is at least 1.234. In this chapter we do not consider minimal dishonesty; unlike
facility location, voting and stable marriage algorithms that we analyze later, we show
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that there is an intuitive characterization for the set of Nash equilibria in the Strategic
Assignment Game and that there is no need for minimal dishonesty.
3.3 The Price of Deception with Lexicographic Tie-Breaking
We first find the Price of Deception when ties are broken lexicographically. If there exist
multiple optimal solutions, we select one where the lowest indexed individual is assigned
their most valued (or least costly) object/task that is lowest indexed iteratively.
3.3.1 [0, 1] Max Assignments
We define the [δ, γ] Max Assignment Problem to be such that πij ≥ δn and
∑
j πij = γ
for each individual i. Unlike the Fair Division Problem, the valuations for each item come
from a continuous domain. Without loss of generality, it suffices to analyze this model
when γ = 1. We begin with the most common δ = 0.
Lemma 3.3.1. If π11 = 1, then r(Π) assigns individual 1 to job 1 in the [0, 1] Max Benefit
Assignment Problem.
Proof. For contradiction, assume that individual 1 is assigned task k 6= 1 and that player
i gets job 1. Consider switching these two assignments. We have that the change in the
objective value is given by π11 + πik − π1k − πi1 = 1 + πik − πi1 ≥ 0. But this implies the
objective value is at least as good when assigning k to individual 1. This is a contradiction
since ties are broken lexiographically.
Corollary 3.3.2. Individual i can alter her preferences to obtain one of her top i ranked
jobs.
The proof of Corollary 3.3.2 follows in the same fashion as Lemma 3.3.1. Individual
i simply needs to submit π̄ij = 1 for a job j where π̄i′j < 1 for all i′ < i. Corollary
3.3.2 shows that the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem with lexicographic tie-breaking is
so responsive to preferences that strategic behavior results in players iteratively picking the
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task or object remaining that they most prefer. This process is known as Serial Dictatorship.
We describe the set of outcomes of Nash equilibria with the following algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for finding outcomes for [0, 1] Max Assignment
1: procedure SERIALDICTATORSHIP
2: Jobs← [n]
3: xij ← 0 ∀{i, j} ∈ [n]2
4: for i = 1 to n do
5: Select j ∈ argmaxk∈Jobs πik
6: Jobs← Jobs \ {j}




The output x of Algorithm 1 decribes the matching. Specifically, xij = 1 if and only if
individual i is assigned to job j. Similarly, we write rij(Π) = 1 if mechanism r assigns i
to j when given profile Π.
Theorem 3.3.3. Let Π be a set of sincere preferences. The assignment x is obtainable at a
Nash equilibrium iff x is a possible output from Algorithm 1
Proof. One direction is simple; if x is not obtainable from Algorithm 1 then there is an
individual i that not obtain one of her top i preferred jobs contradicting Corollary 3.3.2.
For the other direction, let x be an output of Algorithm 1 and consider the putative
profile Π̄ = x. We have that π̄ij > 0 iff π̄ij = 1 iff xij = 1 and therefore r(Π̄) = x. We
now establish that Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium. Consider individual i and her assigned job j
where π̄ij = xij = 1. Let job k be such that πij > πik. By line 5 of Algorithm 1, xlk = 1 for
some l < i. By definition, π̄lk = 1 and individual i cannot alter her preferences to obtain
job k since l < i and ties are broken lexicographically. Therefore individual i cannot alter
her preferences to obtain a better outcome and Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3.4. The Price of Deception in the [0, 1] Max Benefit Assignment Problem is
n2 − n+ 1.
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Proof. Let Xi = ui(πi, r(Π)) be the value individual i obtains when she is sincere and let
Yi = ui(πi, r(Π̄)) be the value at a Nash equilibrium Π̄. Each Xi is at most one, each Yi is




X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn
Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ Yn
(3.10)
≤ X1 + (n− 1)
Y1
(3.11)
≤ Y1 + (n− 1)
Y1
. (3.12)
By Lemma 3.3.1, Y1 corresponds to the value of individual 1’s sincerely most preferred







and the Price of Deception is at most n2 − n+ 1.










∀j > 1 (3.14)
πii = ε ∀i > 1 (3.15)
πi,i−1 = 1− ε ∀i > 1 (3.16)
πij = 0 ∀i > 1, ∀j /∈ {i, i− 1} (3.17)
The optimal solution for this problem is (n − 1)(1 − ε) + 1
n
− ε
n−1 and is obtained
by giving everyone but person 1 her favorite job. By Theorem 3.3.3, there exists a Nash
equilibrium Π̄ where r(Π̄)ii = 1 ∀i ∈ [n] with a value of U(Π, r(Π̄)) = 1n + ε + (n − 1)ε
yielding a Price of Deception of:






+ ε+ (n− 1)ε
→ n2 − n+ 1 as ε→ 0 (3.18)
completing the proof of the theorem.
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In the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 we could have easily taken ε = 0 for the instance Π
to obtain the same result without examining the limiting behavior. However, individual 1
would be indifferent among all tasks. While Π̄ would still be a Nash equilibrium, it would
be an equilibrium where individual 1 is lying spuriously – she had no incentive to lie and
would have received the same utility had she been honest. However, by taking ε > 0,
individual 1 has reason to lie and is minimally dishonest (Section 2.3).
3.3.2 [δ, 1] Max Assignments
In some settings, we may know a priori that πij ≥ δn for some δ. Thus we may impose such
a restriction on the individuals for their submitted preferences. As discussed in Section
3.1.3, 1− δ indicates how much individual preferences vary between tasks.
Both Corollary 3.3.2 and Theorem 3.3.3 extend to this setting (although π̄ij = 1− n−1n δ
for all i, j where xij = 1 and π̄ij = δn in the proof of Theorem 3.3.3).
Theorem 3.3.5. The Price of Deception in the [δ, 1] Max Benefit Assignment Problem is
n2−n+1−(n−1)2δ
1+(n−1)δ .
Proof. The proof follows in the same fashion as Theorem 3.3.4. Once again, let Xi be the
value individual i gets when she is sincere and let Yi be the value individual i gets in some
equilibrium Π̄. As before, Yi ≥ δn for all i and πij = 1 −
∑









X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn
Y1 + Y2 + · · ·+ Yn
(3.19)
≤
X1 + (n− 1)(1− n−1n δ)
Y1 + (n− 1) δn
(3.20)
≤
Y1 + (n− 1)(1− n−1n δ)














n2 − n+ 1− (n− 1)2δ
1 + (n− 1)δ
(3.23)














+ ε ∀i > 1 (3.26)
πi,i−1 = 1− ε−
n− 1
n




∀i > 1, j /∈ {i, i− 1} (3.28)





n−1 and is obtained
by assigning everyone but person 1 his favorite job. By Theorem 3.3.3, there exists a Nash


















2 − n+ 1− (n− 1)2δ
1 + (n− 1)δ
as ε→ 0 (3.29)
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completing the proof of the theorem.
To obtain the guaranteed bound of n
2−n+1−(n−1)2δ
1+(n−1)δ , we need not impose the restriction
that all submitted preferences have value at least δ
n
. It is only necessary that the each sincere
value πij is at least δn . This holds because Corollary 3.3.2 holds regardless of the value of
δ < 1 we give to the individuals. Thus there may seem to be no purpose in analyzing the
[δ, 1] Max Assignment Problem. However, Theorem 3.3.5 tells us how much manipulation
impacts society depending on how much individual preferences vary between jobs. For
instance, if everyone is almost indifferent among tasks and 1
2n













3.3.3 [0, 1] Min Assignments
In the Min Assignment Problem, πij ≥ 0 denotes the cost for individual i to complete job
j. Once again we require
∑
j πij = 1 for each individual i. We seek an assignment of jobs
to individuals that minimizes the total cost.
Theorem 3.3.6. For n = 2, the Price of Deception of the [0, 1] Min Cost Assignment
Problem is 3.
Proof. We begin by establishing the upper bound. When there are only two individuals,
there is a bijection between instances of the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem and instances
of the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem; if individual i has a cost (benefit) of πij for job
j in the Min (Max) Assignment Problem, that corresponds to a benefit (cost) of π′ij =






j=1(1 − πij) = 1 and Π′ is a valid set of preferences.
Furthermore, the social choice mechanism selects the same outcome in both instances:















ijxij . Therefore Corollary 3.3.2 holds
in this setting and individual 1 receives her most preferred job at a Nash equilibrium.
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As in Theorem 3.3.4, let Xi = ui(πi, r(Π)) be the cost to individual i when everyone
is honest and let Yi = ui(πi, r(Π̄)) be the cost at some Nash equilibrium Π̄. By Corollary
3.3.2, Y1 ≤ X1 and therefore Y1 ≤ .5. Since social “utility” is actually a cost we use the







≤ Y1 + 1
X1
(3.31)







To establish the lower bound, consider the following preferences:
π11 = .5− ε π12 = .5 + ε (3.34)
π21 = 0 π22 = 1. (3.35)
In the optimal assignment individual 1 completes task 2 and individual 2 completes task 1
for a total cost of .5 + ε. By Theorem 3.3.4, there is a Nash equilibrium Π̄ where individual
i is assigned task i for a sincere cost of 1.5 − ε yielding a Price of Deception that tends to
3 as ε→ 0.
In the proof of Theorem 3.3.6 we established that the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem is
the same as the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem when there are only 2 individuals. This is
not true when there are more players and Corollary 3.3.2 does not extend. While individuals
do not have the power to get whatever job they desire, manipulation has a much larger
impact on the [0, 1] Min Cost Assignment Problem.
Theorem 3.3.7. The Price of Deception of the [0, 1] Min Cost Assignment Problem is ∞
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for n ≥ 3.
Thus far we have only seen mechanisms with finite Prices of Deception. An infinite
Price of Deception indicates that manipulation can lead to arbitrarily poor results. The
proof of such only requires a family of instances where the Prices of Deception of the
instances tend to infinity.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.7. Consider the following sincere profile Π:
πin = 1 ∀i 6= 1 (3.36)
πij = 0 ∀i 6= 1 ∀j 6= n (3.37)
π1n = ε (3.38)




∀ 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 (3.40)
The sincere outcome r(Π) assigns individual i to job i − 1 for i ≥ 2 and assigns indi-
vidual 1 to job n for a total cost of U(Π, r(Π)) = ε. Individual 1 can alter her preferences
such that individual i is assigned to job i with the preferences given below:
π̄1n = 1 (3.41)
π̄1j = 0 ∀j 6= n (3.42)
π̄ij = πij ∀i 6= 1 ∀j (3.43)
The selected outcome r(Π̄) assigns individual i to job i. This corresponds to a sincere
cost of U(Π, r(Π̄)) = 1. The profile Π̄ corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. Only individual
n would like to deviate from the solution but she cannot as any alterations to π̄n give
the appearance that she can complete job n for the cheapest amount. Thus, the Price of
Deception of this instance is 1
ε
→∞ as ε→ 0.
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When there is an infinite Price of Deception, we actually lose some information. We
cannot distinguish between a mechanism where the cost when everyone is honest is ε and
the cost of the equilibrium is 1 and a mechanism where the cost when everyone is honest
is again ε but the cost of the equilibrium is n. Both mechanisms have Prices of Deception
that approach infinity as ε → 0, the effect of manipulation on the latter is n times worse.
Although the instance in the proof of Theorem 3.3.7 makes the [0, 1] Min Assignment
Problem look like the former, we will show in the next section that it is more similar to the
latter.
3.3.4 [δ, 1] Min Assignments
Similar to the [δ, 1] Max Assignment Problem, we restrict πij such that it is at least δn . As
with the Max Assignment Problem, such a restriction will give us a better idea of how
the Price of Deception behaves with indifference between tasks. As mentioned at end of
the previous section, this restriction will also give us an idea of just how bad the Price of
Deception of∞ is in the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem.




Proof. We begin by establishing the upper bound. The worst possible assignment has a
cost of at most n(1 − (n−1)δ
n
) = n − (n − 1)δ since a job costs at most 1 − (n−1)δ
n
for an
individual to complete. Similarly, the best possible assignment has a cost of δ. Therefore






























− ε− n− 2
n




+ ε− n− 2
n












∀j 6= 1 (3.52)
According to the lexicographic tie-breaking rules, r(Π) assigns individual i to task i−1
for i 6= 1 and assigns individual 1 to task n for a total cost of δ + ε.









∀i ∀j 6= n (3.54)
Since ties are broken lexicographically, r(Π̄) assigns individual i to task i. This corre-






















− (n− 1)(n− 2)
n
δ − (n− 2)ε (3.56)
Similar to Theorem 3.3.7, Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium since any deviation from π̄i by individual
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completing the proof of the theorem.
3.3.5 Integral Max Assignments
In some cases of the assignment problem, we collect ordinal information from individuals
and then treat it as cardinal data. Specifically, we have them rank their jobs such that
πij = n − k + 1 if and only if individual i’s kth favorite task is job j. In this setting,
we seek to maximize the sum of individual benefits. Similar to the [0, 1] Max Assignment
Problem we show that the decision mechanism is very responsive to players’ preferences.
Lemma 3.3.9. Individual 1 can always change her preferences so there is at least one
assignment M ′ that maximizes individuals’ reported utilities and assigns individual 1 to
job a for any a.
Lemma 3.3.9 does not quite guarantee that player 1 can alter her preferences to receive
her most preferred job. If she updates her preferences in accordance with Lemma 3.3.9 it
does not guarantee the lexicographic tie-breaking rule will match her to her most preferred
task. We address this later.
Prior to proving Lemma 3.3.9, we estalish a few preliminaries on finding optimal as-
signments. Every assignment problem can be represented by a complete bipartite graph
with one set of nodes representing individuals and the other set representing jobs. The
edge {i, j} connecting individual i to job j has weight πij . An optimal assignment now
corresponds to a max weight matching in the bipartite graph. We now present a characteri-
zation of the set of max weight matchings.
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Definition 3.3.10. Let M be a perfect matching on a complete bipartite graph and let C be
an even cycle such that 2 · |M ∩ C| = |C|
2
. That is to say that every other edge in C is also





If there exists an augmenting cycle C with respect to M then a better matching M ′
can be obtained by removing edges in M ∩ C and adding edges in C \ M . Formally,




{i,j}∈M∩C πij , this will increase
the value of the assignment and maintain the validity of the matching. Thus M is optimal
if and only if M has no augmenting cycles. The ‘only if’ is an immediate extension of
Berge’s lemma [11].
Proof of Lemma 3.3.9. Suppose Π is a set of preferences where individual 1 is not assigned
her job a in any optimal matching. Let M be an optimal matching and {1, a} /∈ M . Let
b and k be such that {1, b} ∈ M and {k, a} ∈ M ; individual 1 is assigned task b and
individual k is assigned task a according to M .
Let Π̄ = [Π−1, πk] be the profile obtained when individual 1 updates her preferences
to k’s preferences list πk. Suppose for contradiction that no assignment that maximizes
the sum of individual utilities with respect to Π̄ matches individual 1 to job a. Let M ′ =
(M \ {{1, b}, {k, a}}) ∪ {{1, a}, {k, b}} be the matching obtained by forcing individuals
1 and k to switch tasks in the assignment M . Since M ′ assigns individual 1 to job a, M ′
is not optimal with respect to Π by assumption. Thus, M ′ contains an augmenting cycle C
with respect to Π.
First we claim that if no optimal matching contains {1, a} then there is an augmenting
cycle C where {1, a} ∈ C. This follows in the same fashion as Berge’s lemma. Consider
(M ∪M ′) \ (M ∩M ′) – the symmetric difference between M and M ′. Since both M and
M ′ are perfect matchings on a bipartite graph the symmetric difference consists of even
cycles. Since {1, a} ∈M ′, there is a cycle C ∈ (M ∪M ′) \ (M ∩M ′) where {1, a} ∈ C.
If C is not augmenting, then the matching M ′′ = (M \C)∪ (C \M) has at least as high a
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value as M implying M ′′ is also optimal and contains {1, a}. By assumption this is not the
case and therefore there is an augmenting cycle containing {1, a}.
Let C be an augmenting cycle containing {1, a}. We now examine two cases:































wherew 6= a is such that {1, w} ∈ C\M ′. These inequalities hold because by the definition
of Π̄ and M ′, π̄i and πi differ for only i = 1; if i /∈ {1, k} then {i, j} ∈ M ′ if and only if
{i, j} ∈M ; and π̄i = πk. But (3.61) implies that (C \ {{1, a}{1, w}})∪{{k, a}{k, w}} is
a cycle that augments M with respect to Π as shown in Figure 3.1. This is a contradiction
since M is optimal with respect to Π. Therefore Case 1 cannot occur.
Case 2: {1, a}, {k, b} ∈ C. Denote P1k as the path that goes from individual 1 to
individual k within the cycle C and contains the edge {1, a} (see Figure 3.2). Let Pk1 be
the edge-disjoint path going from individual k to individual i in the cycle C. Therefore


























This implies that either the edges in P1k∩M ′ are less valuable than the edges in P1k\M ′

















(b) Augmenting Cycle for M and Π.
Figure 3.1: Augmenting Cycles for Case 1.
we can construct an augmenting cycle as shown in Figure 3.2 with the original matching
M and preferences Π. Without loss of generality assume the edges in P1k ∩M ′ are less







































Similar to Case 1, all steps hold by the definition of Π̄ and M ′. But (3.67) implies that






(a) Augmenting Cycle for M ′ and Π̄







(b) Augmenting Cycle for M and Π
Figure 3.2: Augmenting Cycles for Case 2.
Case 2.
Both cases result in contradictions and thus, individual 1 can change her preferences so
that there is an optimal solution where she is assigned job a.
Corollary 3.3.11. Individual 1 can always change her preferences so she gets her highest
ranked job in the Integral Max Assignment Problem when breaking ties lexicographically.
Proof. By Lemma 3.3.9, individual 1 can adjust her preferences to π̄1 so that there is a
maximum valued solution where she gets her favorite job. We now show how we can adjust
these preferences so that individual 1 gets her favorite job when using the lexicographic
ranked order tie-breaking system.
Denote individual 1’s favorite job as job a. If π̄1a = n, then player 1 gets job a by
our tie-breaking rule. Otherwise, π̄1a = l < n and π̄1b = n where b 6= a. Let M be
an maximum matching assigning individual 1 to job a. If instead individual 1 instead
reports π̄1a = n and π̄1b = l then M remains maximum. Moreover, in every maximum
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matching individual 1 is assigned to job a after setting π̄ia to n, completing the proof of the
corollary.
We note here that this proof only relies on there being a unique maximum weighted job
and hence the same proof technique could have been used in the sections corresponding to
[0, 1] and [δ, 1] Max Benefit Assignments but not the Min Cost Assignment versions.
Corollary 3.3.12. Individual i can alter her preferences so she is assigned one of her i
highest-ranked jobs in the Integral Max Assignment Problem when ties are broken lexico-
graphically.
The proof of Corollary 3.3.12 follows in the same fashion as Corollary 3.3.11. Similar
to Theorem 3.3.3, Algorithm 1 finds all possible outcomes of Nash equilibria. Algorithm 1
iteratively assigns each individual their most valued task of those that remain. Since each
individual assigns each task a unique value, Algorithm 1 has a unique output. More impor-
tantly, this output corresponds to the only outcome we can expect at a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3.13. Let x be the assignment obtained from Algorithm 1 with sincere pref-
erences Π. Then there is a Nash equilibrium Π̄ where r(Π̄) = x. Moreover, for every
equilibrium Π̄, r(Π̄) = x.
Proof. The second part of the the theorem holds immediately by Corollary 3.3.12.
Since lexicographic tie-breaking only relies on the index of the individual, we may
relabel the jobs so that x assigns task i to individual i for all i. This implies that individual
i prefers task j to i if and only if j < i. We will prove that the following set of preferences
form a Nash equilibrium:
π̄ij = n− i+ j ∀i < n ∀j ≤ i (3.68)
π̄ij = n− j + 1 ∀i < n ∀j > i (3.69)





n n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 2 1
n− 1 n n− 2 n− 3 . . . 2 1




... . . .
...
...
2 3 4 5 . . . n 1
n n− 1 n− 2 n− 3 . . . 2 1

. (3.71)
Since ties are broken lexicographically r(Π̄) = x and assigns individual i to task i for
all i. We show Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium via contradiction.
Suppose that Π̄ is not a Nash equilibrium and that individual k can alter her preferences
to π̄′k such that she is assigned task l < k. LetM be the assignment obtained after k updates
her preferences.
We first claim that for all i /∈ {k, l} individual i is assigned job i. We proceed by
minimal counter example and let i /∈ {k, l} be the lowest indexed individual that is assigned
to j 6= i. Suppose instead that individual w is assigned i. By minimality, one of the
following holds: i = n, j = k, w = l; i < n,w > i, j > i; i < n,w > i, j = k < i;
i < n, i > w = l, j > i; or i < n, i > w = l, j = k < i. In each case we will
either give an augmenting cycle for M that yields a higher valued matching, or a value-
neutral cycle for M that yields a matching with same value that is preferred according
to the lexicographic tie-breaking rule. Either way M is not selected after k updates her
preferences, a contradiction.
Case 1: i = n, j = k, w = l. Update M with




Figure 3.3: Cycle for Case 1.
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If we update M according to the cycle in Figure 3.3 by adding edges {n, n} and {l, k}
and removing edges {n, k} and {l, n} then the value of the matching increases by
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = π̄nn + π̄lk − π̄nk − π̄ln (3.72)
= 1 + (n− k + 1)− (n− k + 1)− 1 = 0. (3.73)
Hence the value of the matching is the same if we assign l to k and n to n. Since the lower
indexed l prefers the new matching, the lexicographic tie-breaking rule does not assign l to
n contradicting that M was selected. This completes Case 1.
Case 2: i < n,w > i, j > i. Update M with




Figure 3.4: Augmenting Cycle for Case 2.
If we update M according to the cycle in Figure 3.4 by adding edges {i, i} and {w, j}
and removing edges {i, j} and {w, i} then the value of the matching increases by
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = n+ (n− j + 1)− (n− j + 1)− (n− w + i) (3.74)
= w − i > 0 (3.75)
if w < j and
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = n+ (n− w + j)− (n− j + 1)− (n− w + i) (3.76)
= 2j − 1− i ≥ 0 (3.77)
if w ≤ j. Either way the value of the matching does not decrease and the cycle C in Figure
3.4 is such that (M \ C) ∪ (C \M) is a matching preferred by the decision mechanism.
This is a contradiction and completes Case 2.
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Case 3: i < n,w > i, j = k < i. Update M




Figure 3.5: Cycle for Case 3.
If we update M according to the cycle in Figure 3.5 by adding edges {i, i} and {w, k}
and removing edges {i, k} and {w, i} then the value of the matching increases by
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = π̄ii + π̄wk − π̄ik − π̄wi (3.78)
= n+ (n− w + k)− (n− i+ k)− (n− w + i) = 0 (3.79)
Thus the value of the matching is the same if we assign i to i and w to k. Similar to
Case 1, this is a contradiction and Case 3 is complete.
Case 4: i < n, i > w = l, j > i. Update M





Figure 3.6: Augmenting Cycle for Case 4.
If we update M according to the cycle in Figure 3.6 by adding edges {i, i} and {l, j}
and removing edges {i, j} and {l, i} then the value of the matching increases by
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = π̄ii + π̄lj − π̄ij − π̄li (3.80)
= n+ (n− j + 1)− (n− j + 1)− (n− i+ 1) = i− 1 > 0
(3.81)
since i > l ≥ 1. Therefore the cycle in Figure 3.6 is augmenting. This contradicts that M
56
was selected after k updated her preferences and completes Case 4.
Case 5: i < n, i > w = l, j = k < i. Up-





Figure 3.7: Augmenting Cycle for Case 5.
If we update M according to the cycle in Figure 3.6 by adding edges {i, i} and {l, k}
and removing edges {i, k} and {l, i} then the value of the matching increases by
π̄ii + π̄wj − π̄ij − π̄wi = π̄ii + π̄lk − π̄ik − π̄li (3.82)
= n+ (n− k + 1)− (n− i+ k)− (n− i+ 1) = 2i− 2k > 0
(3.83)
The cycle in Figure 3.7 is augmenting for M . This contradicts that M was selected after k
updated her preferences and this completes Case 5.
The claim holds for all five cases and therefore M assigns individual i to task i for all
i /∈ {k, l}, individual k to task l < k, and individual l to task k. However, this implies
there is an augmenting cycle for M after k updates her preferences. Suppose instead that
we try to assign individual l to task l, individual n to task k and individual k to task n. This
increases the value of the matching by
π̄ll + π̄nk + π̄
′
kn − π̄lk − π̄nn − π̄′kl (3.84)
= n+ (n− k + 1) + π̄′kn − (n− k + 1)− 1− π̄′kl (3.85)
= n− 1 + π̄′kn − π̄′kl (3.86)
≥ 0 (3.87)
However, by the lexicographic tie-breaking rule, the new matching is preferred to M
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since it assigns the lower indexed individual l her more preferred job l. This contradicts
that r([Π̄−k, π̄′k]) = M . Therefore individual k cannot alter her preferences to get a better
outcome and therefore Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium for Π.
Theorem 3.3.14. The Price of Deception of the Integral Max Assignment Problem with
lexicographic tie-breaking is 2(n−1)
n
.
Proof. By Theorem 3.3.13, an equilibrium solution haves value at least
∑n






. The highest value an assignment can have is
∑n
i=1 n = n
2. However, by
Theorem 3.3.13 any set of preferences Π where U(Π, r(Π)) = n2 also has U(Π, r(Π̄)) =
n2 yielding a Price of Deception of 1 for that particular instance. Therefore, if the Price
of Deception is more than 1, then U(Π, r(Π)) is at most n2 − 1 yielding an upper bound
of 2(n−1)
n
on the Price of Deception. To obtain the lower bound, consider the following
possible preferences:
π11 = n (3.88)
π1n = n− 1 (3.89)
πi,i−1 = n ∀i > 1 (3.90)
πii = n− i+ 1 ∀i > 1 (3.91)
πij > n− i+ 1 ∀i > 1 ∀j < i− 2 (3.92)
πij < n− i+ 1 ∀i > 1 ∀j > i+ 1 (3.93)
where π1j is arbitrary for j /∈ {1, n}. The optimal matching r(Π) assigns task i − 1 to
individual i for all i > 1 and task n to individual 1 for a total benefit ofU(Π, r(Π)) = n2−1.
By Theorem 3.3.13, there is a Nash equilibrium Π̄ that assigns task i to individual i for all





yielding a Price of Deception of 2(n−1)
n
and
completing the proof of the theorem.
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3.3.6 Integral Min Assignments
In Integral Max Assignment Problem, each individual i submits a integer weight πij ∈ [n]
to task j. As in the Max Assignment Problem πij = πik if and only if j = k. This time πij
corresponds to the cost. There is an immediate bijection between instances of the Integral
Min Assignments and Integral Max Assignments. If an individuals’ cost (benefit) in the
Min (Max) Assignment Problem is πij , then this corresponds to a benefit (cost) in the Max
(Min) Assignment Problem of π′ij = n − πij + 1. Therefore Theorem 3.3.13 holds in this
setting and we can immediately find the Price of Deception.
Theorem 3.3.15. The Price of Deception of the Integral Min Assignment Problem with
lexicographic tie-breaking is n
2
.








. The cheapest assignment possible has value U(Π, r(Π)) =∑n
i=1 1 = n but once again Theorem 3.3.13 implies that U(Π, r(Π̄)) = n. Therefore if
the Price of Deception is more than one then U(Π, r(Π̄)) ≥ n+ 1 yielding an upper bound
of n
2
on the Price of Deception. To achieve the matching lower bound, simply consider the
preferences Π′ = {π′ij = n − πij + 1}ni,j=1 where Π is defined in the proof of Theorem
3.3.14.
3.4 The Price of Deception with Random Tie-Breaking
In this section, we find the Prices of Deception using a random tie-breaking rule. To break
ties randomly, we re-index individuals uniformly at random and then use the lexicographic
tie-breaking rule with respect to the new indices.
3.4.1 [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem
Theorem 3.4.1. The Price of Deception in the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem breaking




Proof. We begin by assuming that n = k2 where k ∈ Z. We now define our weights in the
following way:
πik+1,ik+1 = 1 ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, (3.94)










∀i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 ∀j = 2, 3, . . . , k ∀t 6= ik + 1. (3.97)
These preferences correspond to k groups of k individuals where each group has a
single task they most prefer1. One member of the group likes only this job and dislikes
all other jobs. The other members of the group are basically indifferent between all jobs.
Ignoring ε terms, the optimal solution to this has value U(Π, r(Π)) = k + (n − k) 1
n
by
giving everyone their job if they place a value 1 on it and assigning all other jobs randomly.
We now consider the following set of putative preferences:
π̄ik+j,ik+1 = 1 ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1,∀j = 1, ..., k (3.98)
π̄ik+j,t = 0 ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 ∀j = 1, ..., k ∀t 6= ik + 1. (3.99)
With respect to Π̄, each group selects one member to receive the most preferred job. All
other tasks are assigned uniformly at random. Again, ignoring ε terms, the optimal solution
to this has value U(Π, r(Π̄)) = k 1
k
+ (n− k) 1
n
since each player with a true value of 1 on
their favorite job only receives it if they are the first that gets to decide amongst those which
prefer that job (which occurs with probability 1
k
). These values are at equilibrium since any
player altering their value ensures she will get her lowest weighted job. This example yields
1For n where
√




ne. This has a negligible effect on the
Price of Deception for large n.
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a Price of Deception of

















completing the proof of the theorem.
We did not obtain a matching upper bound in the proof of Theorem 3.4.1. We give an
upper bound in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.2. The Price of Deception for the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem is inO(n 23 ).




) where k = U(Π, r(Π)). Second, we show that the Price of Deception
is in O(k). Setting n
2
k2
equal to k, we obtain that the upper bound is at most n
2
3 . Prior to
establishing the first part, we present the following lemma.















is bounded below by the following mathematical program:






subject to : (3.102)
k∑
i=1
xi = n (3.103)
x ≥ 1 (3.104)
The Hessian of f , ∇2f , is such that ∇2fij = 0 if i 6= j and ∇2fii = 2x3i . This implies
that ∇2f is positive definite over the domain {x :
∑k
i=1 xi = n, x ≥ 1} implying that f is
strictly convex over its domain. Furthermore, the domain is symmetric and convex and, by









completing the proof of the lemma.
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Theorem 3.4.4. The Price of Deception for the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem is in O(n2
k2
)
where k is the value of the sincere optimal solution.
Proof. Since U(Π, r(Π)) ≥ k there are at least l = dk
2
e individuals getting a value at least
k
2n
in an optimal sincere solution. Otherwise the value of the optimal solution is less than
k
2




= k − k2
4n
< k. Suppose without loss of generality these individuals are
indexed by {1, ..., l} and player i gets job i in the sincere optimal solution.
Let Π̄ be a Nash equililbrium for Π and let αi be the number of individuals placing a
value of 1 on job i (excluding player i) in Π̄. If player i ∈ {1, ..., l} places 1 on job i, then
player i receives job i with probability 1
αi+1
indicating player i has a utility in r(Π̄) of at
least k
2n(αi+1)




















by Lemma 3.4.3 since
∑l













Theorem 3.4.5. The Price of Deception for the [0, 1] Max Assignment Problem is in O(k)
where k is the value of the sincere optimal solution.
Proof. It suffices to show that for any set of preferences, the value of a solution in an equi-
librium is at least some constant c (we will select c = 1
2
).
Let αi be the number of 1’s on job i excluding player 1. As in Theorem 3.4.4, if player
i places 1 on job i then she receives job i with probability 1
αi+1
. Therefore, player 1’s value
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from r(Π̄) is at least
t1 =
max














(1 + αj) ≥
n∑
j=1
π1j = 1 (3.110)
⇒ t1(2n− 1) ≥ t1
n∑
j=1





This holds for every player, implying that the value of the solution in equilibrium is at least
1
2
, thus completing the proof.
Theorems 3.4.4 and 3.4.5 immediately imply Theorem 3.4.2.
3.4.2 [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem
Theorem 3.4.6. The Price of Deception in the [0, 1] Min Assignment Problem breaking ties
randomly is at least n.
Proof. Consider the following sincere preferences:
πin = 1 ∀i 6= 1 (3.113)











This instance has an optimal solution given by U(Π, r(Π)) = 1
n
+ ε obtained by as-
signing job n to individual 1 and all other jobs uniformly at random. We now consider the
63
following set of false preferences:
π̄in = 1 ∀i (3.117)
π̄ij = 0 ∀i ∀j 6= n. (3.118)
The assignment r(Π̄) gives out a completely random matching since everyone has the
same preferences. No players can do better since any change would ensure they get their
worst job. This solution has a since expected value of U(Π, r(Π̄)) = 1 yielding a Price of
Deception of n as ε→ 0.
3.4.3 Integral Max Assignment Problem
Theorem 3.4.7. The Price of Deception in the Integral Max Assignment Problem breaking




Proof. This proof proceeds in a similar fashion to Theorems 3.4.4 and 3.4.5. Let αj be the
number of individuals that place a value of n on job j excluding player i with respect to
equilibrium preferences Π̄. Let α =
∑n
j=1 αj ≤ n. Following from the same strategy as
decribed by Theorem 3.3.13, player 1 can adjust her preferences so that she receives job i
with probability at least 1
αi+1
. If she commits to such a strategy, then her utility of the new





. Therefore her value of r(Π̄) must be at least
t1 =
max













(1 + αj) ≥
n∑
j=1















This holds for all individuals and therefore the value of r(Π̄) is at least




Similar to Theorem 3.3.14, if the Price of Deception is more than one, thenU(Π, r(Π̄)) ≤





3.4.4 Integral Min Assignment Problem
Theorem 3.4.8. The Price of Deception in the Integral Min Assignment Problem breaking






Proof. As stated earlier, there is a bijection between the Integral Min and Max Assignment
Problems. In the proof of Theorem 3.4.7, it was established that each individual receives a
utility of at least n − n2+3n
4
+ 1 in the Integral Max Assignment Problem. As in the proof
of Theorem 3.3.15, this means that each individual can select π̄i such that their cost at an
equilibrium Π̄ is at most n − (n − n2+3n
4
+ 1) + 1 = 3n
2+n
4n
. As established in Theorem
3.3.15, the Price of Deception is greater than one only if U(Π, r(Π)) ≥ n+ 1. This implies













PRICE OF DECEPTION IN SPATIAL VOTING AND FACILITY LOCATION
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the Price of Deception for algorithms that select a single fa-
cility location (or political policy) from anywhere in a compact convex region based on
a st of individually reported facility locations (political preferences). The standard solu-
tion techniques (1-Median and 1-Mean algorithms) give solutions that minimize the sum
of distances between the facility location and the locations preferred by each individual.
While there has been quite a bit of work focused on developing strategy-proof variants of
the 1-Median or p-Median (p facilities) [43, 22, 23], there has not been much working in
understanding the type of outcomes obtained when individuals are strategic.
In this chapter we consider three variants of the Facility Location Problem. We first
examine the 1-Median Problem where a central coordinator attempts to minimize the sum
of individual distances to the facility location where distances are measured with the L1
norm. We also consider the same problem while measuring distances with the L2 or eu-
clidean norm. Finally we consider the 1-Mean Problem where the sum of squared euclidean
distances is minimized. For the first two mechanisms, we consider both randomized and
deterministic tie-breaking rules. For the third, there is always a unique optimal facility
location and there is no need to break ties.
When analyzing a player’s best response, a common approach is to assume individuals
measure the quality of the facility location by measuring the euclidean distance (L2 norm)
between the individual’s preferred location and the facility location. We prove our results
for individual utilities based on any Lp norm where p ∈ (0,∞) (i.e. ui(πi, x) = ||πi−x||pi).
We begin by analyzing the Facility Location Problem without minimal dishonesty. In
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Theorem 4.3.1 we show for the 1-Median Problem when using either the L1 of L2 norm,
for any feasible facility location, there is a Nash equilibrium that yields that location. That
is to say that the Nash equilibrium solution concept considers every facility location an
acceptable outcome regardless of the sincere preferences. There is disappointing from a
normative perspective; there are infinitely many possible facility locations and the Nash
equilibrium concept gives no way to discriminate between them. Morever, it is unrealistic
from a predictive perspective; in the proof of Theorem 4.3.1, each individual submits that
there preferred outcome is location x. As a result the facility is placed at x and these
preferences form a Nash equilibrium because no individual can cause the facility to move
at all. This indicates that people are lying without reason and thus the 1-Median Problem
needs the minimal dishonesty refinement defined in Section 2.3. We remark that the Price
of Deception is the same in the 1-Mean Problem with or without the minimal dishonesty
refinement. Unlike the 1-Median Problem, if any individual changes their preference in
the 1-Mean Problem then the facility location changes; the responsiveness of the facility
location procedure prevents absurd outcomes like the ones we see in Theorem 4.3.1.
After applying the minimal dishonesty refinement we obtain far more satisfying results.
We first observe that tie-breaking rules once again have a large effect on the Price of De-
ception. Unlike the assignment problem however, lexicographic tie-breaking rules yield
quality outcomes while random tie-breaking can lead to arbitrarily poor results. Specifi-
cally, we give a fair variant of the 1-Median Problem that, while manipulable, has a Price
of Deception of one. This represents our best possible hope for a manipulable algorithm;
while manipulation can change the outcome, it does not negatively impact the quality of
the outcome. We also observe that the set of allowed facility locations can have a signif-
icant impact of the Price of Deception; for many of the algorithms we examine the Price
of Deception can be arbitrarily large if the set of allowed facility locations is a triangle.
However, if the set of allowed facility locations is a rectangle then the Price of Deception is
bounded for most mechanisms. These results provide evidence that the Price of Deception
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helps discriminate among various facility location procedures.
4.1.1 Facility Location in R
We begin by examining the problem in one dimension. Since ||x||2 = ||x||1 in R we
consider only the 1-Median and 1-Mean Problem. The results are given in Table 4.1 below.
Table 4.1: Prices of Deception of the Facility Location Problem in R.
Price of Deception in R
Number of Individuals |N | is odd |N | is even





Perhaps most striking in Table 4.1 is the difference in the Prices of Deception of the 1-
Median Problem with deterministic and random tie-breaking rules. In the previous chapter,
we observed a significant difference between randomized and lexicographic tie-breaking
rules. Specifically, we observed that randomized methods outperformed lexicographic
methods due to the biased nature of lexicographic tie-breaking. We examine a stark con-
trast in this setting; deterministic tie-breaking rules have no impact on manipulation while
random tie-breaking can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. This emphasizes the importance
of very carefully considering small changes to an algorithm because small differences can
have significant impacts on performance and those impacts can vary greatly depending on
the setting.
In the 1-Median Problem, the set of optimal facility locations will be given by an inter-
val [a, b] (possibly a = b and always a = b when |N | is odd) for some a ≤ b. To break ties
in the deterministic setting, we select λ ∈ [0, 1] and then place the facility at (1−λ)a+λb.
In Theorem 4.4.6, we establish for λ ∈ {0, 1} that the 1-Median Problem is strategy-proof –
no individual will have incentive to behave dishonesty – and it immediately follows that the
Price of Deception is one. More fascinating however is that for λ ∈ (0, 1) and for |N | even,
the 1-Median Problem is manipulable but the Price of Deception is still one; manipulation
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has an impact on the outcome – the facility location may change due to strategic behavior –
but the social utility of the outcome remains unchanged. This is significant; in accordance
with current literature’s preference for strategy-proof algorithms, we would select λ = 0
to guarantee that the mechanism is unaltered by manipulation. However, selecting λ = 0
prioritizes placing the facility to the left which appears unfair to everyone to the right of
the facility. As a result of this research, we instead recommend that we set λ = .5 because
it is more fair and still guarantees that manipulation has no impact on social utility since
the Price of Deception is one.
We also examine the 1-Mean Problem in R. It has a significantly higher Price of Decep-
tion Θ(n) indicating that the impact of manipulation increases linearly with the number of
individuals in the game. Denoting Π as the set of locations individuals sincerely prefer, we
guarantee that the facility location is placed in conv.hull(Π) when individuals are strate-
gic. However, no further guarantees exist and the strategic facility location can be quite far
from the facility location obtained when everyone is honest.
4.1.2 Facility Location in Rk for k ≥ 2
We also consider the Facility Location Problem in higher dimensions. It is most common
to consider the problem in R2 but we generalize for all higher dimensions. We have only
required that the set of allowed facility locations X be compact and convex. In R, this
describes a line segment. However, in higher dimensions, there are an infinite number of
possibilities for the shape of the set of allowed locations. We consider both arbitrary shapes
as well as hyper-rectangles – the most common set of allowed facility locations. The Prices
of Deceptions for our various procedures are given in Table 4.2.
Perhaps what stands out most is that the Price of Deception is ∞ for arbitrary X re-
gardless of the facility location procedure. Specifically, in Theorems 4.4.26 and 4.4.19 we
show that for a triangle with largest angle α that the Price of Deception converges to ∞
as α tends to π. The only exceptions are a few variants of the deterministic version of
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Table 4.2: Prices of Deception of the Facility Location Problem in Rk for k ≥ 2.
Price of Deception in Rk for k ≥ 2
Allowed Locations X Arbitrary X Rectangular X
Number of Individuals |N | is odd |N | is even |N | is odd |N | is even
Deterministic 1-Median 1 1 or∞ 1 1




Minimize L2 Norm ? ∞ ? ∞
the 1-Median Problem using the L1 norm. In k dimensions, the set of optimal solutions is
some hyper-rectangle {x : a ≤ x ≤ b}. To break ties deterministically, we select some
λ ∈ [0, 1]k and select the facility location (1− λ)a + λb. In Theorem 4.4.17, we establish
that for λ ∈ {0, 1}k that the 1-Median Problem is strategy-proof regardless of the set of
allowed facility locations and therefore has a Price of Deception of 1.
The results improve significantly when the set of allowed facility locations is a hyper-
rectangle. As with the Facility Location Problem in R, we establish that the Price of De-
ception of the 1-Median Problem using the L1 norm is one (Theorem 4.4.14). Specifically
selecting λ = {1
2
}k, we have a fair procedure that, while not strategy-proof, guarantees
that manipulation will have no impact on the quality of the outcome. Moreover, Theorem
4.4.14 holds for all individual utility functions ui(πi, x) = ||πi − x||pi for all pi ∈ (0,∞).
However, if ties are broken randomly in the 1-Median Problem, then manipulation can lead
to sub-optimal outcomes. Even worse, if we use the L2 norm instead for the social utility,
the Price of Deception is unbounded regardless of the tie-breaking rule (Theorem 4.4.26)
and we may obtain arbitrarily poor results. For the 1-Mean Problem, in Theorem 4.4.24
we show that the facility location will always be in the smallest bounding box containing
all the sincere preferences and therefore the Price of Deception is Θ(n) and once again the
impact of manipulation, while finite, scales linearly with the number of individuals. Once
again this result holds for all utility functions.
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4.2 The Model
Once again we present the definitions from Chapter 2 as they relate the Facility Location
Problem.
Definition 4.2.1. An instance of the Facility Location Problem consists of
• A compact convex set X ⊆ Rk of allowed facility locations.
• A Set V = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals.
• For each individual i ∈ V , a location πi ∈ Pi = X representing i’s preferred facility
location. In voting theory πi is called individual i’s ideal point.
• Denote by Π the collection of πi over all i ∈ V . Π ∈ P is called the preference
profile.
• The profile Π is submitted to a publicly known facility location procedure r. The
outcome r(Π) corresponds to a facility location or a distribution of facility locations.
In context of this chapter, r(Π) is a maximizer of a social utility function. We consider
three mechanisms, each having a different social utility function:
• 1-Median Problem: U(Π, x) =
∑n
i=1 ||πi − x||1.
• 1-Mean Problem: U(Π, x) =
∑n
i=1 ||πi − x||22.
• Minimize L2 Norm: U(Π, x) =
∑n
i=1 ||πi − x||2.
Only the 1-Mean Problem is guaranteed a unique optimizer. For the other problems we
consider both lexicographic and random tie breaking rules.
Individual i’s valuation of the location x ∈ X is given by ui(πi, x) = ||πi − x||pi for
some pi ∈ (0,∞). Typically pi is taken to be 2 (the Euclidean norm). We derive our results
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for any pi. In the event that the procedure r is non-deterministic, we assume that individuals
are risk-neutral and that ui(πi, X) for some distribution X is equal to its expected value.
Strategic Facility Location Game
• Each individual i has information πi ∈ X describing their preferred facility location.
The collection of all information is the (sincere) profile Π = {πi}ni=1.
• To play the game, individual i submits putative location π̄i ∈ X . The collection of
all submitted data is denoted Π̄ = {π̄i}ni=1.
• It is common knowledge that a central decision mechanism will select facility loca-
tion r(Π̄, ω) when given input Π̄ and random event ω.
• The random event ω ∈ Ω is selected according to µ. We denote r(Π̄) as the distribu-
tion of facility locations according to Ω and µ.
• Individual i evaluates r(Π̄) according to i’s sincere preferences πi. Specifically, in-
dividual i’s utility of the distribution of outcomes r(Π̄) is ui(πi, r(Π̄)) = E(||πi −
r(Π̄)||pi) for some pi ∈ (0,∞).
By the definition of the Strategic Facility Location Game, a set of submitted preferences
Π̄ forms a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if no individual i would obtain an outcome they
sincerely prefer to r(Π̄) (with respect to πi) by altering π̄i.
Example 4.2.2. A Nash Equilibrium of the Strategic Location Game.
Consider the 1-Mean Problem where the facility location is r(Π) that minimizes U(Π, x) =∑n





the feasible region X = {x ∈ R2 : (0, 0) ≤ x ≤ (1, 1)} and the sincere preferences π1 =
(18 ,
1








8). With respect to these preferences, the facility location is
72
located at r(Π) = (14 ,
1
4). This corresponds to a cost of U(Π, r(Π)) =
∑3










Figure 4.1: Sincere Preferences for Example 4.2.2
Individual 1 would like to move the facility to the lower left, individual 2 to the upper left, and
individual 3 to the lower right. A Nash equilibrium where individuals attempt to do just this is
given by π̄1 = (0, 0), π̄2 = (0, 1), and π̄3 = (1, 0). With respect to the submitted preferences Π̄,
the facility is located at r(Π̄) = (13 ,
1
3). The central decision mechanism believes it has selected a
facility with cost U(Π̄, r(Π̄)) =
∑3





3 ≈ 1.96. With respect to the true
preferences Π, the facility actually costs U(Π, r(Π̄)) =
∑3















Figure 4.2: Putative Preferences for Example 4.2.2
To see that Π̄ corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, first consider individual 1. If individual 1
73
alters her submitted location π̄1, then she must move it up or to the right. Such an action causes
the facility location to move up or to the right respectively. Both possibilities cause the facility to
move further away from π1 and therefore individual 1 cannot alter her submitted preferences to get
a better result. Individual 2 and Individual 3 are giving best responses by symmetric reasoning and
Π̄ is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Example 4.2.2 demonstrates that manipulation in the 1-Mean can cause the social cost
to increase from .736 to .828 – a cost that is .828
.736
= 1.25 times as bad. For the remainder
of the chapter, we focus on finding the Price of Deception (see Section 2.2) to measure the
impact of manipulation in the Facility Location Problem.
Definition 4.2.3 (Price of Deception for Strategic Facility Location Games). Let r be a
facility location procedure. Let U be an associated real-valued cost that, given a profile
Π of preferred facility locations, outputs a social cost U(Π, x) for each possible facility
location x ∈ X . The decision procedure r is such that r(Π) ⊆ argmaxx∈X U(Π, x). Let
NE(Π) denote the set of equilibria of the Strategic Facility Location Game with procedure








Based on Example 4.2.2, we know that the Price of Deception of the 1-Mean Problem
is at least 1.25. Prior to finding the Price of Deception for these algorithms, we first demon-
strate the need for minimal dishonesty when we minimize the sum of L1 or L2 norms.
4.3 Strategic Facility Location Without Refinement
Theorem 4.3.1. Let x be an arbitrary point in X and let n ≥ 3. Regardless of the sincere
preference profile Π, there is a Nash equilibrium Π̄ where r(Π̄) = x when distance is
measured with the L1 or L2 norm.
Proof. Suppose each voter v submits π̄v = x, then r(Π̄) = x and the central decision
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mechanism believes it has selected a facility that is 0 away from everyone. We now show
Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium by showing that no individual can change the facility location.
Suppose voter v submits π̄′v instead. With respect to [Π̄−v, π̄
′
v], the cost to place the facility
at x = r(Π̄) is ||π̄′v − x|| while the cost to place the facility at x′ = x+ d is
∑
v′ 6=v
||π̄v′ − x′||+ ||π̄′v − x′|| = (n− 1)||d||+ ||π̄′v − x′|| (4.2)
= (n− 2)||d||+ ||d||+ ||π̄′v − x′|| (4.3)
≥ (n− 2)||d||+ ||π̄′v − (x′ − d)|| (4.4)
= (n− 2)||d||+ ||π̄′v − x|| (4.5)
Since n ≥ 3, then x′ = x + d costs more with respect to [Π̄−v, π̄′v] than x whenever
||d|| > 0. Therefore, r([Π̄−v, π̄′v]) = x and individual cannot alter their submitted prefer-
ences to get a better result and Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 4.3.2. The Price of Deception of the Facility Location Problem is∞ when dis-
tance is measured with the L1 or L2 norm.
Proof. Let y ∈ X . Suppose n ≥ 3 and let πv = y for all v ∈ N . If individuals are honest
then the central decision mechanism selects r(Π) = y which is 0 away from all individuals.
Let x ∈ X \ y. By Theorem 4.3.1 there is a Nash equilibrium Π̄ where r(Π̄) = x which is
||y−x|| > 0 away from individual v’s sincere location πv. Therefore the Price of Deception
is at least n||y−x||
0
=∞.
Theorem 4.3.1 and Corollary 4.3.2 demonstrate that the Nash equilibria concept can
lead to illogical outcomes. Therefore we apply the minimal dishonesty solution concept
from Section 2.3.
Definition 4.3.3. Let Π be the sincere preferences and let Π̄ be a Nash Equilibrium in the
Strategic Facility Location Game. An individual v is minimally dishonest if ||πv − π̄′v|| <
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||πv − π̄v|| implies that v’s cost of the more honest outcome, uv(πv, r([Π̄−v, π̄′v)]), is more
than v’s cost of the equilibrium outcome, uv(πv, r(Π̄)).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is minimally dishonest if each individual is minimally
dishonest.
Said in the contrapositive, an individual submitting location π̄v is not minimally dishon-
est if she can report a location closer π̄′v to her preferred location πv and obtain at least as
good an outcome. We proceed by examining each problem with deterministic and random
tie-breaking rules.
4.4 Prices of Deception for Facility Location Procedures
4.4.1 1-Median Problem
We begin by analyzing the 1-Median Problem where the facility location r(Π) is a mini-






j=1 |πij−xj|where πij is the jth coordinate
of πi. While there is no closed form solution for this problem, the problem is separable and
easy to solve. Let a be minimal and b be maximal and such that |{πv : πv ≤ a}| ≥ dn2 e
and |{πv : πv ≥ b}| ≥ dn2 e. Then the set of optimal facility locations is given by
{x : a ≤ x ≤ b}. When selecting a facility location we assume r(Π)’s only dependence on
Π is a and b.
1-Median Problem in R.
Breaking Ties Deterministically
We begin by breaking ties deterministically. Consider the λ-1-Median Problem for
when voters submit locations in Rk:
Definition 4.4.1. Let λ ∈ [0, 1]k. For the profile Π, let {x ∈ Rk : a(Π) ≤ x ≤ b(Π)}
be the set of optimal facility locations. The λ-1-Median Problem selects facility location
r(Π) = (1− λ)a(Π) + λb(Π).
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Example 4.4.2. Three Nash Equilibria With the Minimal Dishonesty Refinement
Suppose the set of allowed facility locations is X = [0, 6] and that the sincere preferences
are given in Figure 4.3. Furthermore suppose the 12 -1-Median Problem is used to select a facility
location. Given the sincere preferences, any location in [1, 3] minimizes the sum of L1 norms. If
everyone is sincere, then the procedure places the facility at r(Π) = 2. The total cost of this facility
is
∑6
v=1 |πv − r(Π)| = 12.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
π1 π2
π3 π4 π5 π6
Figure 4.3: Individuals’ Sincere Locations for Example 4.4.2.
The sincere preferences Π do not correspond to a Nash equilibrium since individual 4 can
submit π̄v = 4 to obtain a better result. We present 3 minimally dishonest Nash equilibria for Π
below.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
π̄1 π̄2
π̄3 π̄4π̄5 π̄6
Figure 4.4: First Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2.
In the first equilibrium shown in Figure 4.4, only individual 4 is dishonest. Any location in
[1, 5] minimizes the sum of the L1 norms with respect to the submitted preferences Π̄. Therefore
r(Π̄) = 3 and the actual cost of this facility location (with respect to the sincere locations) is∑6
v=1 |πv− r(Π̄)| = 12. Although someone has successfully manipulated this system, the total cost
for the facility location remains unchanged.




Figure 4.5: Second Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2.
In the second equilibrium, shown in Figure 4.5, individuals 2, 3 and 4 are dishonest resulting in
the facility location r(Π̄) = 2.5. Once again the actual cost of the facility location is 12.
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Figure 4.6: Third Minimally Dishonest Nash Equilibrium for Example 4.4.2.
In the third equilibrium, shown in Figure 4.6, only individuals 1 and 6 are honest resulting in
the facility location r(Π̄) = 3. The actual cost of the facility location is again 12.
In Example 4.4.2, we observe that we reach the ideal outcome for manipulable systems;
The system is manipulable and we have individuals acting strategically by altering their
preferences to obtain better results, but manipulation has no effect on the social utility.
In Theorem 4.4.3, we present a class of mechanisms where manipulation does not impact
the social utility when minimizing the sum of the L1 norms.
Theorem 4.4.3. When individuals are minimally dishonest, the Price of Deception for the
λ-1-Median decision mechanism in R is 1.
Let [a(Π̄), b(Π̄)] be the set of facility locations that minimizes the sum of L1 norms
given the the submitted preferences Π̄. We know |{v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)}| ≥ n2 and that there
is a median voter such that π̄v = a(Π̄). An equivalent statement holds for b(Π̄) implying
a(Π̄) = b(Π̄) = r(Π̄) when n is odd. Prior to proving Theorem 4.4.3, we begin with the
following results describing a relationship between the submitted and the sincere prefer-
ences.
Lemma 4.4.4. Let Π be the sincere preferences and Π̄ be a minimally dishonest equilibrium
when selecting a facility location by minimizing the L1 norm. Then {v : πv ≤ a(Π̄)} =
{v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)}.
Proof. First we show (⊆). Let v be such that πv ≤ a(Π̄) and suppose for contradiction that
π̄v > a(Π̄). Let Π̄′ = [Π̄−v, a(Π̄)] be the preference profile obtained after replacing π̄v with
a(Π̄). With respect to Π̄′, the facility is located at r(Π̄′) = a(Π̄) which is at least as close
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to πv as r(Π̄). However, this is a contradiction to minimal dishonesty since v can be more
honest and get at least as good a result. Therefore {v : πv ≤ a(Π̄)} ⊆ {v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)}.
Showing (⊇) uses an identical argument. Let v be such that π̄v ≤ a(Π̄) and assume
πv > a(Π̄) for contradiction. However, v can obtain at least as good a result by submit-
ting π̄′v = πv causing the facility to be located somewhere in [b(Π̄), πv]. This contradicts
minimal dishonesty. Therefore {v : πv ≤ a(Π̄)} = {v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)} and the lemma
holds.
An identical equality holds for voters to the right of b(Π̄). Therefore, Lemma 4.4.4
allows us to give a partial ordering over the voters’ sincere preferences when we only know
the submitted preferences. Specifically for v where π̄v ≤ a(Π̄) and v′ where π̄v′ ≥ b(Π̄),
we know πv ≤ πv′ and the following corollary holds immediately:
Corollary 4.4.5. Let Π be the sincere preferences and Π̄ be a minimally dishonest equi-
librium when selecting a facility location by minimizing the L1 norm. Then {v : πv ≤
a(Π)} = {v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)}.
We are now able to prove Theorem 4.4.3. We show that manipulation has no impact on
social utility when we solve the 1-Median Problem and break ties by using the center point.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.3. Let Π and Π̄ be sincere and submitted preferences where Π̄ is a
minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. It suffices to show r(Π̄) = (1− λ)a(Π̄) + λb(Π̄) ∈
[a(Π), b(Π)] since every x ∈ [a(Π), b(Π)] is an optimal solution to the 1-Median Problem
for preferences Π.
First we show that a(Π̄) ≤ a(Π). For contradiction, suppose this is not the case and that
there is a median voter with π̄v = a(Π̄) > a(Π) ≥ πv. If v instead is honest and reports
πv then either the facility location will not change or the new facility location will be in
the interval [πv, r(Π̄)). In both cases, v obtains at least as good an outcome contradicting
minimal dishonesty and completing the claim. Symmetrically, b(Π̄) ≥ b(Π).
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We now show r(Π̄) ∈ [a(Π), b(Π)]. For contradiction, and without loss of generality,
assume r(Π̄) < a(Π) implying λ < 1. There must exist a voter v such that πv = a(Π). By
Lemma 4.4.4, π̄v ≤ a(Π̄) < πv. If b(Π̄) ≤ πv, then v can submit π̄′v = πv which will yield
an outcome in [b(Π̄), πv]. If b(Π̄) > πv, then there is an even number of voters and v can
instead submit π̄v =
πv−λb(Π̄)
1−λ which will yield the facility location πv.
In both cases, v can be more honest and get at least as good an outcome contradicting
minimal dishonesty. Therefore r(Π̄) ∈ [a(Π), b(Π)]. Thus the social utility of the outcome
r(Π̄),
∑
v∈N |πv−r(Π̄)|, is equal to the utility of the intended outcome,
∑
v∈N |πv−r(Π)|.
Therefore, the Price of Deception is
∑
v∈N |πv − r(Π̄)|∑
v∈N |πv − r(Π)|
=
∑
v∈N |πv − r(Π)|∑
v∈N |πv − r(Π)|
= 1 (4.6)
completing the proof of the theorem.
Example 4.4.2 shows that people can manipulate the system and Theorem 4.4.3 shows
that manipulation will not impact social utility. Furthermore, we can select λ such that the
mechanism is not manipulable. Specifically, for λ ∈ {0, 1}, the λ-1-Median Problem is
strategy-proof.
Theorem 4.4.6. Fix λ ∈ {0, 1}. The λ-1-Median Problem in R is strategy-proof.
Proof. By definition of strategy-proof, we need to show that Π is a Nash equilibrium for Π.
Let [a(Π), b(Π)] be the set of optimal facility locations. Without loss of generality assume
λ = 1 and r(Π) = b(Π). Suppose voter v changes her submitted preferences to a minimally
dishonest best response π̄v and the facility is now located at r([Π−v, π̄v]) = b([Π−v, π̄v]).
If πv = b(Π), then v has no incentive to change her preferences. If πv > b(Π) then
by Corollary 4.4.5 π̄v ≥ b(Π). However, there is still a median voter v′ where πv′ =
b(Π) and therefore b([Π−v, π̄v]) = b(Π) and v has no incentive to change her preferences.
Symmetrically no voter v where πv ≤ a(Π) can alter her preferences to get a better outcome
for herself. Therefore Π is a Nash equilibrium.
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When |N | is odd, a(Π̄) = b(Π̄) and the tie-breaking rule is never invoked. Therefore
the 1-Median Problem is strategy-proof with an odd number of voters.
Corollary 4.4.7. When |N | is odd the 1-Median Problem in R is strategy-proof.
Breaking Ties Randomly
Next, we consider breaking ties uniformly at random. If |N | is odd then there are no ties
and the 1-Median Problem is strategy-proof. When there are an even number of voters we
show that the Price of Deception is
√
2. First we characterize an individual’s best response.
Lemma 4.4.8. Suppose |N | = 2 and each voter must submit a location in the interval Pi =
X = [l, u] for the 1-Median Problem when breaking ties uniformly at random. If π̄1 ≤ π2,
then voter 2’s unique minimally dishonest best response is π̄2 = min{u, π̄1+
√
2(π2−π̄1)}.
Proof. Trivially if π̄1 = π2 then the best response for player 2 is π̄1 +
√
2(π2 − π̄1) = π2.
Otherwise π̄1 < π2. By scaling and translating we may assume π̄1 = 0 and π2 = 1 and
show that player 2’s best response is min{u,
√
2}. It is straightforward to show that voter
2 should submit a location x ≥ 1. The facility location Y is selected uniformly at random
from [0, x] and voter 2 has an expected utility of













x2 − 2x+ 2
2x
(4.9)
It is straightforward to verify that this function is uniquely minimized at x =
√
2 on
the domain [1,∞]. Therefore if u ≥
√





2 then it is easily verified that E(|Y − 1|) is strictly decreasing on the interval [1, u]
and therefore player 2’s unique best response is x = u. Either way, player 2’s unique
best response is min{u,
√
2}. By the uniqueness of the best response, any more honest
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π̄2 yields a worse outcome for player 2 and therefore min{u,
√
2} is player 2’s unique
minimally dishonest best response.
Theorem 4.4.9. Let |N | = 2. When both individuals are minimally dishonest and ties are




Proof. Without loss of generality π1 ≤ π2.
First we consider π1 = π2 = 0 and show that the Price of Deception is 1. Let Π̄ be a
minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. If π̄1 < 0 then Lemma 4.4.8 implies π̄2 > 0 thus
without loss of generality we may assume π̄1 ≤ 0 ≤ π̄2. By Lemma 4.4.8,








This implies player 2 should submit a locations slightly closer to 0 than player 1. Symmet-
rically, player 1 should submit a location closer to 0 than player 2. Both conditions cannot
simultaneously happen and the only Π̄ satisfying (4.11) and it’s symmetric statement is
Π̄ = Π = (0, 0). It is straightforward to verify this is also a minimally dishonest Nash
equilibrium.
Second we consider π1 < π2. By scaling, translating, and reflecting we may assume
π1 = −1 and π2 = 1 and that u ≥ −l. The sincere outcome r(Π̄) selects a facility
location uniformly at random in [−1, 1] with cost U(Π, r(Π)) = 2. Again let Π̄ be a
Nash equilibrium. By Lemma 4.4.8 π̄2 = min{u, π̄1 +
√
2(1 − π̄1)}. Symmetrically,
π̄1 = max{l, π̄2 +
√
2(−1− π̄2)}.
Observe that if π̄2 = u then
π̄2 +
√









2 < l (4.13)
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This implies that if π̄2 = u then π̄1 = l. Therefore we can break the problem into two
cases: π̄1 > l, π̄2 < u; and π̄1 = l.











which has the unique solution π̄2 = −π̄1 = 1 +
√
2 and the facility location is selected




2]. For brevity, let U = U(Π, r(Π̄)). Let
Y ∼ Unif(π̄1, π̄2) be the randomly selected facility location. We have the following
P (Y ≤ −1) = −π̄1 − 1
π̄2 − π̄1
E(U |Y ≤ −1) = 1− π̄1 (4.16)
P (Y ≥ 1) = π̄2 − 1
π̄2 − π̄1
E(U |Y ≥ 1) = 1 + π̄2 (4.17)
P (−1 ≤ Y ≤ 1) = 2
π̄2 − π̄1
E(U | − 1 ≤ Y ≤ 1) = 2. (4.18)







For Case 1 where π̄2 = −π̄1 =
√
2 + 1 the expected cost of Π̄ is E(U) = 2
√
2. Since the
cost when everyone is sincere is U(Π, r(Π)) = 2, the Price of Deception in Case 1 is
√
2.









Combining both inequalities, l ≥ −
√
2 − 1. Combining the last two inequalities, π̄2 ≤
√
2 + 1.
The function (z2 + y2 + 2)/(z − y) is increasing on the interval 0 ≤ z ≤
√












2 + 1)2 + π̄21 + 2
(
√





2 + 1)2 + π̄21 + 2
(
√
2 + 1)− π̄1
≤ (
√
2 + 1)2 + (−
√
2− 1)2 + 2
(
√










Theorem 4.4.10. Suppose |N | is even. When individuals are minimally dishonest and ties
are broken uniformly at random, the Price of Deception for the 1-Median Problem in R is
√
2.
Proof. The lower bound is given by Theorem 4.4.9.
Let Π be a set of sincere preferences and Π̄ be a corresponding minimally dishonest
Nash equilibrium. Given a game with |N | players we show how to reduce the game to 2
players that yields the same r(Π̄). Finally we show that the Price of Deception of the 2-
player game is at least as large as the Price of Deception of the |N |-player game. Therefore
the Price of Deception is at most
√
2 by Theorem 4.4.9.
Corollary 4.4.5 extends to this setting and {πv : πv ≤ a(Π)} = {π̄v : π̄v ≤ a(Π̄)}. We
begin by showing πi ≤ πj implies π̄i ≤ π̄j . The result immediately holds if πi ≤ a(Π)
but πj > a(Π). Therefore by symmetry assume πj ≤ a(Π̄). If π̄k < a(Π̄) then k obtains
the same outcome if they submit min{a(Π̄), πk}. Therefore by minimal dishonesty π̄k =
min{a(Π̄), πk} and π̄i ≤ π̄j as desired. We proceed to the main result.
Let k = |N |/2 and index players so that π−k ≤ π−k+1 ≤ ... ≤ π−1 ≤ π1 ≤ ... ≤ πk.
By the previous claim, if Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium then π̄−k ≤ π̄−k+1 ≤
... ≤ π̄−1 ≤ π̄1 ≤ ... ≤ π̄k and players 1 and−1 are median voters with respect to Π and Π̄.
84
Construct the following 2-player game. Let u = π̄2 and l = π̄−2. Similar to Theorem 4.4.6,
u ≥ b(Π) = π1 and l ≤ a(Π) = π−1. Players 1 and −1 have preferences π′i = πi. This
is a valid game since l ≤ π′−1 ≤ π′1 ≤ u. It immediately follows that Π̄′ = {π̄−1, π̄1} is a
minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium for Π′ with the same outcome as Π̄ since otherwise
Π̄ is not a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium for Π.
DenoteUi(Π, r) as the cost for player i given location πi and outcome r. ThusE[U(Π, r(Π̄))] =∑
iE[Ui(Π, r(Π̄))]. Since b(Π) = π1 ≤ πi for i ≥ 1,
Ui(Π, r(Π)) = U1(Π, r(Π)) + πi − π1 ∀i ≥ 1. (4.22)
= U1(Π
′, r(Π′)) + πi − π1 ∀i ≥ 1. (4.23)
By the triangle inequality,
E[Ui(Π, r(Π̄))] ≤ E[U1(Π, r(Π̄))] + πi − π1 ∀i ≥ 1. (4.24)
= E[U1(Π
′, r(Π̄′))] + πi − π1 ∀i ≥ 1. (4.25)
Symmetrically,
Ui(Π, r(Π)) = U−1(Π
′, r(Π′)) + π−1 − πi ∀i ≤ −1. (4.26)
E[Ui(Π, r(Π̄))] ≤ E[U−1(Π′, r(Π̄′))] + π−1 − πi ∀i ≤ −1. (4.27)
We proceed by bounding the Price of Deception by grouping players i and−i. Observe







= 1 and x
0
= ∞ for x > 0.
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Therefore
E[Ui(Π, r(Π̄))] + E[U−i(Π, r(Π̄))]
Ui(Π, r(Π)) + U−i(Π, r(Π))
(4.28)
≤E[U1(Π
′, r(Π̄′))] + E[U−1(Π
′, r(Π̄′))] + πi − π1 + π−1 − π−i





′, r(Π̄′))] + E[U−1(Π
′, r(Π̄′))]
U1(Π′, r(Π′))] + U−1(Π′, r(Π′))]
,
πi − π1 + π−1 − π−i








by Theorem 4.4.9 since Π′ and Π̄′ are from a 2-player game.

















Ui(Π, r(Π)) + U−i(Π, r(Π))
) (4.33)
≤ maxi∈[k]
E[Ui(Π, r(Π̄)) + E[U−i(Π, r(Π̄))]





completing the proof of the theorem.
1-Median Problem in Rk
Since the 1-Median Problem is separable we might expect that Theorem 4.4.3 and Theorem
4.4.10 hold in higher dimensions. However, while determining r(Π) might be separable,
determining a minimally dishonest best response π̄v is not as shown in the following exam-
ple:
Example 4.4.11. Finding a Minimally Dishonest Best Response is not Separable.
If determining the minimally dishonest best response an individual v cannot separately compute
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each component of their best response π̄v for general X . Consider the following preferences where
individuals must submit preferences inside X as given by the triangle in Figure 4.7.
3
π̄2 = (3, 0)
π1 = (2, 1)
Figure 4.7: Determining a Best Response is not Separable in the 1-Median Problem.
Let λ = (12 ,
1
2). Ideally, voter 1 would like to submit π̄1 such that r(Π̄) = (2, 1). Denote
π̄ij and rj(Π̄) as the jth coordinate of π̄i and r(Π̄) respectively. Voter 1 can cause r1(Π̄) = 2
by submitting π̄11 = 1 and can cause r2(Π̄) = 1 by submitting π̄12 = 2. Therefore, voter 1 can
only cause r(Π̄) = (2, 1) by submitting π̄1 = (1, 2). This point is not in the triangle and therefore
voter 1 cannot submit (1, 2). The optimal choice of π̄11 depends on the choice of π̄12 and therefore
determining a best response is not a separable problem.
Regrettably, the lack of separability in determining a best response can lead to a large
Price of Deception in higher dimensions.
Theorem 4.4.12. Suppose λ1 ∈ (0, 1) and voter v’s cost of outcome x is uv(πv, x) =
||πv − x||pv for some pv ∈ (0,∞) for each v. Then the Price of Deception of the λ-1-
Median Problem in Rk is∞ for k ≥ 2.
Proof. It suffices to show the result for k = 2 since the bad example can always be placed
in higher dimensions. Let |N | = 2k for some integer k ≥ 2. The sincere preferences are
πv = 0 for all v. The set of feasible facility location placements is X = conv.hull(π1, a, b)
as shown in Figure 4.8.
If everyone is honest, then the facility is placed at r(Π) = (0, 0) with total cost 0.
Suppose half the voters submit π̄v = a and half the voters submit π̄v = b. Then r(Π̄) =
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πv = (0, 0)




Figure 4.8: Preferences Showing the Price of Deception is∞ for the λ-1-Median Problem.
λa + (1 − λ)b = (0, 1) with a sincere cost of |N |. If Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash
equilibrium, then the Price of Deception is∞.
We now show that Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. Consider voter v
that submits π̄v = b. Regardless of how she alters her submitted information, more than
half the voters submit a height of 1 and therefore she cannot change the height of the
facility. Moreover, if she alters her preferences at all then the facility moves to the left
corresponding to a worse outcome for her. There v is providing a minimally dishonest best
response. Symmetrically voter v submitting π̄v = a is providing a minimally dishonest
best response and Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 4.4.13. Suppose voter v’s cost of outcome x is uv(πv, x) = ||πv − x||pv for some
pv ∈ (0,∞) for each v and that ties are broken uniformly at random. Then the Price of
Deception of the 1-Median Problem in Rk is∞ for k ≥ 2.
Proof. The proof is similar identical to Theorem 4.4.13. Again let N = [2k] for some
integer k ≥ 2. The sincere preferences are πv = (−1, 0) for odd indexed voters and let
πv = (1, 0) for even indexed voters. Fix h > 0 and let a = (−1−
√
2, h) and b = (1+
√
2, h)
and let X = conv.hull(π1, a, b) as shown in Figure 4.9.
If everyone is honest then the facility is again placed at r(Π) = (0, 0) with total cost
2|N |. Suppose the odd indexed voters submit π̄v = a and the even indexed voters sub-
mit π̄v = b. Then the facility is selected uniformly at random from [a, b] with total cost
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π1 = (−1, 0)π2 = (1, 0)
b = (1 +
√
2, h)a = (−1−
√
2, h)




2|N | + h → ∞ as h → ∞. Therefore if Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium
then the Price of Deception is∞.
We now show that Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium. By symmetry consider voter 2. As in
Theorem 4.4.12 more than half the voters submit a height of h and therefore voter 2 cannot
change the height of the facility. If voter 2 submits π̄′2 = (x, y) then the facility will be se-
lected uniformly at random between (−1−
√
2, h) and (x, h). Let X ∼ Unif(−1,
√
2, x).






E(|X − 1|)p2 + hp2 (4.36)
which is minimized when E(|X − 1|) is minimized since h is a constant. Therefore the 2-
dimensional game reduces to a 1-dimensional game. By Lemma 4.4.8, voter 2’s minimally
dishonest best response is to submit x = 1 +
√
2 which requires y = h. Therefore voter
2 is submitting a minimally dishonest best response and Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash
equilibrium. Thus the Price of Deception is∞.
Theorems 4.4.12 and 4.4.12 show there is always a set of allowed locations X such that
the Price of Deception is arbitrarily large. In the proof of Theorem 4.4.12, X is a triangle.
In Theorem 4.4.13, X is a trapezoid and could easily be extended to a triangle without
changing the proof. As mechanism designers, we may alter X such that we obtain more
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desirable results. Specifically, we show that if X = {x ∈ Rk : l ≤ x ≤ u} then the Price




Theorem 4.4.14. Suppose X = {x ∈ Rk : l ≤ x ≤ u}. Then the Price of Deception of the
λ-1-Median Problem is 1 for all λ ∈ [0, 1]k.
Theorem 4.4.15. Suppose |N | is even. Suppose X = {x ∈ Rk : l ≤ x ≤ u} and that ties
are broken uniformly at random. Then the Price of Deception of the 1-Median Problem is
√
2.
Unlike Example 4.4.11, the optimal selection of π̄vj is independent of π̄vi for all i 6= j.
Thus, the k-dimensional case reduces to the 1-dimensional case and Theorems 4.4.14 and
4.4.15 hold by Theorems 4.4.6 and 4.4.10. Moreover, we also immediately obtain a variety
of strategy-proof mechanisms regardless of X .
Theorem 4.4.16. Fix λ ∈ {0, 1}k and X = {x ∈ Rk : l ≤ x ≤ u}. The λ-1-Median
Problem is strategy-proof.
Given the description of X , determining a best a response is again separable. Therefore
it suffices to show the result holds for the one dimensional case and Theorem 4.4.16 follows
from Theorem 4.4.6.
Theorem 4.4.17. Fix λ ∈ {0, 1}k and let X be arbitrary. The λ-1-Median Problem is
strategy-proof.
Proof. Given the setX and preferences Π ⊆ X , it suffices to show Π is a Nash equilibrium.
We begin by defining a second voting procedure by expanding X . Let l, u ∈ Rk be
such that X ⊆ X ′ = {x ∈ Rk : l ≤ x ≤ u}. Consider the λ-1-Median Problem on the
set X ′ with sincere preferences Π. By Theorem 4.4.16, Π is a Nash equilibrium implying
πv ∈ X is a best response for each voter v.
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Since X ⊆ X ′ and πv ∈ X for all v, πv must also be a best response in the original
procedure with the smaller feasible setX . Therefore Π is a Nash equilibrium in the original
problem and the λ-1-Median Problem is strategy-proof regardless of X .
Corollary 4.4.18. Let X be arbitrary. When |N | is odd, the 1-Median Problem is strategy-
proof.
As with Corollary 4.4.7, Corollary 4.4.18 immediately holds because there are never
any ties when |N | is odd.
4.4.2 1-Mean Problem
We now proceed to the 1-Mean Problem where the facility location r(Π) is the unique
minimizer of
∑n






Theorem 4.4.19. Suppose voter v’s cost of outcome x is uv(πv, x) = ||πv − x||pv for some









Figure 4.10: Preferences for Theorem 4.4.19
Proof. We show the result for pv = 2 for all v and explain how to generalize the re-
sult at the end. Consider the three points π̄1 = (0, 0), π̄2 = ( 32sin(α) ,
3
2cos(α)





) where α < π
2
. Define X = conv.hull(π̄1, π̄2, π̄3). Suppose the sincere
facility locations are given by π1 = (0, 0), π2 = (cos(α), sin(α)), and π3 = (−cos(α), sin(α))
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as shown in Figure 4.10. With respect to the sincere data, the facility would be placed at
r(Π) = (0, 2sin(α)
3













Now consider the putative preferences given by Π̄ = (π̄1, π̄2, π̄3). With respect to Π̄ the
facility is placed at r(Π̄) = (0, 1
cos(α)




















If Π̄ corresponds to a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium of Π, then the Price of Decep-





→∞ as α→ π
2
. (4.39)
It remains to show that Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. To do this, it
suffices to show that any change to π̄i yields a worse outcome for individual i. Start with
i = 1. Suppose player 1 changes her preferences to π̄′1 = π̄1 + d where ||d|| 6= 0. The
location π̄′1 is inX and therefore d2 > 0. After updating her preferences the facility location
is moved to r([Π̄−1, π̄′1]) = r(Π̄) +
1
3
d. This causes the facility to up and possibly to the
left or the right. Regardless of p1 this is worse for player 1 and therefore she is reporting a
minimally dishonest best response.
The idea is similar to show players 2 and 3 are providing minimally dishonest best
responses. By symmetry, it suffices to consider player 2. Suppose player 2 updates her
preferences to π̄′2 = π̄2 − d. Since π̄′2 ∈ X , d ∈ cone ((1, 0), (π2)). After updating her
preferences, the facility will be located at r([Π̄−2, π̄′2]) = r(Π̄) − 13d. Let B2 = {x :
92
||x− π2||2 ≤ ||π2 − r(Π̄)||2 be the set of points player 2 prefers to r(Π̄). By construction,
{x ∈ R : r(Π̄) − 1
3
dx} is tangent to B2 as shown in Figure 4.11 hence for all d where
||d|| > 0, reporting π̄2 − d would yield a worse solution for player 2. Thus she has given
a minimally dishonest best response. This implies that Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash












Figure 4.11: Possible Locations for r([Π̄−2, π̄′2])
We now consider other pv ∈ (0,∞). As observed previously, player 1 is minimally
dishonest. In the construction given in Figure 4.10, π̄2 is placed such A = {x ∈ R :
r(Π̄) − 1
3
dx} is tangent to B2 ensuring that voter 2 cannot alter her preferences to get a
better outcome. However, if p2 6= 2 then the non-euclidean ball B = {x : ||π2 − x||p2 ≤
||π2 − r(Π̄)||p2} may overlap with A. However, if Figure 4.11 is stretched horizontally,
then the set A converges to a horizontal line. Therefore for any finite norm, we can stretch
the set of allowed feasible locations such that no individual can alter their preferences to
get a better outcome.
The proof of Theorem 4.4.19 suggests that the Price of Deception is dependent on the
feasible region X . To better understand the Price of Deception, we first aim to understand
the possible locations for r(Π̄).
Definition 4.4.20. Given a ∈ Rk and any compact S ⊆ X , let b(a, S) = maxx∈Sa · x.
Definition 4.4.21. The vector a ∈ Rk is limiting for S ⊆ X if for each x ∈ X such that
a · x > b(a, S) there an ε > 0 such that x− εa ∈ X .
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Lemma 4.4.22. Suppose voter v’s cost of outcome x is uv(πv, x) = ||πv − x||pv for some
pv ∈ (0,∞) for each v. Let Π̄ be a Nash equilibrium for Π in the 1-Mean Problem. If a is
limiting for Π in X , then a · r(Π̄) ≤ b(a,Π).
Proof. Without loss of generality let a be a unit vector. For contradiction, suppose that
a · r(Π̄) = b(a,Π) + c for some c > 0. Then there must be at least one voter v such that
a · π̄v > b(a,Π). By Definition 4.4.21 and by convexity of X , there is an ε ∈ (0, c|N |] such
that π̄′v = π̄v − εa ∈ X . Moreover, if v instead submits π̄′v, then the facility location moves
to r = r(Π̄)− εa|N | where b(a,Π) ≤ a · r < b(a,Π) + c by selection of ε. Therefore the new
location r is strictly closer to every point in Π including πv and therefore v is able to alter
π̄v to get a better outcome contradicting that Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 4.4.23. Limiting Directions for a Rectangle
Suppose individuals must submit locations inside of the rectangle X = {x : −2 ≤ x1 ≤
2,−1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1} and that Π = {(0, 0), (1.5, 0), (0, .5)} as shown in Figure 4.12.
a = (−1, 1) Limiting Direction
Not Limiting Direction
x
x− εa /∈ X
Figure 4.12: Voters’ Sincere Locations and Some Limiting Directions for Example 4.4.23.
The direction a = (−1, 1) is not limiting. Consider the point x = (−2,−1). We cannot
move from x orthogonally toward the dash-dotted line without leaving the set X . Moreover, it is
straightforward to verify that (1, 0), (−1, 0), (0, 1) and (0,−1) are limiting regardless of the of the
sincere profile Π. In general, for any hyperrectangle R = {x ∈ Rk : ai ≤ xi ≤ bi ∀i = 1, ..., k}
has limiting directions ±ei where ei is the ith standard basis vector regardless of the sincere profile
Π.
94
Lemma 4.4.22 is sufficient for us to find the Price of Deception for the most common
set of feasible locations, the hyperrectangle.
Theorem 4.4.24. Suppose voter v’s cost of outcome x is uv(πv, x) = ||πv − x||pv for some
pv ∈ (0,∞) for each v and that the set of feasible facility locations is X = {x ∈ Rk : xi ∈
[ai, bi] ∀i = 1, ..., k} for all j = 1, ..., n. Then the Price of Deception of of the 1-Mean
Problem with n individuals is Θ(n).
Proof. First we show an upper bound of 2n. Let Π̄ be a Nash equilibrium for the sincere
profile Π. Let [a′j, b
′
j] ⊆ [aj, bj] be minimal such thatX ′ = [a′1, b′1]×...×[a′k, b′k] contains Π.








||πi − x||22 and therefore rj(Π) ∈ [0, b′j] for all j.
Denoting rj(Π) and πij as the jth coordinate of r(Π) and πi respectively, we have that
n∑
i=1












and therefore the facility cost
∑n






Given equilibrium Π̄, the facility is located at r(Π̄). In Example 4.4.23, we demon-
strated that the standard basis vector ej is limiting for Π and therefore rj(Π̄) ∈ [0, b′j] by
Lemma 4.4.22. Therefore, the total cost for facility location r(Π̄) is
n∑
i=1

















Therefore, the Price of Deception for sincere Π and submitted Π̄ is
∑n
i=1 ||πi − r(Π)||22∑n










We now present an instance with a Price of Deception n. Suppose we have n players
and let X be the hypercube {x : 0 ≤ xi ≤ n ∀i = 1, ..., k}. Let π1 = e1 and πi = 0 for
all i > 1. If everyone is sincere, then the facility is located at r(Π) = ( 1
n









Now consider the putative preferences Π̄ where π̄1 = ne1 and π̄i = πi for i > 1. With





||πi − r(Π̄)||22 = (n− 1) (4.47)





Showing that Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium follows in the same fashion
as Theorem 4.4.19; if player i deviates from π̄i, then the facility moves further from πi
implying player i is minimally dishonest. Therefore the Price of Deception is between n
2
and n implying the Price of Deception is in Θ(n).
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4.4.3 Minimizing L2 Norm
Theorem 4.4.25. Let X ⊆ R. The Price of Deception for facility location when minimiz-
ing the sum of L2 norm distances is 1 when breaking ties deterministically and ∞ when
breaking ties uniformly at random.
Theorem 4.4.25 follows directly from Theorems 4.4.3 and 4.4.10 since the L1 and L2
norm are equivalent in R.
Theorem 4.4.26. Suppose voter v’s outcome of x is uv = (πv, x) = ||πv − x||pv for some
p ∈ (0,∞). Let X ⊆ Rk for k ≥ 2. The Price of Deception for facility location when
minimizing the sum of L2 norm distances is∞ when breaking ties by selecting the center
point or uniformly at random.
Proof. It suffices to show this is true in R2. Let n = 2c and suppose πi = (0, 0) for all
i. If everyone is honest then the facility is located at r(Π) = (0, 0) with a total cost of
0. Suppose instead that the players submit Π̄ where π̄i = (−1, 1) for i = 1, ..., c and
π̄i = (1, 1) for i = c − 1, ..., 2c. With respect to these preferences, the facility is either
located at (0, 1) or uniformly at random between (−1, 1) and (1, 1) with a sincere cost of
at least 1. Furthermore, if Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium, then the Price of
Deception of this instance is∞.
We now show Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. It suffices to examine
player 1. If player 1 instead submits π̄′1 where π̄
′
12 6= π̄12, then r([Π̄−1, π̄′1]) = (1, 1)
yielding a worse outcome for player 1. If π̄′1 is directly to the left of π̄1, then the outcome
does not change and player 1 is less honest. If player 1 submits π̄′1 = (w, 1) for some
w ∈ (−1, 1), then the facility is located either at (1+w
2
≥ 0, 1) or uniformly at random
between (w, 1) and (1, 1). Both correspond to worse outcomes for player 1. Finally, if
player 1 submits π̄′1 = (w, 1) for some w ≥ 1, then r([Π̄−1, π̄′1]) = (1, 1) yielding a worse
outcome for player 1. All possibilities yield either worse outcomes for player 1 or cause
player 1 to be less honest without any benefit. Thus player 1 is giving the unique minimally
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dishonest best response and Π̄ is a minimally dishonest Nash equilibrium. Therefore the
Price of Deception when minimizing the L2 norm is∞.
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5
PRICE OF DECEPTION IN ELECTIONS
5.1 Introduction
Arrow’s possibility theorem [4] and its many descendants (see e.g. [5, 47]) tell us that to
choose a voting rule is to trade off some desirable rationality properties against others be-
cause they are not mutually attainable. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite [28, 65], Gardenfors [27]
and related theorems tell us that every election rule that one would consider to be reason-
able is manipulable by a strategic voter. Therefore, we always sacrifice non-manipulability
in lieu of other properties. But is it wise to take such an all-or-nothing position with respect
to manipulability, especially since we always settle for nothing? To quantify the effect of
manipulation in voting, we examine the game of deception known as the Strategic Voting
Game.all
We first prove (Theorem 5.3.2) that the straightforward definition of the Game of De-
ception is not adequate because it permits arbitrarily bad but absurd outcomes. Branzei
et al. [13] eliminate these spurious outcomes by examining only equilibria that can be
obtained through an iterative process where each player selects their best response with
respect to the previous iteration given that everyone was truthful in the first iteration. How-
ever, we prove (Theorem 5.3.4) that as the number of voters increases, the probability
converges to 1 that this iterative process terminates at the first iteration. Hence that refine-
ment cannot provide an accurate model since strategic behavior is known to occur in large
populations.
To better understand human behavior we again incorporate our minimal dishonesty
refinement, a plausible and experimentally supported refinement (see Section 2.3), into the
players’ Game of Deception. We then analyze the Price of Deception of several standard
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voting rules, including Borda count, approval voting, and plurality voting. Different rules
turn out to have significantly different Prices of Deception. The results therefore support
our proposal that the Price of Deception can help discriminate among different voting rules.
For instance, plurality voting has the worst Price of Deception of all the voting rules we
analyze, despite its widespread use in U.S.A. elections.
5.1.1 Lexicographic Tie-Breaking
We begin by analyzing voting procedures when ties are broken lexicographically. Table 5.1
summarizes our results for several voting mechanisms given m > 2 candidates.
Table 5.1: Prices of Deception for Various Voting Mechanisms.
Price of Deception
Voting Mechanism Standard Scores Normalized Scores
Dictatorship 1 1











Majority Judgment u− 1 um−2m+1
u−1





The Price of Deception for each mechanism is given in the “Standard Scores” col-
umn of Table 5.1. For instance, in approval voting, if candidate c would win the elec-
tion with 30 points when everyone is sincere, then the winner at any minimally dishonest
equilibrium will have at least 15 points with respect to the sincere preferences. We also
normalize each social utility for each voting rule so that minΠ∈P minc∈C U(Π, c) = 1 and
maxΠ∈P maxc∈C U(Π, c) = m for each pair of profile Π and candidate c via an affine trans-
formation. Normalization enables us to make comparisons between otherwise dissimilar
voting procedures.
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With the exception of plurality voting, our results show a striking relationship between
the use of information and the Price of Deception. Dictatorship employs one datum, the
candidate most preferred by the dictator. Of the procedures analyzed, it ignores the most
voter preference data and has the least Price of Deception. Veto voting relies on one datum
per voter, the least preferred candidate. It uses the next smallest amount of information, and
has the next lowest Price of Deception. Approval voting uses one bit of information per
candidate from each voter, and has the next lowest Price of Deception. The next three pro-
cedures in Table 5.1 use full information and have substantially larger Prices of Deception,
all of order m.
Plurality uses the same amount of information as veto voting, but has the largest Price
of Deception. And indeed, plurality voting has received heavy criticism for encouraging
strategic voting [16]. (It has also been criticized for limiting the number of political parties
[21], wasted votes resulting in lower voter turnout, and being vulnerable to the spoiler effect
(i.e. grossly violating independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)). We find it confirmatory
that, of the voting mechanisms we have analyzed, plurality has the worst price of deception
- a candidate is able to win at an equilibrium even if the candidate would receive no votes
when everyone is honest. We also find it both ironic and confirmatory that plurality voting
was employed in many state primary elections in the U.S. in 2016, amid many reports of
strategic voting.
On the other hand, approval voting has been used by organizations such as the Mathe-
matical Association of America, the Institute for Operations Research and the Management
Sciences, the American Statistical Association, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers and the United Nations [56]. In addition, it is believed that approval voting im-
proves voter turnout, deters the spoiler effect and reduces negative campaigning [12]. Of
the voting mechanisms analyzed, approval voting has one of the lowest Prices of Deception.
Majority Judgment has been proposed by Balinski [7] as an alternative to voting in the
sense that voters submit cardinal data rather than ordinal rankings. He shows that Majority
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Judgment avoids many of the axiomatic pitfalls, such as IIA, that plague classical voting.
It is pertinent, therefore, to evaluate its Price of Deception to see how it compares, in
this sense, with classical voting rules. The result is that Majority Judgment has Price of
Deception of the same order of magnitude as Borda and Copeland voting. Hence, by this
measure, Majority Judgment is similar to some classic voting rules, but substantially poorer
than approval voting.
5.1.2 Random Tie-Breaking
We established that mechanisms can have significantly different Prices of Deception and
that we are able to discriminate between different mechanisms based upon how badly they
can be manipulated. We also establish that making even a small change to a decision
mechanism such as changing how ties are handled can significantly impact the Price of
Deception.
For mechanisms such as veto, approval, Borda count with a risk-neutral society, and α-
Copeland the Price of Deception remains unchanged when we switch from a lexicographic
tie breaking rule to a random tie breaking rule. For each of these mechanisms the best
lower bound for the Price of Deception was achieved when there was a unique candidate
with a high score at equilibrium – no tie breaking rule was needed to determine the winner.
However, as shown in Table 5.2, the Price of Deception can change depending on the tie
breaking rule.
Table 5.2: Prices of Deception May Vary Depending on how Ties are Broken.
∗ Assumes Society is Risk-Neutral. † Denotes Normalized Price of Deception.
Tie Breaking Rule
Voting Mechanism Lexico Random Unique Winner




















For sufficiently small m (m ≤ u−2
α−1 ), Majority Judgment when breaking ties lexico-
graphically has a Price of Deception that is at least α times as bad when compared to
breaking ties randomly. It is not surprising that lexicographic tie breaking has a worse
Price of Deception; by definition, it is a biased mechanism that violates either neutrality or
anonymity. Voters may be able to take advantage of the bias in the mechanism to yield a
more extreme result.
In contrast, the Price of Deception for a plurality election is significantly better when
ties are broken lexicographically. If ties are broken randomly, a candidate can lose the
election even if the candidate is sincerely the unanimous favorite.
Not only does the type of tie breaking rule potentially have an impact on the Price of
Deception, this impact is not always same. In one case (Majority Judgment) we see that
lexicographic tie breaking leads to a worse Price of Deception. However, for plurality elec-
tion, the exact opposite occurs – random tie breaking leads to a worse Price of Deception.
5.2 The Model
As in Chapters 3 and 4 we reinforce the notation and definitions from Chapter 2 by redefin-
ing them in context of the Voting Problem.
An instance of the Voting Problem consists of
• Set V = {v1, ..., vn} and C = {c1, ..., cm} of voters and candidates, respectively.
• For each v ∈ V , a total ordering πv on C, representing voter v’s preferences on the
candidates. Denote by Pi as the set of all possible preferences. For the procedures
Dictatorship, Veto, Borda Count, α-Copeland, and Plurality the preferences πv are
strict. For Approval voting, πv is a strict ordering over a subset of C where c ∈ πv if
v approves of candidate c. For Majority Judgment voting, πv = {πv1, ..., πvm} where
πvc ∈ {1, ..., u} for some predefined u is voter v’s valuation of candidate c.
• Denote by Π the collection of πv over all v ∈ V . Π is called the preference profile.
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• The profile Π is submitted to a publically known procedure r. The outcome r(Π)
corresponds to a single candidate c ∈ C or a distribution over the set of candidates.
We begin by defining a large family of voting procedures that includes Borda, approval,
plurality, and veto. These are procedures in which each voter assigns an integer score
within a bounded range to each candidate, and a candidate with largest sum of scores wins
the election.
Definition 5.2.1. For candidate set C, a score voting procedure bounded by K is a social
choice procedure to select a winning candidate as follows: For each voter v ∈ V there









Denote by G the set of possible score functions1. Hence |G| ≤ K |C|.
With exception of the α-Copeland voting procedure, every algorithm we analyze in
this chapter is a score voting procedure. The α-Copeland winner is determined from a
tournament graph where the weights on edges are determined by plurality, a score voting
procedure.
Example 5.2.2. Borda count as a score voting procedure.
For Borda count, gv(c) = |C| − k if v’s kth favorite candidate. For example, if voter v’s
preference list is πv = (c1, c2, c3) then v’s favorite candidate is c1 followed by c2 and then c3. In
this case, gv(c1) = 2, gv(c2) = 1 and gv(c3) = 0. Furthermore, if we have five voters, v1, v2, v3, v4
1The score function g is not the same as the individual utility function u. We assume that gv(c) ≥ gv(c′)
if and only if uv(πv, c) ≥ uv(πv, c′). However, g does not specify individual v’s utility for a probability
distribution over a subset of the candidates.
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and v5 with the following sincere preferences:
πv1 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.2)
πv2 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.3)
πv3 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.4)
πv4 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.5)
πv5 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.6)
Then the score for candidate c1 is
5∑
i=1
gvi(c1) = 2 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 7. (5.7)
Similarly, the scores for candidates c2 and c3 are 2 and 6 respectively. Therefore if Π is
submitted to a decision mechanism using Borda count, then c1 is selected. In this example each
voter assigns each candidate a value between 0 and |C| − 1. Therefore, in Definition 5.2.1,
K > |C| − 1 = 2.
It is well known that every reasonable voting procedure is manipulable [28, 65, 27].
For instance in Example 5.2.2, voter v4 could instead submit π̄v4 = (c3, c2, c1) causing
candidates c1 and c3 to tie. Under certain tie-breaking rules, this yields a better outcome
for voter v4 since voter 4 prefers c3 to c1. As a result, we cannot expect that voters are
submitting truthful information. The voters are actually submitting strategic preferences in
the Strategic Voting Game.
Strategic Voting Game
• Each voter v has information πv ∈ Pv describing their preferences. The collection of
all information is the (sincere) profile Π = {πv}nv=1.
• To play the game, voter v submits putative preference data π̄v ∈ Pv. The collection
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of all submitted data is denoted Π̄ = {π̄v}nv=1.
• It is common knowledge that a central decision mechanism will select candidate
r(Π̄, ω) ∈ C when given input Π̄ and random event ω.
• The random event ω ∈ Ω is selected according to µ. We denote r(Π̄) as the distribu-
tion of outcomes according to Ω and µ.
• Voter v evaluates r(Π̄) according to v’s sincere preferences πv. Specifically, voter v’s
utility of the set of outcomes r(Π̄) is uv(πv, r(Π̄)).
Voter utilities are consistent with Π; ui(πi, c) > ui(πi, c′) only if c appears prior to c′ in
the preferences πi. For single-valued voting rules (i.e. r(Π̄) = r(Π̄, ω) = r(Π̄, ω′) for all
ω, ω′ ∈ Ω) it suffices to consider only the preferences πi and not the utilities ui since they
are consistent. However, when r is not single valued, ui is necessary to determine a voter’s
valuation of probability distribution over a set of candidates. We begin by considering r
single-valued.
By the definition of the strategic voting game, a set of submitted preferences Π̄ forms a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium if no individual v would obtain an outcome they sincerely
prefer to r(Π̄) (with respect to πv) by altering π̄v.
Example 5.2.3. A Nash equilibrium of the Strategic Voting Game.
Suppose there are five voters, three candidates and the Borda count is used to select the winning
candidate. Suppose further that the preferences from Example 5.2.2 are the sincere preferences of
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the five voters. Then the following submitted preferences correspond to a Nash equilibrium:
π̄v1 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.8)
π̄v2 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.9)
π̄v3 = (c3, c2, c1) (5.10)
π̄v4 = (c3, c2, c1) (5.11)
π̄v5 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.12)
Only voters v3 and v4’s submitted preferences deviate from their sincere preferences. As a
result, the scores for candidates c1, c2 and c3 are 5, 4, and 6 respectively and candidate c3 wins
the election with respect to the submitted preferences. Voters v3, v4, and v5 receive their sincere
first choice and therefore have no further incentive to alter their submitted preferences. Though
voters v1 and v2 receive their last choice, neither voter can alter the results of the election and the
submitted preferences form a Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Strategic Voting Equilibria without Minimal Dishonesty
In Example 5.2.2, using Borda count would cause c1 to win the election if everyone is
sincere. However, in Example 5.2.3, we see that we may obtain a different result when
individuals behave strategically; the strategic voters select candidate c3, the sincere Con-
dorcet winner. This equilibrium makes sense in that a majority of voters prefer c3 to c1 and
a majority prefer c3 to c2. Furthermore, if all voters were honest, then both c1 and c3 have
similar Borda counts – 7 and 6 respectively. However, we see in the next example that not
all equilibria make sense.
Example 5.3.1. A Second Nash equilibrium of the Strategic Voting Game.
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Once again suppose the sincere preferences are given in Example 5.2.2. Then the following
preferences are a Nash equilibrium where c2 wins the election.
π̄v1 = (c2, c1, c3) (5.13)
π̄v2 = (c2, c1, c3) (5.14)
π̄v3 = (c2, c3, c1) (5.15)
π̄v4 = (c2, c3, c1) (5.16)
π̄v5 = (c2, c3, c1) (5.17)
With respect to the submitted preferences candidates c1,c2 and c3 have Borda counts of 2, 10
and 3 respectively and c2 wins the election. These preferences correspond to an equilibrium since
each voter can change a candidate’s score by at most two.
Unlike Example 5.2.3, the voters in Example 5.3.1 are lying spuriously to obtain poor
results – voters v3, v4 and v5 all indicate that they most prefer their least preferred candidate,
c2, causing c2 to win the election. We see in the next theorem that this oddity is unique to
neither the preferences in Example 5.2.2 nor the Borda count.
Theorem 5.3.2. For each of the non-dictatorial voting rules, Kemeny, Borda, approval,
Dodgson, STV, and any Condorcet-consistent rule, there exist instances of the Strategic
Voting Game in which:
(i) there is a single candidate c1 (respectively cm) who is most (respectively least) preferred
by every voter;
(ii) there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that elects cm.
Proof. Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm}. Let πv = (c1, c2, . . . , cm) ∀v ∈ N . Property (i) holds
by construction. For any m ≥ 2 and |N | ≥ m + 1 unanimity implies that the submitted
preference profile Π̄ where π̄v = (cm, cm−1, . . . , c1) ∀v yields social choice r(Π̄) = cm.
Moreover, if any one voter v alters π̄v, cm remains the Condorcet winner, the Kemeny
winner, the Borda winner, etc. Therefore, Π̄ corresponds to a pure Nash equilibrium of the
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strategic voting game. Incidentally, by unanimity r(Π) = c1 and hence Π corresponds to a
pure Nash equilibrium of the game, though that is not needed for the proof.
The Nash equilibrium strategy set Π̄ in the proof of Theorem 5.3.2 is absurd because
the voters are dishonest to their own disbenefit. It is not plausible that voters would lie in
order to achieve a less preferable outcome. The strategic voting game admits many other
nonsensical pure strategy equilibria. For example, most submitted profiles that are unan-
imous yield Nash equilibria. These observations call for a refinement concept to remove
such equilibria.
5.3.1 Dynamic Cournot Equilibria
Branzei et al. [13] propose to refine the set of equilibria by retaining only pure strategy
equilibria reachable from sincere voting by a sequence of best responses of the voters. We
refer to these as dynamic Cournot equilibria. This refinement does eliminate the absurd
equilibrium in Example 5.3.1. However, it also eliminates the equilibrium in Example
5.2.3. With respect to the sincere preferences in Example 5.2.2, everyone is honest in the
only dynamic Cournot equilibrium.
Example 5.3.3. A Dynamic Cournot Equilibrium
Consider the sincere preferences from Example 5.2.2.
πv1 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.18)
πv2 = (c1, c2, c3) (5.19)
πv3 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.20)
πv4 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.21)
πv5 = (c3, c1, c2) (5.22)
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Suppose further that we select the winning candidate using Borda count and break ties by se-
lecting the best candidate with the lowest index. With respect to the sincere preferences the Borda
counts for candidates c1, c2, and c3 are 7, 2, and 6 respectively. Candidate c1 wins the election and
neither v1 nor v2 have a desire to change the outcome of the election. The remaining voters prefer
c3. However, no individual can change the result of the election; v3 cannot increase the score of
c3 and can only decrease the score of c1 by one which does not cause c3 to win the election. Thus,
voters have no incentive to deviate from their sincere preferences and the sincere preferences are
the only dynamic Cournot equilibrium.
Example 5.3.3 demonstrates that the dynamic Cournot refinement is too stringent. We
show in Theorem 5.3.4 and Corollary 5.3.5 that, with probability converging to 1, only
one dynamic Cournot equilibrium exists, and in that equilibrium all voters are truthful.
Hence the restriction to dynamic Cournot equilibria is, with high probability, tantamount
to forbidding manipulation. Definition 5.2.1 puts no requirement on how ties are broken.
To detect unavoidable ties, we say voter v distinguishes candidates c, d is iff gv(c) 6= gv(d).
Theorem 5.3.4. Let a score voting procedure bounded by K be employed to select from
candidate set C. Let p be any probability distribution on G, the set of possible score func-
tions, such that every pair of candidates is distinguishable with positive probability. Let
a population of n voters be sampled independently according to p. Then as n → ∞ the
probability converges to 1 that the only dynamic Cournot equilibrium is for all voters to be
truthful.
Proof: Let random variable Sc be the score of c ∈ C. By assumptionE[Scn ] =
∑
g∈G p(g)g(c).
Hence if the candidate pair c, d is distinguishable there must exist g ∈ G such that p(g) > 0





P (|Sc − Sd| < k) = 0. (5.23)






then |Sc− Sd]→∞ with probability 1 by the law of large numbers. If the expected values
are equal, Sc − Sd is the sum of n i.i.d. non-trivial random variables with mean 0, which

















P (|Sc1 − Sc2| ≥ 2K) = 0. (5.24)
Therefore, if all voters are truthful, the probability converges to 1 that there is a unique
winning candidate who wins by at least 2K.
A single voter can change Sc − Sd by at most 2K − 2. (In fact w.p. 1 no coalition
of order n.5−ε voters could change the outcome.) Therefore, if all voters are truthful, the
probability converges to 1 that the outcome is a Nash equilibrium, which therefore is the
unique dynamic Cournot equilibrium.
We now extend Theorem 5.3.4 to voting procedures that are based the outcomes of
pairwise elections. A Condorcet winner is a candidate who is preferred to every other
candidate by more than half of the voters. The principle is often accepted that the Condorcet
winner, if it exists, should be the social choice. Several voting procedures take this principle
as a point of departure and thereby operate on the tournament graph on vertex set C where
a directed edge (c, d) exists iff c defeats d and an undirected edge {c, d} exists iff c and d
tie, i.e. are preferred by an equal number of voters. For example, in α-Copeland scoring
candidate c gets 1 point for each outgoing edge and 0 ≤ α < 1 points for each incident
undirected edge.
Corollary 5.3.5. Theorem 5.3.4 holds for social choice rules that select a winning subset
of the candidates based only on the tournament graph, and perform tie-breaking within
that subset either independent of V or based on a scoring function according to Definition
5.2.1.
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Proof: A pairwise election between c, d ∈ C is equivalent to a score voting procedure with
K = 2 and gv(c)+gv(d) ≤ 2 ∀v ∈ N . By Lemma 5.6.1 P (|Sc−Sd| ≤ 2)→ 0 as n→∞.
Hence the probability of a pairwise tie goes to zero. Moreover, since a single voter can only
change the difference of the scores within a pairwise election by 2, the probability goes to 0
that any voter can alter the tournament graph. If tie-breaking is based on a scoring function,
then by Theorem 5.3.4 the probability goes to 0 that any voter can change the tie-breaking
outcome.
5.3.2 Minimally Dishonest Voting and the Price of Deception
Theorem 5.3.2 shows that we must refine the set of equilibria of the strategic voting game.
Theorem 5.3.4 and its corollary show that the dynamic Cournot refinement of Branzei et
al. [13] is too restrictive. We propose a different refinement based on the hypothesis that
although people may lie for a purpose, they do not lie spuriously. It follows that a voter
would lie “just enough” to achieve a more-preferred outcome, but would not lie more than
necessary to achieve it. We call such behavior minimal dishonesty as defined in Section
2.3. We begin by measuring honesty.
Definition 5.3.6 (Bubble Sort or Kendall Tau Distance). For all ci, cj ∈ C, denote by
R(π, ci, cj) the relationship between ci and cj with respect to π. The the distance between
π1 and π2 is defined as
d(π1, π2) := |{i, j} : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ |C|;R(π1, ci, cj) 6= R(π2, ci, cj)}|. (5.25)
Example 5.3.7. Calculating d(π1, π2).
In Example 5.3.1, voter v3’s sincere prefererences were πv3 = (c3, c1, c2). With respect to the
sincere preferences voter v3 prefers c1 to c2 (i.e. c1  c2 and R(πv3 , c1, c2) = {}). However,
with respect to the submitted preferences list π′v3 = (c2, c3, c1), voter v3 indicates they prefer c2
to c1 and R(π′v3 , c1, c2) = {≺} 6= R(πv3 , c1, c2). Similarly, R(π
′





Definition 5.3.8. Let Π be the sincere preferences and let Π̄ be a Nash equilibrium in the
Strategic Voting Game. A voter v ∈ V is minimally dishonest if d(π̄′v, πv) < d(π̄v, πv)
implies that v’s utility of the more honest outcome, uv(πv, r([Π̄−v, π̄′v])), is less than v’s
utility of the equilibrium outcome, uv(πv, r(Π̄)).
A pure strategy Nash equilibrium is minimally dishonest if every voter is minimally
dishonest.
Stated in the contrapositive, players are not minimally dishonest if a small change to
their purported preference π̄ is more truthful and yields at least as (truthfully) preferred an
outcome.
We can now precisely define the Price of Deception in strategic voting games.
Definition 5.3.9. Let r be the single-valued voting rule of a strategic voting game. Let U
be an associated real-valued function that, given a profile Π of voter preferences over C,
outputs for each c ∈ C a societal utility U(Π, c) of candidate c respect to Π. The function r
must be such that for all Π, r(Π) ∈ arg maxc∈C U(Π, c). When voting is characterized as a






Let NE(Π) denote the set of purported preference profiles of the minimally dishonest






Normalized Price of Deception
The Price of Deception as defined is not a fine enough measure to discriminate among
scenarios with unbounded Price of Deception. For example, suppose that the sincere winner
gets 40% of the votes in one plurality election and gets 20% of the votes in another. Suppose
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in both elections there is a strategic equilibrium in which the winner is no voter’s top choice.
The Price of Deception is equally bad – infinity – in both elections, yet we might wish it
to be measured as worse in the first election. In Section 3.3 we handle this by bounding
how close preferences can get to zero. However, our voting rules are integer valued and
therefore such a trick will not work.
Another potential shortcoming of the Price of Deception is that its value can be greatly
altered by changing a score’s scale. For instance, in a plurality election it is possible for
a winning candidate in the strategic voting game to be no voter’s first choice. The Price
of Deception can be 1/0 = ∞. Create a new decision mechanism, plurality+, where a
candidate receives 2 points for being most favored by a voter, and 1 point from the voter
otherwise. Plurality and plurality+ always yield the same outcome, yet they have signifi-
cantly different Prices of Deception. With respect to plurality+, every candidate receives
between n and 2n votes and the Price of Deception is at most 2.
To address both of these issues, we can normalize the Price of Deception so that its
value is at most m for all voting mechanisms. We apply an affine transformation to the
scoring function such that each candidate receives at least 1 and at most m points. While
Price of Deception without normalization gives a pure measure of how much a voting rule
can be manipulated, we believe that normalization is appropriate for comparing Prices of
Deception of different mechanisms. For example, plurality and plurality+ have the same
Prices of Deception after normalization.
5.4 Prices of Deception for Voting Rules with Lexicographic-Tie Breaking
This section derives exact values or estimates of the Price of Deception of several well-
known voting procedures, and also the Price of Deception of Balinski’s recently proposed
“majority judgement” procedure [7]. We include proofs of several lower and upper bounds
that illustrate the ideas and types of reasoning employed. We defer to Section 5.6 proofs
that are technical but require no additional concepts.
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Since r is single-valued, the winning candidate, r(Π) ∈ argmaxc∈C U(Π, c), is uniquely
selected even though their may be multiple candidates that maximize social utility. We as-
sume that ties are broken lexicographically according to some predetermined list. For each
voting mechanism the predetermined list is described and an example is given to demon-
strate the lower bound for the Price of Deception. Throughout this section, m = |C|
denotes the number of candidates and n denotes the number of voters.
5.4.1 Dictatorship
Since dictatorship is immune to strategic voting, its Price of Deception equals 1.
5.4.2 Veto
The veto rule is a score voting procedure in which each voter gives zero points to their least
preferred candidate and one point to all other candidates. The winning candidate has the
highest number of points. Given n voters and m candidates, the score for each candidate is
between 0 and n and each voter gives out m− 1 points.
Theorem 5.4.1. The Price of Deception for veto voting is 1 + 1
m−1 .
Proof: First, we show that the Price of Deception is at most 1 + 1
m−1 . Suppose that at a
minimally dishonest equilibrium candidate cm is the winning candidate. Let A be the set
of voters that would veto cm if everyone was sincere. The sincere score for cm is n− |A|.
For all v ∈ A, at the equilibrium, v must veto cm. If not, v is not minimally dishonest
since v can be more honest and veto cm which either causes cm to lose the election, a strict
improvement for v, or has no result on the outcome.
Therefore, the equilibrium score for cm is at most n − |A|. For cm to win the election,
cm must receive at least the average number of votes. Hence n − |A| ≥ n(m−1)m implying
that |A| ≤ n
m
and that cm’s sincere score is at least n − nm . Since the sincere winner can
receive at most n points, the Price of Deception is at most n
n− n
m
= 1 + 1
m−1 .
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Finally, we give an example showing that the Price of Deception is at least 1+ 1
m−1 . The
predetermined list for tie breaking is such that if c1 and cj 6= c1 both have the same score,
then c1 will not be the winner of the election. There are m groups of voters A1, ..., Am. Let
k be a multiple of m and consider the following preference profiles for each group:




πji = (c1, c2, ..., cm) ∀i ∈ Aj where |Aj| =
k
m
+ 1 ∀j ∈ {2, ...,m}. (5.28)
If everyone is sincere, c2 through cm−1 tie for first place with k + m − 1 points and





k + m − 1 points. We now give a set of submitted
preferences describing a minimally dishonest equilibrium where c1 is the unique winner
giving a Price of Deception of k+m−1
(1− 1m)k+m−1
which approaches 1 + 1
m−1 as k grows large.
All voters in group i will veto candidate ci. Since A1 is the smallest set, c1 is the winner
in this equilibrium. Every voter in A1 is honest and cannot cause c1 to lose points and
cannot cause any other candidate to gain points. Therefore no one in A1 can alter their
submitted preferences to be more honest or get a better result. Every voter in Am is honest
and their favorite candidate is the unique winner therefore no one in Am has incentive to
change their submitted preference. For all other i, their favorite candidate is the unique
winner, so only honesty could motivate them to alter their vote. If voter v ∈ Ai is more
honest, then candidate ci will tie with c1 resulting in a worse outcome for v, who prefers
c1 to all other candidates. Therefore these preferences describe a minimally dishonest
equilibrium and the Price of Deception can be arbitrarily close to 1 + 1
m−1 .
To normalize the score of any voting mechanism, we need to apply a affine transfor-
mation to the points given by the voters such that the ratio of the maximum to minimum
number of total points a candidate can receive is m. For veto, this is achieved by having a
voter give 1
n
points to the candidate whom they veto and m
n
points to all other candidates.
Theorem 5.4.2. The normalized Price of Deception for veto voting is 1 + m−1
m2−m+1 .
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Proof: This proof follows in the same fashion as the proof for Theorem 5.4.1. As before,
|A| ≤ n
m











= 1 + m−1
m2−m+1 . Similarly, updating the scores in the lower bound, the Price




which approaches 1 + m−1
m2−m+1 as k grows
large.
5.4.3 Approval
Approval voting is a score voting procedure in which candidate c receives one point from
every voter who approves of c. As with veto voting, the winning candidate has the highest
number of points. For n voters and m candidates, each candidates receives between 0 and
n points. We assume that voter v has no preferences over the set of candidates whom v
does not approve of.
Theorem 5.4.3. The Price of Deception for approval voting is 2.
Proof: We begin by giving the upper bound. Suppose that c1 would get the most points if
everyone were sincere and that cm wins the election at a minimally dishonest equilibrium.
Let A and B be the set of individuals who sincerely approve of c1 and cm respectively. The
Price of Deception is |A||B| .
We claim that for all v ∈ A \ B, v declares approval of c1 at the equilibrium. If not,
consider the consequences of v being more honest by declaring approval of c1. This either
has no effect on the outcome or causes c1 to win the election. Thus, by minimal dishonesty,
the claim holds. By a symmetric argument, for all v /∈ B, v declares disapproval of cm at
the equilibrium.
This implies that c1 receives at least |A \ B| points and cm receives at most |B| points
at an equilibrium. Since cm receives the most points at an equilibrium, |B| ≥ |A \ B| ≥
|A| − |B| which implies that |B| ≥ |A|
2
and that the Price of Deception is at most 2.
Finally, we show by construction that the Price of Deception is at least 2. Consider
k + 1 voters who prefer cm to c1 and who disapprove of all other candidates and k voters
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who only approve of c1. If voters were sincere, c1 would receive 2k points and cm would
receive k points. We now give an equilibrium where cm wins the election yielding a Price
of Deception of 2k+1
k+1
which approaches 2 as k grows large.
Each of the first k + 1 voters purports to approve only of cm. The remaining k voters
are honest. The first k voters receive their first choice and if they are more honest then they
receive a strictly worse outcome. The remaining k voters are honest and cannot change the
result of the election. Therefore these submitted preferences form a minimally dishonest
equilibrium and the Price of Deception is at least 2.
Since the maximum and minimum scores for any candidate are n and 0 respectively, the
scoring function for approval voting is not normalized. We normalize by giving m
n
points
to candidate ci for each voter who approves of ci, and 1n points for each voter who does not
approve. Each candidate now receives between 1 and m points.
Theorem 5.4.4. The normalized Price of Deception for approval voting is 2m
m+1
.
Proof: Once again this proof follows in the same fashion as the previous proof. Updating
the upper bound from Theorem 5.4.3, the Price of Deception is at most 2m
m+1
. Updating the







Borda count is a score voting procedure where gv(c) = |C| − k if c is v’s kth favorite
candidate. The winning candidate is a candidate that receives the most points. Given n
voters and m candidates, the points for each candidate are between 0 and n(m − 1) and






Theorem 5.4.5. The Price of Deception for Borda count voting is m.
Proof: Suppose c1 = r(Π) and that c2 = r(Π̄) is the winner at an equilibrium. Let xij
be the number of voters who would give i − 1 points to c1 and j − 1 points to c2 if they
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were honest for i, j ∈ {1, ...,m}. The sincere scores for the candidates are then given by
SΠc1 =
∑
i 6=j(i− 1)xij and SΠc2 =
∑






i 6=j(j − 1)xij
. (5.29)
Due to minimal dishonesty, voter v is honest if c2 is v’s sincerely least preferred can-
didate. Because of this and Lemma 5.6.2 in Section 5.6.1, the following holds for the
equilibrium scores, SΠ′c1 and S
Π̄
c2














Since SΠ̄c2 ≥ S
Π̄
c1
















(i− 1)xi1 ≤ 0 (5.33)
xij ∈ Z≥0. (5.34)
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(i− 1)xi1 ≤ 0 (5.36)
∑
i 6=j
(j − 1)xij = 1 (5.37)
xij ∈ R≥0. (5.38)
The dual to this linear program is
min w′ = y2 (5.39)
subject to : (i−m− 1)y1 +(j − 1)y2 ≥ i− 1 ∀ i > j > 1 (5.40)
(1−m)y1 +(j − 1)y2 ≥ i− 1 ∀ j > i (5.41)
(i− 1)y1 ≥ i− 1 ∀i = 2, ...,m (5.42)
y1 ∈ R≥0. (5.43)
A feasible solution to the dual is y1 = 1 and y2 = m with objective value m. By weak
duality [66], for every feasible z′ and w′, z′ ≤ w′ and the Price of Deception is at most m.
To realize the lower bound we give three groups of voters, A1 A2 and A3, with sincere
preferences Π. The predetermined list for tie breaking is such that if c2 and cj 6= c2 have
the same score, then c2 will not win the election.
πi = (c1, c3, c4, ..., cm, c2) ∀i ∈ A1 where |A1| = n (5.44)
πi = (cm, cm−1, ..., c1) ∀i ∈ A2 where |A2| = n− 1 (5.45)
πi = (c2, c1, cm, cm−1, ..., c3) ∀i ∈ A3 where |A3| = m (5.46)
For sufficiently large n, SΠci < S
Π
cm = nm + m
2 − 4m + 1 for all i 6= m and SΠc2 =
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n − 1 + m2 − m. If c2 is the winner at a Nash equilibrium, then the Price of Deception
of Borda count voting is at least nm+m
2−4m+1
n−1+m2−m which approaches m as n grows large. We
claim that the following preferences Π̄ form a minimally dishonest equilibrium:
π̄i = (c1, c3, c4, ..., cm, c2) (honest) ∀i ∈ A1 (5.47)
π̄i = (c2, cm, cm−1, ..., c3, c1) ∀i ∈ A2 (5.48)
π̄i = (c2, c1, cm, cm−1, ..., c3) (honest) ∀i ∈ A3 (5.49)
For all i ≥ 3, SΠ̄ci = nm − n + 2 − i + (m − 1)i − 3m ≤ nm − n + 2 + m
2 − 4m
and SΠ̄c2 = S
Π̄
c1
+ 1 = nm + m2 − 2m − n + 1 and thus c2 wins the election. Candidate
c2 defeats c1 by one point and all other candidates by at least 2m − 1 points. Since any
single voter can cause a candidate’s score to change by at most m − 1, no candidate can
cause ci to win for i ∈ {3, ...,m}. Furthermore, voters in A1 can neither increase c1’s score
nor decrease c2’s score. Therefore, no one can alter their preferences to get a strictly better
result. Finally, if a voter v ∈ A2 is more honest, then it will cause c1 to at least tie which
results in a worse outcome for v. Thus, the Price of Deception is at least m.
To normalize the Borda count, we let ḡv(c) = |C| − k + 1 if c is v’s kth favorite
candidate. The points for each candidate are now between n and nm and the Price of
Deception is trivially at most m.





When updating Theorem 5.4.5, the lower bound becomes m+2
3
. When updating the
proof for the upper bound, since all scores increase by one point, only the second column
and right hand sides will change. They will both increase by one and a new dual feasible
solution is y1 = m2m−1 and y2 =
m2





Majority Judgment [7] is a scoring social choice mechanism where each voter v has a
sincere valuation of candidate c given by gΠv (c) ∈ {1, ..., u}. As before, voter v may act
strategically and submit a value of gΠ̄v (c) ∈ {1, ..., u} for candidate instead. The winning
candidate is a candidate with the highest median score. The highest and lowest score for
any candidate is u and 1 respectively.
Unlike other mechanisms analyzed in this paper, Majority Judgment does not rely on
ordinal information from the voters. As a result, we must alter the definition of minimal
dishonesty for this mechanism. A voter v is minimally dishonest if for every candidate c
and for every x ∈ {1, ..., u} where |gΠv (c) − x| < |gΠv (c) − gΠ̄v (c)|, v prefers the outcome
obtained by submitting a value of gΠ′v (c) for candidate c over the outcome obtained by
submitting a value of x for candidate c.
Theorem 5.4.7. The Price of Deception for Majority Judgment is u− 1.
Proof: If any voter has a sincere value of u for candidate c, then voter v will be honest
about c. Similarly, if a voter has a sincere value of 1 for candidate c, then v will be honest
about c. Thus, if candidate c has a sincere median score of u (1), then c will also have a
median score of u (1 respectively) at equilibrium. Therefore if the sincere winner has a
sincere score of u, then then equilibrium winner must have a sincere median score of at
least 2 and the Price of Deception is at most u
2
. Alternatively, the sincere winner may have
a sincere score of u − 1, the equilibrium winner may have a score of 1 and the Price of
Deception is at most u− 1.
We now show that the Price of Deception is at least u − 1. Let gΠv (c) be v’s sincere
value for candidate c and gΠ̄v (c) be v’s submitted value for candidate c at an equilibrium.
The predetermined list for tie breaking is such that if c1 has the highest median score, then
c1 will win the election. Consider three groups of voters, A1, A2, and A3. Their sincere and
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submitted preferences are as follows:
v ∈ A1 : gΠv (c1) = gΠ̄v (c1) = 1, gΠv (ci) = gΠ̄v (ci) = u, (5.50)
v ∈ A2 : gΠv (c1) = gΠ̄v (c1) = 1, gΠv (ci) = gΠ̄v (ci) = 1, (5.51)
v = A3 : g
Π
v (c1) = g
Π̄
v (c1) = u, g
Π
v (ci) = u− 1, gΠ̄v (ci) = 1, (5.52)
where |A1| = n, |A2| = n and |A3| = 1.
For some i 6= 1, ci wins the election if everyone is honest with a median score of u− 1
while c1 only has a median score of 1. Due to the tie breaking rule c1 is selected with the
submitted preferences. Furthermore, no individual can change their preferences to get a
better candidate and all individuals are minimally dishonest and the Price of Deception is
u− 1.
If voter v’s score for candidate c is x, then v’s normalized score for c is m−1
u−1 (x−1) + 1.
After the transformation, the maximum score for any candidate is m and the minimum
score for any candidate is 1. The bound for the Price of Deception can be obtained by
updating Theorem 5.4.7.
Theorem 5.4.8. The normalized Price of Deception for Majority Judgment is um−2m+1
u−1 .
5.4.6 α-Copeland
In α-Copland voting, each voter has a strict ordering over all candidates. For each pair of
candidates ci and cj , if the majority prefers ci to cj , then ci gets one point. In the event of a
tie, each candidate receives α points where 0 ≤ α < 1. Each candidate receives between 0
and m− 1 points in total.
Theorem 5.4.9. The Price of Deception for α-Copland voting is at least m− 2.
Proof: The predetermined list for tie breaking is such that if c2 and cj 6= c2 have the same
score, then c2 does not win the election. Again let SΠci be the sincere Copeland score for
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candidate ci and let SΠ̄ci be the Copeland score for candidate ci with respect to the submitted
preferences. A set of sincere preferences to achieve this lower bound is as follows:
π1 = (c3, c4, c5, ..., cm−2, cm−1, c2, c1, cm) (5.53)
π2 = (c4, c5, c6, ..., cm−1, cm, c2, c1, c3) (5.54)
... (5.55)
πm−2 = (cm, c3, c4, ..., cm−3, cm−2, c2, c1, cm−1) (5.56)
πi = (c1, c3, c4, ..., cm−3, cm−2, cm−1, cm, c2) ∀i ∈ A (5.57)
πi = (c1, cm, cm−1, ..., c6, c5, c4, c3, c2) ∀i ∈ B (5.58)
where |A| = |B| = m−3
2







for all other i. Candidate c1 is the winner if everyone is sincere. A minimally
dishonest equilibrium is as follows:
π̄1 = (c2, c3, c4, c5, ..., cm−2, cm−1, c1, cm) (5.59)
π̄2 = (c2, c4, c5, c6, ..., cm−1, cm, c1, c3) (5.60)
... (5.61)
π̄m−2 = (c2, cm, c3, c4, ..., cm−3, cm−2, c1, cm−1) (5.62)
π̄i = (c1, c3, c4, ..., cm−3, cm−2, cm−1, cm, c2) ∀i ∈ A (5.63)
π̄i = (c1, cm, cm−1, ..., c6, c5, c4, c3, c2) ∀i ∈ B (5.64)
In this equilibrium, SΠ̄c2 = S
Π̄
c1
+ 1 = m − 1 and SΠ̄ci =
m−3
2
for all other i. Letting
C be the directed cycle defined by c3 → c4 → ... → cm → c3, candidate ci wins a
majority over the m−3
2
candidates appearing before ci and loses to the m−32 appearing after
ci. Furthermore, if cj appears k ≤ m−32 positions prior to ci, then ci would lose a majority
election to cj by m − 2k votes. For i where 3 ≤ i ≤ m, candidate ci loses to c2 by 1 vote
and to c1 by 1 vote. We now show that the solution is an equilibrium.
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Voters in A and B, they cannot decrease c2’s score, cannot increase c1’s score and for
all other i, can only increase ci’s score by 1 point by placing ci ahead of c1. Therefore, for
any permutation, candidate c2 still wins the election. Furthermore, voters in A and B are
minimally dishonest.
By symmetry, it now suffices to show that voter 1 can do no better. The voter will only
change their preferences if they can make ci win where 3 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 or if they can be
more honest and get at least as good a result. However, for i where 3 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the
voter can only increase the score of ci by 1 since ci already appears ahead of c1. Since c2
has a score of m− 1 and ci has a score of m−32 , the voter cannot make ci win. Furthermore,
the voter will be more honest only if they switch ci with c2 for some iwhere 3 ≤ i ≤ m−1.
However, this will cause the score of c2 to decrease by 1 and thus c1 and c2 will tie resulting
in a strictly worse solution for the voter. Thus, the submitted preferences form a minimally
dishonest equilibrium and the Price of Deception is at least m− 2.
To normalize 1st order Copeland scores, we add one to the score of every candidate.
Every candidate receives between 1 and m points and the normalized Price of Deception
is by definition at most m. After updating the proof for Theorem 5.4.9, we obtain the
following bound on the Price of Deception.





Plurality voting is a scoring voter mechanism where each voter give only one point to
their favorite candidate and zero points to all other candidates. The winning candidate is
a candidate that receives the most points. The maximum and minimum number of points
that a candidate may receive is n and 0 respectively.
Theorem 5.4.11. The Price of Deception for plurality voting is∞.
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Proof: The predetermined list for tie breaking is such that if c2 and cj 6= c2 have the same
score, then c2 does not win the election. Suppose that the sincere and putative preferences
are given by
πi = (c1, ..., cm) π̄i = πi ∀i ∈ A1 (5.65)
πi = (c1, ..., cm) π̄i = (c2, c1, c3, c4, ..., cm) ∀i ∈ A2 (5.66)
πi = (c3, c4, ..., cm, c1, c2) π̄i = πi ∀i ∈ A3 (5.67)
where |A1| = k − 2, |A2| = k + 1 and |A3| = k. When everyone is honest, c1 wins the
election with 2k − 1 points and c2 receives zero points. With the submitted preferences c2
wins the election with k + 1 points. Since c2 defeats c3 by one point and c1 by 3 points, no
voter can alter their preferences to receive a strictly better outcome. Furthermore, if anyone
in A2 is more honest, then c3 would win the election. Thus the submitted preferences form
a Nash equilibrium and the Price of Deception is∞.
To normalize the scoring for plurality voting candidate ci would receive mn points from
a voter that lists ci as their favorite candidate and 1n from all other voters.
Theorem 5.4.12. The normalized Price of Deception for plurality voting is 2m+1
3
.
Proof: Updating the proof of Theorem 5.4.11, the Price of Deception is at least (2m+1)k−m
3k−1
which converges to 2m+1
3
as k grows large.
It remains to prove the upper bound. Suppose that c1 is a winner if everyone is sincere
and that c2 is the winner at equilibrium. We may assume that c2 is not the sincere winner
since this would yield a Price of Deception of one.
First we claim that if voter v most prefers candidate ci then v either indicates that they
most prefer ci or c2. For contradiction, suppose that v indicates that they most prefer cj /∈
{c2, ci}. If v is completely honest, then cj’s score decreases and ci’s score increases. This
cannot yield a worse solution for v contradicting that the submitted preferences formed a
minimally dishonest equilibrium. Thus, if voter v most prefers candidate ci then v indicates
126
that they most prefer either ci or c2.
Next we claim there is a candidate ci that loses to c2 by at most one vote. For con-
tradiction suppose that every candidate loses to c2 by at least two votes. Since c2 is not a
sincere winner and by the previous claim, there must be a voter v who most prefers ci for
some i 6= 2 but indicates that they most prefer c2. If v were honest then c2 would lose one
vote and ci would gain one vote. Since c2 wins by at least two votes, either c2 will remain
the unique winner or ci and c2 will tie. Neither outcome is worse for v contradicting that
the preferences formed a minimally dishonest equilibrium. Thus there is a candidate ci that
loses to c2 by exactly one vote.
Now we break the problem into two cases. In Case 1 c1 comes in second at equilibrium
and in Case 2 c3 comes in second but c1 does not.
Case 1: c1 finishes in second. Let A be the set of voters that most prefer c1, W be the
set of voters that indicate that they most prefer c2 and let B = W ∩ A. Since c1 loses to c2
by at most one vote, |B| = 0. Thus |W | ≥ |A| and |W |+ |A| ≤ n, and |A| ≤ n
2
. If c2 was










Case 2: c3 finishes in second but c1 does not. Let A be the set of voters that most prefer
c1, W be the set of voters that indicate that they most prefer c2, B = W ∩ A and let D be
the set of voters that indicate that they most prefer c3. Since there are n voters, we have
that |W | + |D| + |A| − |B| ≤ n. Since c3 is in second place, |D| + 1 ≥ |W | ≥ |D|.
By definition, |W | ≥ |B|. Furthermore, c1 loses to c3 by at least one vote and we have
that |D| ≥ |A| − |B| + 1. Using Fourier-Motzkin elimination, we obtain that |A| ≤ 2
3
n.










5.5 Prices of Deception for Voting Rules with Random-Tie Breaking
To this point, like Gibbard and Satterthwaite, we have examined decision mechanisms that
are single-valued. Neutral (anonymous) voting mechanisms are such that relabeling the
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candidates (respectively voters) does not change the outcome of an election. In general,
single-valued voting mechanisms cannot be both neutral and anonymous [68]. By breaking
ties lexicographically according to a predetermined list of candidates in Section 5.4, we
have violated neutrality. Alternatively every theorem in Section 5.4 holds if we break ties
by violating only anonymity and select the most preferred candidate by a particular voter
from the set of candidates with the highest score.
In this section, we consider neutral and anonymous decision mechanisms where ties
are broken randomly. One option is to randomly select a tie breaking rule that violates
neutrality or anonymity and report the rule to the voters. For example, in Section 5.4,
instead of breaking ties by selecting the first possible candidate from a predetermined list,
ties would be broken by selecting from a randomly chosen list. The selected list however
would be reported to candidates prior to voting. Thus, from the perspective of the voters at
the time that they cast their ballots the decision mechanism is single-valued and all upper
bounds from Section 5.4 hold.
More interesting however is when voters do not know the result of the randomness prior
to voting. We now consider voting mechanisms where the winner is selected uniformly at
random from the set of candidates that have the highest score. Instead of being single
valued, f(Π) ⊆ C is the set of candidates that have positive probability of winning2.
5.5.1 Valuation of Risk and the Price of Deception
An immediate consequence of allowing r to be set-valued is that ordinal preferences over
C are no longer sufficient to characterize a voters’ preferences. Ordinal preferences over
C are insufficient to determine whether voter v prefers their 2nd most preferred candidate
to an outcome yielding their most preferred candidate half the time and their 3rd most
preferred candidate the rest of the time. Instead, each candidate needs to have ordinal
2For non-uniform distributions we should view r(Π) ∈ [0, 1]|C| as a probability distribution where r(Π)i
denotes the probability that ci wins the election. However since we are selecting the candidate uniformly at
random, giving only the set of candidates that have positive probability of winning is sufficient to characterize
the outcome.
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preferences over all 2|C| − 1 non-empty subsets of C3.
Alternatively, as in Definition 5.2.1 for score voting procedures, we can always cast
individual preferences as cardinal values. However, a voter v must have a value for gv(C ′)
for all C ′ ⊆ C. An individual’s expected utility, 1|r(Π)|
∑
c∈r(Π) uv(c), is not necessarily
equal to the utility of the outcome, uv(r(Π)). An individual is risk-neutral if the two are
equal. An individual is risk-prone (risk-averse) if the utility of the outcome r(Π) is more
(respectively less) than the expected utility of r(Π).




|C′|1{uv(c)≥k} be the probability that the randomly selected can-
didate will have a utility is at least k given outcome C ′ for voter v. Voter v is rational only
if uv(C ′) ≥ uv(C ′′) whenever Pv(C ′, k) ≥ Pv(C ′′, k) for all k. Individual valuations of
risk can greatly impact the set of equilibria and in general may greatly alter the Price of
Deception. However, all results in this section only require that voters are rational.
Society also has its own valuation of risk that may not correlate with the voters’ val-
uations of risk. Unlike the voters, society’s valuation of risk has no impact on the set of
equilibria. It does, however, impact the Price of Deception. As society becomes more risk-
averse (prone) the Price of Deception will not decrease (respectively increase). Generally,
we only assume that society is rational.
Definition 5.3.8 for minimal dishonesty is unchanged when r becomes set-valued and
Definition 5.3.9 for the Price of Deception is easily updated for set-valued functions given
society’s valuation of risk. We now analyze how the Prices of Deception from Section 5.4
change when ties are broken randomly. In addition, we find the Price of Deception when
the winner is uniquely determined.
5.5.2 Random Dictator
Given that there is never a tie when the winning candidate is determined by a dictator, we
instead analyze the random dictator rule. A voter is selected uniformly at random and the
3For non-uniform distributions, a voter may need to have preferences over all distributions over the set of
candidates, {x ∈ [0, 1]|C| : ||x||1 = 1}.
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voter’s most preferred candidate is selected as the winning candidate. Furthermore, since
honesty is the only minimally dishonest response for any dictator, every individual will be
honest and the Price of Deception is one.
5.5.3 Veto
The key step in Theorem 5.4.1 was showing that if cm has the most points at an equilibrium,
then the sincere score of for cm is at least n − nm . However, this holds for all candidates
who have positive probability of winning in an election where ties are broken randomly
and the upper bound for the Price of Deception remains unchanged assuming society is
rational. Furthermore, the lower bound presented in Theorem 5.4.1 is still valid and the
(normalized) Price of Deception remains 1 + 1
m−1 (respectively 1 +
m−1
m2−m+1 ). The example
in Theorem 5.4.1 has a unique candidate with high score. Thus, the Price of Deception
remains unchanged even if there is no unique winner.
5.5.4 Approval
Like veto, the key step in Theorem 5.4.3 was showing if cm has the most points at an equi-
librium and c1 was the sincere winner, then the sincere score for cm is at least half the
sincere score of c1. Once again this holds for all candidates that have positive probability
of winning and the upper bound for the Price of Deception remains unchanged assuming
society is rational. The lower bound in Theorem 5.4.3 remains valid with random tie break-
ing and the (normalized) Price of Deception remains 2 (respectively 2m
m+1
). Once again the
Price of Deception remains unchanged in the event of no unique winner.
5.5.5 Borda Count
The preferences given in Theorem 5.4.5 remain valid and the (normalized) Price of Decep-




Theorem 5.5.1. Given that two individuals tie at an equilibrium and that society is risk-





The proof of Theorem 5.5.1 is similar to Theorem 5.4.5 and can be found in Section
5.6.1.
Theorem 5.5.2. Given that at least three individuals tie at an equilibrium and that society
is risk-neutral or risk-prone, the (normalized) Price of Deception for Borda count is at most
m− 1 (respectively m
2
).
Proof: Since society is risk-neutral or risk-prone the societal utility of the outcome r(Π̄) is
U(Π, r(Π̄)) ≥ (|r(Π̄)|−1)n+(|r(Π̄)|−2)n+...+n+0|r(Π̄)| ≥ n. Since a winning candidate can receive at
most n(m− 1) points, the Price of Deception is at most m− 1. The proof for normalized
Price of Deception is similar.
It remains to establish the upper bound when there is a unique winner. The proof
technique in Theorem 5.4.5 applies when there is a unique winner and the (normalized)




2m−1 ]). However, when ties are broken
randomly and there is a unique winner, we are able to establish that the normalized Price
of Deception is at most m
3−2m2+3m−3
2m2−3m giving us that the bound
m+2
3
is tight for m = 3.
Theorem 5.5.3. If there is a unique winner, then the normalized Price of Deception for
Borda count voting is m+2
3




2m2−3m for m > 3.
We replace the model from Theorem 5.4.5 with two new models. Let c be a sincere
winner. In the first model, we assume that c is the only candidate to come in second place
at a minimally dishonest equilibrium and obtain an upper bound of m+1
3
. In the second
model, we assume there is some c′ 6= c that comes in second place at a minimally dishonest
equilibrium. In the second model we obtain a bound of m+2
3
for m = 3 and m
3−2m2+3m−3
2m2−3m
for m > 3. Both models can be found in the Section 5.6.1.
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We also conjecture that the m+2
3
bound is tight. There are two reasons why m
3−2m2+3m−3
2m2−3m
is likely to be loose. In the proof of Theorem 5.4.6 we create a variable xijk representing
the number of sincere voters that give i points to c1, j points to c2 and k points to c3. In
the case when m = 3, this enumerates all types of voters. However, we lose quite a bit of
information when adding more candidates. In addition, we only consider two models. In
this first model the sincere winner comes in second place and in the second model there
is at least one other candidate that comes in second place. For m = 3, this describes all
possible outcomes. However, when there are more candidates there are many more models
to consider. Not only are there multiple possibilities for what place a sincere winner could
come in, there are many possibilities for how many candidates tie for second, third, etc.
5.5.6 Majority Judgment
Theorem 5.5.4. The (normalized) Price of Deception for Majority Judgment is u − 1 (re-
spectively um−2m+1
u−1 ) when society is completely risk-averse.
Proof: The proof for the standard score is symmetric to the normalized score. Thus we
consider only the standard score. We consider two cases. In the first we assume that there
is a sincere winner with median score u. In the second case we assume a sincere winner’s
median score is at most u− 1.
If the sincere winner has a sincere median score of u then by minimal dishonesty that
candidate will have an equilibrium median score of u. Furthermore, if a candidate has a
sincere median score of 1, they will also have an equilibrium median score of 1. As a result
every candidate that comes in first at equilibrium must have a sincere median score of at
least 2 and the Price of Deception is at most u
2
.
If the sincere winner has a sincere median score of u − 1 or less, then it may be pos-
sible for for an equilibrium winner to have a sincere median score of one and the Price of
Deception is at most u− 1.
The preferences given in the proof of Theorem 5.4.7 give a valid lower bound of u− 1
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completing the proof of this theorem.





Proof. The argument for normalized Price of Deception is similar so we only examine the
standard score. As shown in Theorem 5.5.4, if a candidate has a sincere median of 1, then
the candidate will have a score of 1 at equilibrium. Since there are no ties and 1 is the
smallest possible, the candidate cannot win the election. Similarly, if a candidate has a
sincere median score of u, the candidate is the unique winner with a score of u at every
equilibrium and the Price of Deception is one. Thus, if the Price of Deception is more than
one, u − 1 is the highest possible sincere score for the sincere winner and 2 is the lowest
possible sincere score for the equilibrium winner and the Price of Deception is at most
u−1
2
. It remains to give a set of preferences achieving this value. Consider the following
preferences
v ∈ A1 : gΠv (c1) = gΠ
′
v (c1) = u− 1, gΠv (c2) = gΠ̄v (c2) = u, (5.68)
v ∈ A2 : gΠv (c1) = gΠ
′
v (c1) = u− 1, gΠv (c2) = gΠ̄v (c2) = 1, (5.69)
v = A3 : g
Π
v (c1) = g
Π′
v (c1) = 1, g
Π
v (c2) = 2, g
Π̄
v (c2) = u, (5.70)
where |A1| = n, |A2| = n and |A3| = 1. All unlisted values are one. The sincere
winner is c1 with a score of u − 1 while c2 has a sincere score of only 2. The winner
given the submitted preferences is c2. Voters in A1 and A2 are honest and cannot alter their
preferences to obtain a better outcome. If voter v′ is more honest, then v′ will obtain a
strictly worse outcome (assuming ties are broken such that c2 has positive probability of
losing given that c2 ties with c1).










Proof. Once again we only consider the standard scores. The bound of u−1
2
comes from
Theorem 5.5.5 when there is a unique winner. We now assume there is not a unique winner
and the remainder of the proof follows in a similar fashion to Theorem 5.5.4. The lower
bound um−m
u+m−2 comes directly from the example in Theorem 5.4.7.
Once again if a sincere winner has a sincere score of u, then the sincere winner will tie
for first at equilibrium and every other candidate tied for first will have a sincere score of at







is at least one candidate tied for first at equilibrium with a score of u. Thus the Price of
Deception is at most um
u+2m−2 .
Alternatively, an equilibrium winner can have a sincere score of 1. This candidate will
also have an equilibrium score of 1 and thus every candidate must tie for first place. Since
every candidate has an equilibrium score of 1, there can be no candidates with a sincere
score of u. Let x ≤ u − 1 denote the highest sincere score for any candidate. Society’s






yielding a Price of Deception of at
most xm




There were no ties given in the proof of Theorem 5.4.9 and the lower bound given is still
valid when ties are broken randomly. Thus the Price of Deception remains unchanged.
5.5.8 Plurality
The lower bound given in Theorem 5.4.11 remains valid and the Price of Deception is∞
even if ties are broken randomly. However, the normalized Price of Deception changes.
Theorem 5.5.7. The normalized Price of Deception for plurality voting is m.
Proof: The upper bound ism by definition. To obtain the lower bound suppose that we have
k voters with sincere preferences (cm, c1, c2, ..., cm−1) and k voters with sincere preferences
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(cm, cm−1, ..., c1). Candidate cm is the only candidate that would receive any points if
candidates were honest.
We now describe an equilibrium where c1 and cm−1 have a probability of .5 each of be-
ing the winning candidate. The first k voters submit the preference list (c1, cm, c2, ..., cm−1)
while the second set of voters submit the preference list (cm−1, cm, cm−2, ..., c1). No voter
can cause cm to win and if any voter is more honest, they would get a worse solution. Thus
the Price of Deception is m
1
= m.
Finally we note that the proof for Theorem 5.4.12 remains valid if there is a unique
winner even when ties are broken randomly. Thus, given a unique winner, the normalized




Lemma 5.6.1. Let c, d ∈ C be a pair of candidates in an election with n random voters
sampled from a probability distribution p on G(C, g). Suppose there exists g ∈ G(C, g)
such that g(c) 6= g(d) and p(g) > 0. Then for any constants k and ε > 0,
lim
n→∞
n.5−εP (|Sc − Sd| ≤ k) = 0. (5.71)
Proof: For i = 1, . . . , n define the random variable Yi = gvi(c) − gvi(d), where vi is the
ith sample voter drawn according to µ. Let Y =
∑n
i=1 Yi. On the one hand, Y = Sc − Sd.
On the other hand, Y is a sum of n i.i.d. random variables each with nonzero mean or
with nonzero variance σ2. The variance σ2 is finite because the range of |Yi| is bounded by
g(|C|).
















If E[Yi] = 0 then σ2 6= 0 and by the central limit theorem Y/
√
nσ2 converges in dis-
tribution to the standard Gaussian (normal) distribution N(0, 1). The density of a standard





x2 , attains its maximum value 1√
2π
at x = 0.
Therefore








Lemma 5.6.2. Given a sincere profile Π and a profile Π̄ forming a minimally dishonest
equilibrium where |r(Π̄)| ≤ 2, let ωv = maxc∈r(Π̄) gΠv (c) + 1. If gΠv (c) ≥ ωv, then gΠ̄v (c) ≥
gΠv (c)− 1.
Proof: For contradiction, assume there is a c such that gΠv (c) ≥ ωv but gΠ̄v (c) ≤ gΠv (c)− 2.
If c ∈ r(Π̄), then the result immediately holds since v could move c up one position in their
preference list and c would be the unique winner. We now split the problem into two cases
and show that we have a contradiction in both cases.
Case 1: There is a c′ /∈ r(Π̄) such that gΠ̄v (c′) ≥ gΠv (c) − 1 but gΠv (c′) ≤ gΠv (c) − 2.
Voter v can be more honest by switching the location of c and c in π̄v which either has no
effect on the election, causes c to be added to r(Π̄) or causes c to be the unique winner. All
three possibilities yield at least as good an outcome for v, a contradiction. Thus, Case 1
cannot occur.
Case 2: If |r(Π̄)| = 1 then Case 1 must occur. Thus we may assume that r(Π̄) =
{c′, c′′}. Without loss of generality we assume that v prefers c′ to c′′.
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Both gΠ̄v (c
′) ≥ gΠv (c) − 1 and gΠ̄v (c′′) ≥ gΠv (c) − 1. Voter v can be more honest by
switching the locations of c′′ and c in π′v. After the switch, either c
′ will win, c will win or




′) > gΠv (c
′′). This is a contradiction since Π′ describes an equilibrium and the
lemma holds.
Lemma 5.6.3. When ties are broken randomly, if r(Π̄) ∩ r(Π) = ∅ and {c2, c3} = r(Π̄),




Proof: Without loss of generality we examine only standard scores. For contradiction
assume Lemma 5.6.3 is not true and that for all c /∈ r(Π̄), SΠ̄c ≤ SΠ̄c2 − 2. Let A be the
set of voters that prefer c2 to c3 and let B be everyone else. We claim that for all v ∈ V ,
gΠ̄v (c2) = m−1 and gΠ̄v (c3) = 0. If not, then v can either move c2 up in their preference list
causing c2 to be the unique winner, or v can move c3 down in their preference list causing
c2 to be the unique winner since all other candidates lose by at least 2. Thus the claim
holds.








Since this is the average score, every candidate must have this score contradicting that there
were only two candidates with positive probability of winning completing the proof.
Theorem 5.5.1. If ties are broken randomly, two individuals tie at an equilibrium and that
society is risk-neutral or risk-prone, the (normalized) Price of Deception for Borda count





Proof: If r(Π̄) ∩ f(Π) 6= ∅ the Price of Deception is at most 2 since society is either
risk-neutral or risk prone. Thus we assume that c1 ∈ r(Π) \ r(Π̄) and that r(Π̄) = {c2, c3}.
Let xijk be the number of voters that would give i − 1 points to c1, j − 1 points to
c2 and k − 1 points to c3 if they were honest for i, j, k ∈ {1, ...,m}. Let M be the set






(j + k − 2)xijk
(5.75)
We begin by claiming that xi21 = xi12 = 0 for all i. For contradiction, suppose that
xi21 > 0 and let v be such a voter. Due to Lemma 5.6.3, there is a candidate c /∈ {c2, c3}
such that SΠ′c = S
Π′
c2
− 1. First, gΠ̄v (c2) = m − 1, since otherwise v can move c2 up in
their preference list resulting in a better solution. Similarly, since c loses by only one point,
gΠ̄v (c) = m − 1 implying that c = c2, a contradiction. Thus we may omit xijk from the
model when max{j, k} = 2.
The remainder of this proof follows in the same fashion as Theorem 5.4.5. As before
we can show that if voter v would sincerely give c2 or c3 no points, then v would also do this
at an equilibrium. Furthermore, if v sincerely prefers c2 over c3, v’s submitted preferences
will also indicate this. Due to all this and Lemma 5.6.2, we know the following about the






























We generate a mathematical program maximizing the Price of Deception where SΠ̄ci ≥
SΠ̄c1 for i ∈ {2, 3}. After relaxing the problem into a linear program and taking the dual, we
get that every feasible solution to the following linear program creates an upper bound on
the Price of Deception:
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min w′ = y3 (5.79)
subject to :
(i−m− 1)y1 +(i−m)y2 +(j + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, k} ∈M, j > k > 1, i ≥ max{j, k} > 2 (5.80)
(1−m)y1 +(2−m)y2 +(j + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, k} ∈M, j > k > 1, i < max{j, k} > 2 (5.81)
(i−m)y1 +(i−m− 1)y2 +(j + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, k} ∈M, k > j > 1, i ≥ max{j, k} > 2 (5.82)
(2−m)y1 +(1−m)y2 +(j + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, k} ∈M, k > j > 1, i < max{j, k} > 2 (5.83)
(i− 2)y1 +(i−m− 1)y2 +(1 + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, 1, k} ∈M,, i ≥ max{1, k} > 2 (5.84)
y1 +(3−m)y2 +(1 + k − 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, 1, k} ∈M,, i < max{1, k} > 2 (5.85)
(i−m− 1)y1 +(i− 2)y2 +(j + 1− 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, 1} ∈M,, i ≥ max{j, 1} > 2 (5.86)
(3−m)y1 +y2 +(j + 1− 2)y3 ≥ 2(i− 1) ∀ {i, j, 1} ∈M,, i < max{j, 1} > 2 (5.87)
y1, y2 ∈ R≥0. (5.88)
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The coefficients for y1 correspond to the constraint SΠ̄c2 ≥ S
Π̄
c1
, and the coefficients for y2
correspond to the constraint SΠ̄c3 ≥ S
Π̄
c1
, the coefficients for y3 correspond to the constraint
created by setting the denominator of the Price of Deception to one. Finally, the lower
bounds for each of the constraints come from the numerator of the Price of Deception.
A feasible solution to this linear program is y1 = y2 = 2m−23m−7 and y3 =
2m2−6m+4
3m−7 and
thus the Price of Deception when there are exactly two individuals tied is at most 2m
2−6m+4
3m−7 .
When updating the linear program for normalized scores only the third column and right
hand side of the dual linear program will change since the first two columns correspond to
the differences of two candidates scores. Each entry in the third column and right hand sides
will increase by two. A new feasible solution to the linear program is y1 = y2 = 2m5m−11 and
y3 =
2m2−4m
5m−11 and the normalized Price of Deception is at most
2m2−4m
5m−11 .
Theorem 5.5.3. If ties are broken randomly and there is a unique winner, the normal-
ized Price of Deception for Borda count voting is m+2
3




2m2−3m for m > 3.
Prior to proving Theorem 5.5.3, we establish that if the sincere winner does not win at
equilibrium, then there must be another candidate that barely loses.




Proof: For contradiction, suppose that every candidate loses by at least two points. Since
c′ is not a sincere winner, there must be some voter v that moved c′ up in their list of prefer-
ences. Let c be the candidate that appears immediately after c′ in v’s submitted preferences
list. By Lemma 5.6.2, v prefers c to c′. As a result v is more honest if they switches the
location of c and c′. Since c′ wins by at least two votes, either c′ will remain the unique
winner or only c and c′ will tie for first. Neither possibility is worse for v. This contra-
dicts that the set of preferences formed an minimally dishonest equilibrium and the lemma
holds.
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We now prove Theorem 5.5.3 in two parts.
Lemma 5.6.5. The normalized Price of Deception for Borda count voting (breaking ties
lexicographically) is at most m+1
3
if the sincere winner is the only candidate in second
place.
Proof: As with Theorem 5.4.5, let c1 = r(Π) and c2 = r(Π̄). Let xij be the number of
voters that would give i points to candidate c1 and j points to candidate c2. The sincere
scores for the candidates are given by SΠc1 =
∑











i 6=j i · xij∑
i 6=j j · xij
(5.89)
Claim 1: xij = 0 for all i and j where m > i > j.
For contradiction, suppose that there is some voter v that would give c1 i points and c2
j points if sincere where m > i > j. By Lemma 5.6.2, v gives c1 either i or i − 1 points
at equilibrium. However, since i < m, by Lemma 5.6.4 c1 loses by at most one point and v
can get a strictly better solution by moving c1 up one position in their submitted preference
list. This contradicts that the preferences formed an equilibrium and thus xij = 0 for all i
and j where m > i > j.
Claim 2: If voter v would sincerely give m points to c1 and j points to c2, then voter v
gives at most j points to candidate c2 at equilibrium.
For contradiction, suppose this is not the case. Let c3 (c3 6= c1 in an argument similar
to Claim 1) be the candidate appearing directly after c2 in v’s submitted preference list. By
Lemma 5.6.2, v prefers c3 to c2. Voter v could move c2 down one position in their submitted
preference list causing candidate c3 to move up one position. Since c1 is the only candidate
in second place, only c1, c2 and possibly c3 can tie first after the move. However since v
prefers both c1 and c3 to c2, v will prefer the outcome obtained after moving c2 down one
position. This contradicts that that the preferences form an equilibrium. Thus, v gives c2 at
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most j points.
When these two claims are combined with Lemma 5.6.2 the following holds for the
equilibrium scores, SΠ̄c1 and S
Π̄
c2











j · xij +
∑
j>i
m · xij (5.91)
As in Theorem 5.4.5, since SΠc1 ≤ S
Π
c2
the following mathematical program gives an
upper bound on the Price of Deception:
max z =
∑
i 6=j i · xij∑
i 6=j j · xij
=
∑
j<mm · xmj +
∑
j>i i · xij∑
j<m j · xmj +
∑








(1−m)xij ≤ 0 (5.93)
xij ∈ Z≥0. (5.94)




m · xmj +
∑
j>i







(1−m)xij ≤ 0 (5.96)
∑
j<m
j · xmj +
∑
j>i
j · xij = 1 (5.97)
xij ∈ R≥0. (5.98)
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The dual of this problem is given by
min w = y2 (5.99)
subject to: (m− j)y1 + j · y2 ≥ m ∀j < m (5.100)
(1−m)y1 + j · y2 ≥ i ∀j > i (5.101)
y1 ∈ R≥0. (5.102)






pleting the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 5.6.6. Given a unique winner, the normalized Price of Deception for Borda count
voting is at most m+2
3
for m = 3 and m
3−2m2+3m−3
2m2−3m for m > 3 if c1 is a sincere winner and
c3 6= c1 comes in second at equilibrium.
Proof: As with Theorem 5.4.5, let c2 = r(Π̄). Let xijk be the number of voters that
would give i points to candidate c1, j points to candidate c2 and k points to candidate
c3. Let M = {{i, j, k} ∈ {1, ...,m}3 : i 6= j, j 6= k, i 6= k}. All sums include only





{i,j,k} j · xijk and SΠc2 =
∑





{i,j,k} i · xijk∑
{i,j,k} j · xijk
(5.103)
Claim 1: xijk = 0 for all j and k where m > i > j. This claim follows in the same
fashion as Claim 1 in Lemma 5.6.5.
Claim 2: If v would sincerely give candidate c2 1 point, then voter v is honest. This is
a trivial consequence of minimal dishonesty since v receives their worst outcome.
Claim 3: If v would sincere give c3 m points, the v will give c3 m points at an equilib-
rium.
For contradiction, suppose this is not the case. Since c3 is currently in second places
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and only loses by one point by Lemma 5.6.4, v can receive a strictly better outcome by
moving c3 up one position. This contradicts that the preferences formed an equilibrium
and the claim must hold.
When these three claims are combined with Lemma 5.6.2 the following holds for the
equilibrium scores, SΠ̄c1 , S
Π̄
c2









































































































Since SΠ̄c2 ≥ S
Π̄
c3
≥ SΠ̄c1 , the following mathematical program gives us an upper bound
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on the Price of Deception:
max z =
∑
{i,j,k} i · xijk∑











































(1−m)xijk ≤ 0 (5.112)
xijk ∈ Z≥0 ∀{i, j, k} ∈M (5.113)
By relaxing integrality, fixing the denominator of the objective to be one by scaling,
and by taking the dual, we obtain the following linear program:
min w =y3 (5.114)
subject to:
(i− j)y1 +(1−m)y2 + j · y3 ≥ i ∀{i, j, k} where i > j > k (5.115)
(i− 1−m)y1 +y2 + j · y3 ≥ i ∀{i, j,m} where m > i > j > 1 (5.116)
(i−m)y1 +(m− 1)y2 + j · y3 ≥ i ∀{i, 1,m} where m > i > 1 (5.117)
(2−m)y1 +y2 + j · y3 ≥ i ∀{i, j,m} where m > j > i (5.118)
(2− j)y1 +(1−m)y2 + j · y3 ≥ i ∀{i, j, k} where j > max{i, k} (5.119)
y1, y2 ∈ R≥0 (5.120)
A feasible solution to this problem is y1 = m
2+m−3
2m2−3m , y2 =
m−1




and the Price of Deception is at most m
3−2m2+3m−3










Stable marriage has an illustrious history in both theory and application. Gale and Shap-
ley introduced the concept of stability and invented the first algorithm that always finds a
stable marriage, given the preferences of the men and women [25]. Knuth [39] also pio-
neered theoretical analysis of stable marriage. Applications of stable marriage including
Roth’s celebrated design of the resident matching and kidney-exchange markets [59, 3] are
surveyed in Section 6.1.4.
In general, theoretical studies of stable marriage assume that individuals’ preferences
are known. But in many situations an individual’s preferences are private information. This
opens up the troublesome possibility that individuals may behave strategically. A putatively
stable marriage based on strategically submitted preference data could be sincerely unsta-
ble, that is, unstable with respect to the true preferences of the individuals. Gusfield and
Irving posed the question of strategic submission of preference data in their classic text on
stable marriage [31]. However, little progress has been made and Manlove’s recent text
[45] reports that this question remains open.
A series of results in the literature provides a fairly satisfactory answer to the question
for the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We describe these results in detail in Section 6.1.4. The
main points are that the men have no incentive to lie, and, if the men are honest and the
women are strategic, the women can collude to manipulate the algorithm to arrive at any
given sincerely stable marriage. The question of strategic preference data is unanswered
for all other algorithms. Applications of the Stable Marriage Problem and its variants tend
to employ the Gale-Shapley algorithm, often citing the concern for sincere stability.
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This paper addresses Gusfield and Irving’s general question of achieving a sincerely
stable marriage when individuals submit private preference data strategically. We identify
what we believe to have been the primary obstacle to stability and propose a natural means
of overcoming it.
To examine this problem, we consider the Strategic Stable Marriage (SSM) game. Each
individual x has private information πx which describes x’s preferences for members of
the opposite gender. The set of all private information is the profile Π. Each individuals
submits a putative preference list π̄x to a publicly known stable marriage algorithm r. The
mechanism r then selects the marriage r(Π̄) that is stable with respect to Π̄. The outcome
for x is the individual who is married to x in r(Π̄) and is evaluated by x according x’s
sincere preferences πx.
Our first result (Theorem 6.3.4), is that regardless of r, the set of pure strategy Nash
equilibrium outcomes of SSM is the set of all individually rational marriages (with respect
to the sincere preferences). This is discouraging because no matter how one designs the
public mechanism r, there will be Nash equilibria with poor outcomes. For example, let
M	 be a minimax stable marriage for Π, meaning that the highest ranked partner anyone
gets has the lowest rank possible. M	 is a worst possible stable marriage in the sense that it
makes the happiest person as unhappy as possible. Yet, for every r, there is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium with outcome M	.
But that is not the worst implication of the result. The worst thing is that M may not
be stable with respect to the sincere preferences. The only marriages not attainable by pure
Nash equilibria are those that are egregiously unstable by assigning to at least one person
an individual whom they are unwilling to marry. Therefore, all of the unstable marriages,
as long as they are rational, are outcomes of pure Nash equilibria of SSM, no matter what
the stable marriage mechanism r. We believe that this has been the principal obstacle
to progress on the general question of strategic stable marriage. From a normative point
of view, this obstacle is deleterious because there is no mechanism r that guarantees a
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stable marriage when players are strategic about their private preference information. It
is also unfortunate from a empirical point of view, for it inhibits predictive power. The
equilibria include bizarre ones wherein people omit all but their least favored partner from
their submitted preference list, and thereby get a poor outcome. To accommodate for the
bizarre equilibria we once again apply the minimal dishonest refinement from Section 2.3
to SSM.
We also require that r, when cast as maximizing a societal value f , satisfy two rational-
ity criteria, f must be monotonic and independent of non-spouses (INS). Monotonicity in
this context means that the societal value of a marriage M does not decrease if an individ-
ual increases their preference for the spouse M assigns to them. INS in this context means
that the societal value does not change if an individual exchanges two non-spouses in their
preference list.
With these conditions, we show that stability is assured. Specifically, we show (The-
orem 6.3.14) that if r is monotonic and INS representable, then for every minimally dis-
honest equilibrium Π̄, the marriage r(Π̄) is stable with respect to the sincere preferences
Π.
To clarify the definition of a monotonic INS representable decision mechanism, it is
only necessary that r has a representation that is monotonic and INS. The mechanism r
must behave as if society has a value for all marriages and r chooses a stable marriage
with maximum value. For example, in the case of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, there is no a
priori defined societal value. However, the Gale-Shapley algorithm always selects the man-
optimal marriage and there exists a function that the man-optimal marriage uniquely opti-
mizes among the set of stable marriages [31]. Furthermore, this function is monotonic and
INS and therefore the Gale-Shapley algorithm is a monotonic INS representable stable mar-
riage mechanism. With the exception of the sex-equal decision mechanism that minimizes
the absolute difference between the utility of men and women, we provide a monotonic INS
representation for every stable marriage mechanism (Theorem 6.3.13) we have found to be
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commonly referenced in the literature [31, 36]. These include the Gale-Shapley algorithm,
egalitarian stable marriage mechanisms, minimum regret stable marriage mechanisms and
decision mechanisms that maximize the minimum of men and women’s utilities.
We believe that Theorem 6.3.14 has the potential for significant impact on applications
of stable marriage. As mechanism designers, we no longer need to be limited to only the
man-optimal or woman-optimal marriage if we desire a sincerely stable outcome. Instead
we now have a wide array of algorithms to choose from, algorithms that are not completely
biased against either the women or the men. It is true that the man-optimal algorithm has
the additional property that men will tend to reveal their sincere preferences. However, the
goal of mechanism design should be a good societal outcome, rather than the elicitation of
honesty. If the latter were the goal, mechanism design would be solved by the revelation
principle.
In addition to raising the general issue of strategic submission of private information in
Stable Marriage Problems, Gusfield and Irving [31] ask specifically for an algorithm that
always selects a sincere egalitarian stable marriage even when individuals behave strategi-
cally. Here we prove a negative result: there is no monotonic INS representable r such that
there is always a minimally dishonest equilibrium of SSM and where for every minimally
dishonest equilibrium Π̄ the marriage r(Π̄) is an egalitarian stable marriage with respect to
the sincere preferences (Theorem 6.3.15).
This means that in SSM, no r with these rationality criteria is guaranteed to always get
an egalitarian stable marriage from a minimally dishonest equilibrium. Theorem 6.3.15
doesn’t mean that no algorithm r ever yields a sincere egalitarian stable marriage. Indeed,
we prove that there are mechanisms r for which the egalitarian marriage does come from
a minimally dishonest equilibrium. But there may be other minimally dishonest equilibria
that yield different marriages.
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6.1.1 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms
Next, we take a closer examination of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. When Gale and So-
tomayor first showed that when men are honest any stable marriage can be obtained, they
also considered the set of strong equilibrium points [26]. Strong equilibrium points are
obtained from a refinement on the set of equilibria – in addition to no individual being able
to alter their preferences to get a better outcome, there also cannot be a coalition that can
collude to strictly improve the outcome for every coalition member.
Gale and Sotomayor show that the woman-optimal marriage is the outcome of a strong
equilibrium when using the Gale-Shapley algorithm [26]. Given that honesty is a best re-
sponse for men, and that when men are honest, the women can always work together to
obtain the woman-optimal marriage, one could hope that all strong equilibria yield the
woman-optimal marriage. However, Gale and Sotomayor prove an additional result which
they remark is “unfortunate”: the woman-optimal marriage is not the only marriage ob-
tained from the set of strong equilibria.
Minimal dishonesty provides the perverse, yet satisfying result that Gale and Sotomayor
desired. When both men and women are minimally dishonest, the Gale-Shapley algorithm
produces the woman-optimal sincerely stable marriage at all equilibria (Theorem 6.4.2).
Moreover, we show there is always a minimally dishonest equilibrium.
We also consider mechanisms that are fairer than the biased Gale-Shapley algorithm.
A stable marriage mechanism r is never-one-sided if, when given a preference profile Π
with at least two stable marriages, there is positive probability of avoiding the man-optimal
marriage and positive probability of avoiding the woman-optimal marriage.
Let r be an arbitrary monotonic, INS and never-one-sided representable stable marriage
algorithm. Let M be a marriage and let Π be a sincere preference profile. We show that
M is sincerely stable if and only if there exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ in the
strategic stable marriage game where r(Π̄) = M (Theorem 6.4.4).
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6.1.2 Extensions to Student Placement and College Admissions
We consider extending our results to both the Admissions Problem and the Student Place-
ment Problem.
The College Admissions Problem is a polyandrous generalization of the Stable Marriage
Problem. Each man may be married to at most one woman, but each woman w may be
married to any number of men up to her quota qw. It is traditional to refer to the men as
students and the women as colleges. Both have preferences over the other set and stability
is still a necessary condition. The most famous application of the Admissions Problem is
the Nobel Prize winning National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [59] which assigns
residents to hospitals.
The Student Placement Problem is a variant of the Admissions Problem where the
colleges’ preferences are publicly known, or, equivalently, colleges must be honest. Ap-
plications of the Student Placement Problem include assigning students to universities in
Turkey [6], and to primary schools in New York [1], and Boston [2]. If players are honest,
both the admissions and Student Placement Problems can readily be transformed into Sta-
ble Marriage Problems by making multiple copies of the colleges. The question at hand is
whether sincerely stable marriages can be obtained if players are strategic.
We prove that Theorem 6.3.14 also holds for student placement. As long as a monotonic
INS representable stable marriage mechanism is used, the outcome will be a sincerely
stable marriage. In addition, the result still holds even if some of the students commit
to telling the truth even when they could act strategically to get a better outcome. As a
consequence, we urge the community to consider mechanisms besides the Gale-Shapley
algorithm for assigning students to schools. At the very least, the desire for a sincerely
stable marriage should not be the sole reason for selecting the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Rather, we should seek to obtain a sincerely stable marriage that optimizes societal utility
in some sense.
Roth has long claimed that the Admissions Problem is not equivalent to the Stable
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Marriage Problem [60]. He proves that, unlike in the Stable Marriage Problem, a sin-
gle college may be able to alter its preferences to obtain a marriage that it prefers over
the college-optimal marriage. Hence, when students and colleges are strategic, the Gale-
Shapley algorithm may yield an equilibrium marriage that is not sincerely stable. We prove
a considerably more general statement: When students and colleges are strategic, no stable
marriage algorithm always yields an equilibrium marriage that is sincerely stable, with
or without minimal dishonesty refinement. This result strongly confirms Roth’s distinction
between college admissions and the other Stable Marriage Problems.
6.1.3 Other Extensions
Finally, we describe some other extensions which generalize results or weaken assump-
tions. All of the results hold if there are unequal numbers of men and women. The minimal
dishonesty refinement can be replaced by a weaker “locally minimal dishonesty” refine-
ment without affecting the results. Individuals are minimally dishonest if every change
to their putative preferences that increases honesty decreases utility. Individuals are lo-
cally minimally dishonest if every small change to their putative preferences that increases
honesty decreases utility.
The results also extend to strategic stable marriage games that permit collusion. Per-
mitting collusion is equivalent to the strong equilibrium refinement discussed in Section
6.1.1. We show that every minimally dishonest equilibrium is also a strong equilibrium.
Thus, minimal dishonesty is sufficient to guarantee that a coalition cannot manipulate the
outcome of an equilibrium.
6.1.4 Related Literature
The Stable Marriage Problem was originally examined by Gale and Shapley [25]. They
proved the existence of stable marriages via the Gale-Shapley algorithm that completes
in O(n2). The Stable Marriage Problem has since received much attention and has been
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applied to a variety of areas including the Nobel Prize winning work by Roth and Shapley
on the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design including the design
of the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [51]. Other applications include:
Canadian Resident Matching Service (CVaRMS) [17],
Japan Residency Matching Program (JRMP) [37],
US Navy has a web-based multi-agent system for assigning sailors to ships [41],
Design of the kidney exchange market [3],
Assigning stundents to universities in Turkey [6],
Assigning students to primary schools in New York [1] and Boston [2].
Types of Stable Marriages
The Gale-Shapley algorithm [25] proves the existence of a stable marriage by finding the
man-optimal stable marriage – the stable marriage that is simultaneously best for all men
[25]. Roth later shows that the man-optimal stable marriage is also woman-pessimal [58] –
the man-optimal marriage is the stable marriage that is simultaneously worst for all women.
This suggests that there may be more than one stable marriage. This is true and Knuth
[39] motivates a study on the number of stable marriages. Irving and Leather [34] show
that if there are n men and n women where n = 2k then there is an instance with at least
2.28n/(1 +
√
3) stable marriages. Although the number of stable marriages can therefore
be exponential, Pittel proves that the expected number of stable marriages is asymptotic to
e−1n lnn [55]. No non-trivial upper bounds are known.
With so many stable marriages, it is natural that we would look for a “best stable mar-
riage”. A natural partial ordering on the set of stable marriages has M ≥ M ′ if every man
likes his M -partner at least as much as his M ′-partner. Knuth proves that this partial order-
ing induces a distributive lattice [39]. Furthermore, Knuth shows that the lattice remains
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intact if ≥ is replaced with ≤ and if man is replaced with woman. Thus for two stable
marriages M and M ′ if there is man who prefers M then there is a woman who prefers M ′
and there may be no universally agreed-upon “best” stable marriage.
Several types of stable marriages are often considered in the literature. Most mech-
anisms depend on the ordinal preferences π̄y for each individual y. However, there are
mechanisms that depend on a cardinal cost cy(z) individual y assigns to being married to
individual z. Specific types of stable marriages are often defined as optimizers of an ob-



















The man-optimal marriage minimizes the sum of the men’s costs and is found by the
Gale-Shapley algorithm in O(n2) time. A minimum regret stable marriage maximizes
the happiness of the least happy individual. Gusfield shows that a minimum regret stable
marriage can also be found in O(n2) time [30]. An egalitarian stable marriage places
equal weight on every individual and minimizes the sum of everyone’s cost. The optimal
marriage is a stable marriage that minimizes the sum of all individual costs, where the
costs are specified by the individuals’ cardinal preferences. Irving, Leather and Gusfield
give a polyhedral description of the set of stable marriages [35] that allows for a O(n4)
(O(n4 lnn)) algorithm to find an egalitarian (optimal respectively) stable marriage. A sex-
equal marriage is a stable marriage that minimizes the absolute difference between the
cost for the men and the cost for the women. Gusfield and Irving proposed the problem
of finding a polynomial time algorithm to give a sex-equal marriage as the 6th of 12 open
problems for the Stable Marriage Problem in [31]. This problem has been resolved by Kato
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who proved that finding a sex-equal stable marriage is NP-hard [38].
Strategic Behavior in the Stable Marriage Game
Much of the literature related to the Stable Marriage Problems deals with the many-to-
one marriages seen in the college admissions and Student Placement Problems. In these
problems each woman w is allowed to marry up to qw men. All decision mechanisms
that select a stable marriage for the college Admissions Problem can be simulated by a
one-to-one stable marriage mechanism after creating qw copies of each woman. Thus it
is unsurprising that many properties for the Stable Marriage Problem also apply to the
many-to-one marriage problems [31]. For instance, Gale and Sotomayor show that if an
individual is unmarried in one stable marriage then that individual is unmarried in every
stable marriage [26]. This results translates to the many-to-one settings and guarantees that
every college will be assigned the same number of applicants in every stable marriage [61].
While the college Admissions Problem can be simulated via the Stable Marriage Problem,
the two are vastly different once we consider manipulation.
Regarding the Stable Marriage Problem, Roth shows that every stable marriage mech-
anism is manipulable [57]. Men have no incentive to lie if the decision mechanism always
selects the man-optimal marriage [20] (Gale-Shapley algorithm). In addition, if the men
are honest, the algorithm will select a sincerely stable marriage [26]. Furthermore, the
women can collectively manipulate their preferences to obtain the woman-optimal (or any
other stable) marriage. However, in general this is not the only equilibrium even if we
only examine “strong” equilibria (where no coalition can collectively strategize to strictly
improve the outcome for each coalition member) [IBID].
Roth’s result showing that every stable marriage mechanism is manipulable also applies
to the college Admissions Problem. However, it does not apply to to the Student Placement
Problem. In the Student Placement Problem, women by definition are always honest. Since
it is in the best interest of men to be honest when running the Gale-Shapley algorithm, there
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exists an incentive compatible mechanism.
For the Stable Marriage Problem, it is known that no subset of men can manipulate their
preferences to obtain a result they all strictly prefer to the man-optimal marriage [31]. Once
again, this result also applies to the Student Placement Problem. However, Roth showed
that the result does not hold for the college Admissions Problem – a single college may
be able to alter its preferences to obtain a marriage that it strictly prefers to the college-
optimal marriage [60]. This raises the disquieting possibility that the results from [26] may
not apply to the college Admissions Problem and that the decision mechanism may select
a marriage that is sincerely unstable at an equilibrium even when we use the Gale-Shapley
algorithm.
Other literature considers manipulation in a different way. In the computational social
choice literature, strategic behavior is analyzed for its computational complexity, the worst-
case amount of computational effort needed to find a beneficial manipulation [9]. Teo
proves that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate [67]. Pini
proves that certain other mechanisms are NP-hard to manipulate [54]. However, with the
exception of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, it is not known what type of marriage is obtained
at an equilibrium, or even if the marriage will be sincerely stable.
6.2 The Model
We redefine the Game of Deception and minimal dishonesty from Chapter 2 as they pertain
to the Stable Marriage Problem.
Definition 6.2.1. An instance of the Stable Marriage Problem consists of
• Sets V = {m1,m2, ...mn} and W = {w1, w2, ...wn} of “men” and “women”, re-
spectively.
• For each m ∈ V , a total ordering πm on a subset of W , representing man m’s strict
preferences on the subset of women he is willing to be married to; symmetrically, for
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each w ∈ W , a preference list πw.
For all y ∈ V ∪W , if α precedes β in πy, we write α πy β to indicate that y prefers α
to β. Following tradition, we use u to represent “unmarried” and we extend πy to a partial
order on W ∪ {u} or V ∪ {u} as follows:
• α πy u for all α whom y is willing to marry;
• u πy z for all z of the other gender whom y is not willing to marry;
• Enforce transitivity of preferences;
• Denote by Π the collection of πy over all y ∈ V ∪ W . π is called the preference
profile.
Definition 6.2.2. A marriage is a partial injection M ⊂ V ×W . That is, M is a set of
disjoint pairs {m,w} ∈ V ×W . If {m,w} ∈ M , we say M weds m to w, or equivalently
M weds w to m, and we define the M -partner of w to be sM(w) = m and the M -partner
of m to be sM(m) = w. If for y ∈ V ∪W there is no z ∈ V ∪W such that {y, z} ∈M or
{z, y} ∈ M , then we say y is unmatched or unmarried and we define the M -partner of y
to be sM(y) = u.
Definition 6.2.3. A marriage M is individually rational with respect to Π if sM(y) πy u
for every individual y.
Definition 6.2.4. A pair {m,w} is a blocking pair forM with respect to π̄ ifw πm sM(m)
and m πw sM(w).
Definition 6.2.5. The marriage M is stable with respect to Π if M is rational and has no
blocking pairs according to Π.
Stability is a necessary condition for any solution [39, 31, 45]. If either condition does
not hold, the marriage is unstable. If the marriage is not rational, some y prefers being
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unmarried over their M -partner and would leave sM(y) to be unmarried. If there is a
blocking pair {m,w}, then both m and w prefer each other to their respective M -partners
and would leave their M -partners to be together.
A stable marriage mechanism takes a preference profile Π, selects a stable marriage M
and assigns each individual their M -partner. The process for selecting M is not necessarily
deterministic. Let S be the set of all marriages (not necessarily stable) between V and W .
Let P be the set of all possible preference profiles for V and W . Every stable marriage
mechanism that selects a stable marriage based on Π can be characterized by
M.1 A discrete sample space Ω comprising a finite set of atoms ω ∈ Ω;
M.2 A probability measure µ on Ω where µ(ω) > 0 for all atoms ω ∈ Ω,
M.3 A function f : S × P× Ω→ R,
where the stable marriage mechanism selects ω ∈ Ω according to µ and then selects a
marriage stable with respect to Π that maximizes f(M,Π, ω). All tie-breaking can be
incorporated into f , Ω and µ. Thus, without loss of generality, we require
M.4 | argmaxM∈S{f(M,Π, ω) : M is stable}| = 1 ∀ω ∈ Ω.
Let r(Π) be the set of marriages that have positive probability of being selected when using







{f(M,Π, ω) : M is stable}
}
. (6.1)
As defined, r is not necessarily deterministic and |r(Π)|may be greater than one. Corol-
lary 6.3.3 establishes that |r(Π̄)| = 1 at every equilibrium. After completing the proof of
Corollary 6.3.3, we treat r(Π̄) as a singleton if Π̄ is an equilibrium.
The two most commonly studied types of stable marriages are the man-optimal and
woman-optimal stable marriages, and egalitarian stable marriages. Without loss of gen-
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erality, by gender symmetry the Gale-Shapley algorithm always selects the man-optimal
marriage with respect to the submitted preference profile.
Example 6.2.6. r1 = {f1,Ω, µ} that selects the man-optimal marriage (Gale-Shapley al-
gorithm).
Define
σ(X,x) = i if x is in the ith position in X. (6.2)
The man-optimal marriage with respect to Π is the stable marriage that maximizes f1(M,Π, ω) =
−
∑
{m,w}∈M σ(πm, w) for all ω ∈ Ω [57]. The man-optimal marriage is known to be unique
and the decision mechanism r1 = {f1,Ω, µ} selects the man-optimal marriage regardless of the
selection of Ω and µ. It is also known [25] that in the man-optimal marriage, each man weds his
most-preferred woman among all women he weds in the set of all stable marriages.
Example 6.2.7. r2 = {f2,Ω, µ} that selects a egalitarian marriage uniformly at random.
Define σ(X,x) as in Equation 6.2. An egalitarian marriage with respect to Π is a stable mar-






[31]. Let Ω be the set of all
permutations of all possible marriages, let f2(M,Π, ω) ≡ g(M,Π)+ σ(ω,M)|ω|+1 and let µ(ω) = µ(ω
′)
for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. We claim that r2 = {f2,Ω, µ} selects an egalitarian marriage uniformly at
random.
Since σ(ω,M)|ω|+1 < 1, M maximizes f2(M,Π, ω) only if M also maximizes g(M,Π). Hence r(Π)
is a subset of the set of egalitarian marriages. Since σ(ω,M) takes a unique value for each M , r2
always selects a unique marriage given ω ∈ Ω and r2 is well-defined.
Let p(M) be the probability that the marriage M is selected by r andM be the set of all stable
marriages. By symmetry, p(M) = p(M ′) for all M,M ′ ∈ M. Therefore r2 = {f2,Ω, µ} selects
an egalitarian marriage uniformly at random.
Individuals may act strategically and submit insincere preferences to r. We examine
the Strategic Stable Marriage game to analyze the effect of strategic behavior.
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Strategic Stable Marriage Game (SSM)
• Each individual i has information πi ∈ Pi describing their preferences. The collec-
tion of all information is the (sincere) profile Π.
• To play the game, individual i submits putative preference data π̄i ∈ Pi. The collec-
tion of all submitted data is denoted Π̄.
• It is common knowledge that a central decision mechanism will select the marriage
r(Π̄, ω) that is stable with respect to Π̄ when given the random event ω.
• The random event ω ∈ Ω is selected according to µ. We denote r(Π̄) as the distribu-
tion of outcomes according to Ω and µ.
• Individual i evaluates r(Π̄, ω) according to i’s partner in the marriage r(Π̄, ω) and i’s
sincere preferences πi.
Definition 6.2.8. A marriage M is a sincerely (putatively) stable marriage is if it is stable
with respect to Π (Π̄ respectively).
Example 6.2.9. Honesty can fail to be an equilibrium strategy in SSM
Let there be two men, m1,m2 and two women w1, w2. Let the sincere preferences π be
πm1 = w1 πm1 w2 πw1 = m2 πw1 m1 (6.3)
πm2 = w2 πm2 w1 πw2 = m1 πw2 m2 (6.4)
There are two sincerely stable marriages given by M1 = {{m1, w1}, {m2, w2}} and M2 =
{{m1, w2}, {m2, w1}}. The Gale-Shapley algorithm would yield M1, which is the man-optimal
marriage in the sense that each man is married to his most-preferred woman among all those to
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whom he could be married to in some stable marriage. Were Gale-Shapley run with the roles of
women and men reversed, it would yield M2, which is the woman-optimal marriage. In this small
example there are no other stable marriages.
Suppose M1 ∈ r(Π). If all players are truthful (if Π̄ = Π) then there is positive probability
of selecting M1. However, Π̄ = Π would not be a Nash equilibrium in the game SSM, because w1
can improve her outcome by altering her putative preference data to π̄w1 = m2. The only stable
marriage with respect to the altered preference data would be M2. The other marriages would not
be stable by the following reasoning: M1 is not rational because w1 prefers u to m1; {{m1, w2}}
is not stable because m2 and w1 both prefer each other to u; {{m2, w2}} is unstable because
{m1, w2} is a blocking pair. Therefore r will select M2, an outcome that w1 prefers to M1. A
symmetric argument proves that if r(Π) = M2 the SSM game is not at equilibrium at Π̄ = Π.
Therefore no algorithm r makes SSM an incentive-compatible game.
We continue Example 6.2.9 by exhibiting a Nash equilibrium to this instance of SSM.
Example 6.2.10. An equilibrium strategy π̄ in an instance of SSM
For the SSM game defined in Example 6.2.9, consider the strategically submitted putative pref-
erences π̄:
π̄m1 = w1 π̄w1 = m2 π̄w1 m1 (6.5)
π̄m2 = w2 π̄w2 = m1 π̄w2 m2 (6.6)
The only stable marriage with respect to π̄ is M1, which weds each man to his sincerely most-
preferred woman. Therefore neither man can improve his outcome by submitting different preference
data. If w1 alters π̄w1 to m1 or m1 π̄w1 m2, M1 continues to be the only putative stable marriage.
Any algorithm r must select M1 and so w1 receives the same outcome. If w1 were to alter π̄w1 to
m2 or the empty list ∅, the only stable marriage would be {{m2, w2}}, which is a worse sincere
outcome for w1. By symmetry, w2 cannot alter π̄w2 to get a better outcome for herself. Hence Π̄ is
an equilibrium set of strategies for this instance of SSM.
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6.3 Equilibria of the Strategic Stable Marriage Game
We begin by examining pure strategy equilibria of SSM. Given that it is well known that
there is no strategy-proof stable marriage mechanism, it is unsurprising that there are equi-
libria with sincerely unstable outcomes.
Example 6.3.1. Strategic behavior can lead to unstable outcomes.
For three men a, b, c and three women w, x, y let the true preferences be given by Π and the
putative preferences be be given by Π̄ below.
πm1 = w1 πm1 w2 πm1 w3 πw1 = m3 πw1 m1 πw1 m2 (6.7)
πm2 = w2 πm2 w3 πw2 = m2 πw2 m3 πw2 m1 (6.8)
πm3 = w3 πm3 w1 πm3 w2 πw3 = m1 πw3 m3 πw3 m2 (6.9)
π̄m1 = w1 π̄m1 w2 π̄w1 = m3 (6.10)
π̄m2 = w3 π̄w2 = m1 (6.11)
π̄m3 = w1 π̄w3 = m2 (6.12)
The stable marriages with respect to Π are the man-optimalM1 = {{m1, w1}, {m2, w2}, {m3, w3}}
and woman-optimal M2 = {{m1, w3}, {m2, w2}, {m3, w1}}. The only stable marriage with re-
spect to Π̄ is M = {{m1, w2}, {m2, w3}, {m3, w1}}. Hence, regardless of r, r will choose M even
though {{m1, w1}, {m2, w2}, {m3, w3}} dominates it with respect to Π.
Moreover, Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium in SSM. No man can improve his outcome because he is now
married to the only woman willing to marry him, and he prefers her to being unmarried. Similarly,
neither w2 nor w3 can improve her outcome. Woman w1 cannot improve her outcome because she
is now married to her (sincerely) most-preferred man.
We show that at every equilibrium a marriage will be selected deterministically regard-
less of which stable marriage mechanism is used. We build on this determinism to prove
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that a marriage M is the outcome of an SSM equilibrium iff M is rational with respect to
the sincere preferences.
Lemma 6.3.2. Let r and Π be arbitrary. Suppose Π̄ is an equilibrium of the Strategic
Stable Marriage game (SSM). Then there cannot exist a marriage M ∈ r(Π̄), another
putatively stable marriage M ′ (i.e. M ′ is stable with respect to π̄), and an individual y ∈
V ∪W who prefers their M ′-partner to their M -partner, i.e., such that sM ′(y) πy sM(y).
Furthermore, for all M ∈ r(Π̄), M is individually rational with respect to Π.
Proof. We prove the first statement by contradiction. Assume such Π̄, M ∈ r(Π̄), M ′ and
y exist. Without loss of generality make the maximality assumption that M ′ is such that
sM ′(y) is y’s most preferred partner among all putatively stable marriages.
As in previous chapters, let [Π̄−y, π̄′y] denote the profile obtained after replacing π̄y with
π̄′y in the profile Π̄.
Suppose y were to strategically submit π̄′y consisting only of sM ′(y). The marriage M
′
would be stable with respect to [Π̄−y, π̄′y] since deleting elements from a preference list
cannot create a new blocking pair. By the Rural Hospitals Theorem [61] (Lemma 6.6.1),
y is married in every marriage that is stable with respect to [Π̄−y, π̄′y]. Moreover, in each
of these marriages y weds sM ′(y) because, according to π̄′y, y is not willing to wed anyone
else. If instead y submits π̄y, M ∈ r(Π̄) and property M.2 imply that y weds the less
preferred sM(y) with strictly positive probability. By the maximality assumption, r(Π̄)
never weds y to someone y prefers to sM ′(y). Therefore, y strictly prefers to submit π̄′y
than to submit π̄y, contradicting Π̄ being a Nash equilibrium.
To prove the second statement, suppose that M ∈ r(Π̄) is not individually rational with
respect to Π. Then for some individual y, M weds y to someone y is sincerely unwilling
to marry. That is, u πy sM(y). The first part of the lemma implies that for all M ′ ∈ r(Π̄),
u πy sM ′(y). In words, r always weds y to someone y is sincerely unwilling to marry.
Therefore, y can get the strictly better outcome u by submitting an empty preference list,
contradicting Π̄ being a Nash equilibrium.
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Corollary 6.3.3. For every stable marriage mechanism r and every equilibrium Π̄ of the
SSM game, the putatively stable marriage is deterministically selected.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary there areM,M ′ ∈ r(Π̄) and an individual y where sM(y) 6=
sM ′(y). By the second part of Lemma 6.3.2, M and M ′ are individually rational. Since
preferences are strict, sM(y) πy sM ′(y) or sM ′(y) πy sM(y), a contradiction to the first
part of Lemma 6.3.2.
Theorem 6.3.4. For every instance of SSM, regardless of the stable marriage mechanism
r, there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium whose outcome is the marriage M if and
only if M is individually rational (with respect to the sincere preferences π).
Proof. Lemma 6.3.2 guarantees that every possible outcomeM of r is individually rational.
It remains to show existence. Let M be a rational marriage with respect to Π. For each
married individual y, let π̄y = sM(y); for each unmarried individual y let π̄y = ∅. M
is the only stable marriage with respect to π̄ and hence, regardless of r, r(Π̄) = M . If
sM(y) = u, the putative profile Π̄ indicates that no one is willing to wed y. Hence y cannot
improve by altering π̄y. If y is married in M , only sM(y) is putatively willing to marry y.
Hence y can only alter his/her preferences to become unmarried. By rationality this is not
an improvement for y. Hence Π̄ is an equilibrium.
6.3.1 Minimal Dishonesty
The proof of Theorem 6.3.4 can require individuals to lie in absurd ways to obtain results
that they least prefer. For instance, Theorem 6.3.4 implies that everyone reporting that
they would be prefer to be unmarried is a perfectly reasonable outcome regardless of the
sincere profile. This is unsatisfactory in a predictive sense - any rational marriage can
eventuate - and in a normative sense - as discussed in Section 2.3 individuals tend to lie
only if they benefit. To improve the theory, we refine the set of equilibria to those where
individuals are minimally dishonest. Empirical justification for this refinement was given
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in Section 2.3. Here we define a metric on the set of preference lists, and employ that
metric to formally define minimal dishonesty (Definition 6.3.7). With this refinement, we
will establish in Theorem 6.3.14 that every monotonic and INS stable marriage mechanism
yields a sincerely stable marriage when individuals behave strategically.
As stated in the introduction, Gusfield and Irving specifically ask for a mechanism
that selects an egalitarian stable marriage in the face of strategic behavior. We will give a
negative answer, proving in Theorem 6.3.15 that no monotonic INS stable marriage mech-
anism always selects a sincere egalitarian stable marriage when strategic individuals are
minimally dishonest.
According to minimal dishonesty, individuals prefer to be as little dishonest as possible
without worsening their outcome. To apply this concept, one needs a way to measure
dishonesty. Once again, we will use the Bubble Sort or Kendall Tau distance – the most
common way to evaluate the distance between two ordered lists.
Definition 6.3.5 (Bubble Sort or Kendall Tau Distance.). Let π1m and π2m be two prefer-
ence lists over the set W = {w1, w2, . . . , wn}. Let wn+1 ≡ u so that {W ∪ {u}} =
{w1, w2, . . . , wn+1}. For all wi, wj ∈ {W ∪ {u}} denote by R(πm, wi, wj) the relationship
between wi and wj with respect to πm. Then the distance between π1m and π
2
m is defined as
d(π1m, π
2
m) ≡ |{i, j} : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n+ 1;R(π1m, w1, w2) 6= R(π2m, w1, w2)}|. (6.13)
Example 6.3.6. Calculating the distance between two preference lists.
Consider the following preference lists πm and π̄m for the set of womenW = {w1, w2, w3, w4}:
πm = w1 πm w2 πm w3 π̄m = w4 π̄m w2 (6.14)
With respect to the sincere preferences πm,m sincerely prefersw1 to all other partners and he is
willing to marryw1. However, in his submitted list π̄m, he indicates that he prefersw4 andw2 tow1,
he is indifferent between w1 and w3 and that he prefers being unmarried to w1. Thus for each z ∈
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{w2, w3, w4, u}, π̄m and πm describe different relationships between w1 and z and Rπ̄m(w1, z) 6=
Rπm(w1, z). Similarly π̄m and πm indicate different relationships for each of the following pairs:
{w2, w4}, {w3, w4}, {w3, u} and {w4, u}. Thus there are 8 distinct pairwise disparities between
π̄m and πm and d(π̄m, πm) = 8.
The formal definition of minimal dishonesty can now be stated succinctly in the notation
of Definition 6.3.5.
Definition 6.3.7. Let Π be the sincere preferences and let Π̄ be an equilibrium in the Strate-
gic Stable Marriage game. Individual y is minimally dishonest if d(π̄′y, πy) < d(π̄y, πy)
implies r(Π̄) = M πy M ′ for some M ′ ∈ r([Π̄−y, π̄′y]).
If there is a π̄′y such that d(π̄
′
y, πy) < d(π̄y, πy) and y does not sincerely prefer r(Π̄) to
r([Π̄−y, π̄
′
y]), then y can obtain at least as good a result by submitting the more honest π̄
′
y.
If an individual is able to be more honest and obtain at least as good a result, we assume
the individual would do so since individuals prefer being honest. Thus we only examine
minimally dishonest equilibria – equilibria where every individual is minimally dishonest.
Example 6.3.8. Not every equilibrium is a minimally dishonest equilibrium.
Recall the sincere preferences Π and putative preferences Π̄ from Example 6.3.1.
πm1 = w1 πm1 w2 πm1 w3 πw1 = m3 πw1 m1 πw1 m2 (6.15)
πm2 = w2 πm2 w3 πw2 = m2 πw2 m3 πw2 m1 (6.16)
πm3 = w3 πm3 w1 πm3 w2 πw3 = m1 πw3 m3 πw3 m2 (6.17)
π̄m1 = w1 π̄m1 w2 π̄w1 = m3 (6.18)
π̄m2 = w3 π̄w2 = m1 (6.19)
π̄m3 = w1 π̄w3 = m2 (6.20)
When using the Gale-Shapley algorithm with the putative preferences Π̄, the marriage M =
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{{m1, w2}, {m2, w3}, {m3, w1}} is selected. Example 6.3.1 established that Π̄ is a Nash equi-
librium. We now show that Π̄ is a not minimally dishonest equilibrium, according to Definitions
6.3.5 and 6.3.7.
Consider the preference list π̄′m3 = w3 π̄′m3 w2 π̄′m3 w1. Since d(π̄m3 , πm3) = 4 (the
disparities are {w3, w1}, {w3, w2}, {w3, u}, {w2, u}) and d(π̄′m3 , πm3) = 1 ({w2, w3}), man m3
would be more honest if he submitted π̄′m3 . The marriageM is the only stable marriage with respect
to [π̄−m3 , π̄
′
m3 ] and m3 obtains the same result if he is more honest. Thus Π̄ is not a minimally
dishonest equilibrium.
In Example 6.3.8 we could equally well have let m3 submit preference list π̄′′m3 =
w1 π̄′′m3 w3, which also must result in the marriage M . This would disprove minimal
dishonesty because d(π̄′′m3 , πm3) = 3 < 4 = d(π̄m3 , πm3). One could argue that m3 would
more readily choose π̄′′m3 than π̄
′
m3
because the former differs from π̄m3 in a particularly
simple way, namely by changing the location of one woman. Later, in Section 6.5, we
define a weaker “local” version of minimal dishonesty, and show that our results extend to
it.
We continue Example 6.3.8 by providing all minimally dishonest equilibria.
Example 6.3.9. Minimally dishonest equilibria can yield a sincerely stable marriage.
In Examples 6.2.9 and 6.3.8, we have seen both a non-equilibrium solution and an equilibrium
solution that is not minimally dishonest. Let r be the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Let the sincere
preferences Π be as in Examples 6.3.1 and 6.3.8. By enumeration one can verify there are only two
minimally dishonest equilibria. In both equilibria the men are honest. The two women’s putative
preference profiles are:
π̄w1 = m3 π̄w1 m1 π̄w1 m2 (6.21)
π̄w2 = m2 π̄w2 m3 π̄w2 m1 (6.22)
π̄w3 = m1 π̄w3 m2 (6.23)
and
π̄w1 = m3 π̄w1 m2 (6.24)
π̄w2 = m2 π̄w2 m3 π̄w2 m1 (6.25)
π̄w3 = m1 π̄w3 m3 π̄w3 m2 (6.26)
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both of which yield the woman-optimal sincerely stable M2 = {{m1, w3}, {m2, w2}, {m3, w1}}.
We will later show in Theorem 6.4.2 that the woman-optimal outcome is not a coincidence.
In what follows we will frequently consider swapping the locations of two members of
a preference list. For convenience we employ the following notation:
δ(Π̄, y, {z−1, z1}) =

Π̄ after swapping z−1 and z1 in π̄y if z±1 π̄y u
Π̄ after removing zi from π̄y if zi π̄y u, z−i = u
Π̄ after adding zi to the end of π̄y if u π̄y zi, z−i = u
(6.27)
We require two more formal definitions, one for monotonicity, the other for INS.
Definition 6.3.10. A function f is monotonic if for every Π̄ ∈ P, ω ∈ Ω, M ∈ S, and
{y, z} ∈M , then
f(δ(Π̄, y, {z, z1}),M, ω) ≥ f(Π̄,M, ω) if z1 π̄y z. (6.28)
Monotonicity means that if an individual y indicates that if they prefer their M -partner
more than they previously indicated, the value of M should not decrease. Decision mech-
anisms are often used to maximize social welfare. Thus, it seems natural for the value of
a marriage to respond positively (or at least not negatively) when an individual alters their
preferences in this way.
Definition 6.3.11. A function f is independent of non-spouses (INS) if for every Π̄ ∈ P,
ω ∈ Ω, M ∈ S, and {y, z} ∈M , then
f(Π̄,M, ω) = f(δ(Π̄, y, {z1, z−1}),M, ω) if z 6= z±1 and z±1 π̄y u, (6.29)
f(Π̄,M, ω) = f(δ(Π̄, y, {z1, u}),M, ω) if z 6= z1, u π̄y z1. (6.30)
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INS here is an adaptation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives definition used
in voting [4]. Essentially, it states that the value of a marriage should depend only on
the spouses’ valuations of each other. To be precise, INS requires (1) if y exchanges the
positions of z1 and z−1 then the value of any marriage that weds y to z /∈ {z1, z−1} doesn’t
change, and (2) if y adds z1 onto the end of their preference list then the value of any
marriage that does not wed y to z 6= z1 remains unchanged. Although changing the position
of z1 and z−1 does not change the value of a marriage, it may alter the stability.
Definition 6.3.12. r = {f,Ω, µ} is a monotonic INS representable stable marriage mech-
anism if f is both monotonic and INS.
Theorem 6.3.13. Each of the following stable marriage selection criteria can be repre-
sented by a monotonic INS stable marriage mechanism:
1. Man-Optimal
2. Egalitarian
3. Maximize the minimum individual utility
4. Maximize the minimum of the women’s total utility and the men’s total utility
when using any of the following tie-breaking rules:
a. Uniformly at random
b. Lexicographically based on a predetermined list L of marriages
c. Lexicographically giving the lowest indexed mi his most preferred partner available
Proof. The proof of Theorem 6.3.13 presents a monotonic INS function gi where the only
stable marriages that maximize gi are the stable marriages described by criterion i. Then
a sample space Ωj , a probability measure µj and a monotonic INS function tj are given
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that discriminate between marriages according to tie-breaking rule j. Finally, fij = gi + tj
is such that rij = {fij,Ωj, µj} selects a stable marriage satisfying criterion i according to
tie-breaking rule j.
Define σ(X, x) as in Equation 6.2. Let S(Π) be the set of marriages stable with respect
to Π. By definition [31], the marriages satisfying the above criteria are described by the
following sets respectively:
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We show that the tie-breaking rules are given by the following functions, sample spaces
and probability measures:
a. ta(M,Π, ω) =
σ(ω,M)
|ω|+ 1
where Ωa is the set of all permutations of S and µa(ω) =
µa(ω
′) for all ω, ω′ ∈ Ωa.
b. tb(M,Π, ω) =
|L| − σ(M,L)
|L|
where Ωb and µb are arbitrary.
c. tc(M,Π, ω) =
∑
{mi,w}∈M
|W | − σ(πmi , w)
|W |i
where Ωc and µc are arbitrary.
For each selection criterion i ∈ {1, ..., 4}, we show gi(Π,M) is monotonic and INS. We
then show the function tj(Π,M, ω) is monotonic INS and discriminates between optimal
marriages according to tie-breaking rule j for each j ∈ {a, b, c} given Ωj and µj . Mono-
tonicity and INS are preserved through addition. Therefore fij(Π,M, ω) = gi(Π,M) +
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tj(Π,M, ω) is monotonic and INS. Thus the decision mechanism rij = {fij,Ωj, µj} se-
lects a stable marriage according to criterion i and tie-breaking rule j.
Each gi is monotonic and INS: Let f and g be two monotonic INS functions. First we
show that f + g and min{f, g} are also monotonic and INS. INS means that under certain
conditions, f and g will not change. Therefore, functions of f and g such as f + g and
min{f, g} will will not change under those conditions, and are also INS. Both summing
and taking the minimum are well known to be monotonic operators. Therefore both f + g
and min{f, g} are monotonic INS functions.
Next we show −σ(πm, w) and −σ(πw,m) are monotonic and INS for each {m,w} ∈
M . By symmetry, consider only −σ(πm, w). If m moves w up (or down) in πm then
−σ(πm, w) increases (respectively decreases) and therefore −σ(πm, w) is strictly mono-
tonic. The value of −σ(πm, w) depends only on w’s location and remains unchanged if m
swaps two other women, adds a woman onto the end of π̄m or if anyone else changes their
preferences. Therefore −σ(πm, w) is both monotonic and INS.
Each gi consists only of sums and minima of monotonic INS functions and therefore is
monotonic and INS.
Each tj is monotonic and INS: Both ta and tb are independent of Π and therefore are
monotonic and INS. Like each gi, tc is also monotonic and INS.
Each tj discriminates between optimal marriages according to tie-breaking rule j:
Since each gi is integer and 0 ≤ tj < 1, a marriage that maximizes fij = gi + tj also
maximizes gi. Therefore, the marriages that maximize fij for some ω ∈ Ωj are a subset of
S i. Furthermore, for every ω ∈ Ωj , tj(M,Π, ω) has a unique value for each M implying
fij has a unique optimizer and rij(Π) ⊆ S i is well defined. It remains to show that that the
probability of selectingM given criterion i and tie-breaking rule j is equal to the probability
of selecting M given rij .
In Example 6.2.7, we demonstrated that ta, Ωa and µa correctly discriminate between
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optimal marriages. Thus ria = {fia,Ωa, µa} is a monotonic INS representable decision
mechanism that selects a marriage according to criterion i while breaking ties uniformly at
random.
Breaking ties lexicographically by a predetermined list of marriages is a deterministic
tie-breaking rule. Given Π, let Mi be the marriage that is selected according to criterion
i and tie-breaking rule b. Let M ∈ rib(Π) ⊆ S i be any marriage selected with positive
probability by rib. Since Mi satisfies criterion i, Mi ∈ S i and gi(Mi,Π) = gi(M,Π).
Furthermore, since Mi is selected according to tie-breaking rule b, Mi appears no later
than M in L and σ(L,Mi) ≤ σ(L,M). These two inequalities imply fib(Mi,Π, ω) ≥
fib(M,Π, ω) for all ω. Since every M ′ ∈ rib(Π) maximizes fib for some ω, rib(Π) = Mi
as desired. Therefore rib is a monotonic INS decision mechanism that selects a marriage
according to criterion i while breaking ties lexicographically according to L.
Once again, breaking ties lexicographically by giving the lowest indexed mi his most
preferred partner available is a deterministic tie-breaking rule. Let Mi be the marriage
selected according to criterion i and tie-breaking rule c. As before, let M ∈ ric(π̄) ⊆ S i.
Once again, gi(Mi,Π) = gi(M,Π). Suppose M 6= Mi and let j be the lowest index such
that sM(mj) 6= sMi(mj). Thus, for all k < j, mk has the same partner in M and Mi. Since
Mi is selected according to tie-breaking rule c, mj prefers his Mi-partner to his M -partner
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≤ t3(Mi,Π, ω) (6.35)
and fic(Mi,Π, ω) ≥ fic(M,Π, ω) for all ω. As in the previous instance, this implies
ric(Π) = Mi and ric is a monotonic INS representable decision mechanism that selects
a marriage according to criterion i while breaking lexicographically by giving the lowest
indexed mi his most preferred partner available.
We come now to our principal positive result.
Theorem 6.3.14. If r is monotonic and INS representable, then for every minimally dis-
honest equilibrium Π̄ of the strategic stable marriage game, the marriage r(Π̄) is stable
with respect to the sincere preferences Π.
Proof. The bulk of the proof is a sequence of nine lemmas that gradually reveal the nec-
essary structure of Π̄ at a minimally dishonest equilibrium. These are stated and proved
in 6.6.1. The early lemmas consider a marriage M that is stable with respect to a putative
profile Π̄, and identify changes to π̄y that retain the stability of M by not interfering with
the ranking of y’s M -partner. These lemmas depend mainly on the transitivity of prefer-
ences and do not invoke monotonicity or INS. In the succeeding lemmas, the main ideas
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are essentially as follows:
• If y is unmarried in a putatively stable M , y can only be helped by adding people y is
willing to marry to π̄y, and can not be hurt by removing unacceptable partners from
π̄y. Therefore more honesty does not harm y.
• If y is married inM , the Rural Hospitals Theorem [61] and retention of stability from
the early lemmas assure that y remains married when y makes certain alterations to
π̄y. If y has falsely purported to prefer x less than z, altering π̄y by swapping x and
z in π̄y keeps M stable, and by INS and monotonicity, the value of marriages that y
likes at least as much as M will not decrease while the value of all other marriages
will not increase and the mechanism still selects a marriage that y likes as least as
much as M .
• Similarly, monotonicity and INS permit y to elevate y’s M -partner to a more honest
rank without losing M ’s optimality.
• These arguments imply that Π̄ must be quite similar to Π at any minimally dishonest
equilibrium.
• Given that Π̄ is constrained to be similar to Π, Lemma 6.3.2 in turn constrains the
set of stable marriages – not just r(Π̄) – to be a singleton and have other useful
properties.
For readability, we state three critical lemmas here.
Lemma 6.6.4. If y is unmarried at a minimally dishonest equilibrium then π̄y = πy.
Lemma 6.6.8. At any minimally dishonest equilibrium for a monotonic INS representable
stable marriage mechanism, if y is married to the kth member of πy, then the first k elements
of π̄y are identical to and appear in the same order as the first k elements of πy.
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Lemma 6.6.9. For preference profiles Π and Π̄, and a marriage M that is stable with
respect to Π̄, if π̄y agrees with πy up to y’s M -partner, then M is stable with respect to Π.
Lemmas 6.6.4 and 6.6.8 show that Π̄ meets the conditions of Lemma 6.6.9. Therefore,
Π̄ yields a marriage that is stable with respect to Π, proving the theorem.
However, there is no monotonic INS representable stable marriage mechanism that
always selects an egalitarian stable marriage.
Theorem 6.3.15. There is no monotonic INS representable r such that there is always
a minimally dishonest equilibrium and where for every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄
the marriage r(Π̄) is an egalitarian stable marriage with respect to the sincere preferences.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction there is a monotonic INS representable mechanism r =
{f,Ω, µ} that always selects a sincere egalitarian stable marriage. The proof begins by
presenting a set of sincere preferences Π1 with stable marriagesM1,M2 andM3. To ensure
that a sincere egalitarian marriage is selected at an equilibrium, for j ∈ {1, 3} there must
exist a sample path ωj , where a non-egalitarian stable marriage Mj has a higher value than
the unique egalitarian stable marriage M2 when everyone is honest and Π1 is submitted.
We then analyze a second set of sincere preferences Π2, obtained by slightly modifying
Π1. The set of stable marriages remains unchanged but every marriage that was egalitarian
for Π1 (respectively Π2) is not egalitarian for Π2 (respectively Π1). By INS and monotonic-
ity, Mj still has a higher value than M2 for the sample path ωj if individuals are honest and
submit Π2. However, this allows the construction of a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄
for the sincere preferences Π2 where M2, a marriage that is not egalitarian with respect to
Π2, is selected. This implies there is no r that always selects a sincere egalitarian stable
marriage.
Consider the preference profile Π1. With respect to Π1 the set of stable marriages is
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given in Table 6.1. The unique egalitarian stable marriage is M2.
π1m1 = w1 π1m1 w2 π1m1 w4 π1m1 w3 π
1
w1
= m2 π1w1 m3 π1w1 m4 π1w1 m1 (6.36)
π1m2 = w2 π1m2 w3 π1m2 w4 π1m2 w1 π
1
w2
= m3 π1w2 m1 π1w2 m4 π1w2 m2 (6.37)
π1m3 = w3 π1m3 w1 π1m3 w4 π1m3 w2 π
1
w3
= m1 π1w3 m2 π1w3 m4 π1w3 m3 (6.38)
π1m4 = w4 π1m4 w1 π1m4 w2 π1m4 w3 π
1
w4
= m4 π1w4 m1 π1w4 m2 π1w4 m3 (6.39)
Table 6.1: Set of Stable Marriages With Respect to Π1 and Π2.
Marriage Spouses
M1 {m1, w1} {m2, w2} {m3, w3} {m4, w4}
M2 {m1, w2} {m2, w3} {m3, w1} {m4, w4}
M3 {m1, w3} {m2, w1} {m3, w2} {m4, w4}
Claim 1: For each j ∈ {1, 3} there is ωj ∈ Ω such that f(Mj,Π1, ωj) > f(M2,Π1, ωj).
By symmetry let j = 1. Suppose instead f(M1,Π1, ω) ≤ f(M2,Π1, ω) for all ω ∈
Ω. Suppose the sincere preferences are given by Π1 and that Π̄ is a minimally dishonest
equilibrium. Since r always selects a sincere egalitarian stable marriage, M2 is stable with
respect to Π̄. Furthermore by Corollary 6.6.7, M2 is the only stable marriage with respect
to Π̄. We now show that π1wi = π̄wi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} implying that M1 is also stable with
respect to Π̄, a contradiction to Lemma 6.3.2 since m1 prefers M1 to M2.
Subclaim 1: If Claim 1 does not hold, then m4 π̄w u for each w ∈ {w1, w2, w3}.
Suppose there is w such that u π̄w m4. By Lemma 6.6.8, π1w and π̄w agree on the first
two elements. Womanw is more honest in the profile Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, w, {m4, u}). Furthermore,
by Lemma 6.6.3 M2 remains stable and all new marriages wed w to m4. However, by
Lemma 6.6.8. π1j , π̄j and π̄
′
j agree on the first element for j ∈ {m4, w4} and m4 and
w4 must wed in every marriage. Therefore no new stable marriages are created when w
becomes more honest by adding m4 onto her preference list and w receives at least as
good an outcome after becoming more honest, a contradiction to minimal dishonesty. This
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completes Subclaim 1.
Subclaim 2: If Claim 1 does not hold, then m4 is the third element of π̄w for each w ∈
{w1, w2, w3}.
Suppose without loss of generality this does not hold for w1. By Lemma 6.6.8, π1w1 and
π̄w1 agree on the first two elements. By Subclaim 1, π̄w1 is then given bym2 π̄w1 m3 π̄w1
m1 π̄w1 m4. Similar to the proof of Subclaim 1, w1 can be more honest by swapping m1
and m4 without obtaining a worse result. Once again this contradicts minimal dishonesty
and Subclaim 2 holds.
Subclaim 3: If Claim 1 does not hold, then π̄1w = π̄′w for each w ∈ {w1, w2, w3}.
Once again, without loss of generality assume this subclaim does not hold for w1.
By Lemma 6.6.8 and Subclaims 1 and 2, π̄w1 is given by m2 π̄w1 m3 π̄w1 m4 and
woman w1 can only be more honest by adding m1 onto π̄w1 – by updating Π̄ to Π̄
′ =
δ(Π̄, w1, {m1, u}). If adding m1 onto w1’s list creates no new stable marriages, then w1
violates minimal dishonesty. If adding m1 creates a new stable marriage, then by Lemma
6.6.3 the only new stable marriage is M1 and π1w = π̄w for w ∈ {w2, w3}. Since f is INS,
f(Mi,Π
1, ω) = f(Mi, Π̄
′, ω) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Furthermore, since Claim 1 is assumed to be
false, f(M1, Π̄′, ω) = f(M1,Π1, ω) ≤ f(M2,Π1, ω) = f(M2, Π̄′, ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Since
M1 andM2 are the only two stable marriage and since given any ω the mechanism r always
selects a unique marriage, f(M1, Π̄′, ω) < f(M2, Π̄′, ω) implying that M2 is still selected
if w1 is more honest, a contradiction to minimal dishonesty completing the proof of the
subclaim.
By Subclaims 1, 2 and 3, if Claim 1 is false then π̄1wi = π̄wi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and M1
is stable with respect to Π̄, a contradiction to Lemma 6.3.2. Therefore, Claim 1 holds.
We have established the first part of the proof; for j ∈ {1, 3} there is some sample path
ωj , where a non-egalitarian stable marriage Mj must have a higher value than the unique
egalitarian stable marriage M2 if everyone honest and π1 is submitted.
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Now consider a second set of sincere preferences Π2 pbtained by moving w4 (m4) up
one position in m1, m2 and m3’s preference lists (w1, w2 and w3 respectively). Once again
the marriages M1,M2 and M3 in Table 6.1 are stable. However, unlike Π1, M1 and M3 are
the only egalitarian stable marriages.
π2m1 = w1 π2m1 w4 π2m1 w2 π2m1 w3 π
2
w1
= m2 π2w1 m4 π2w1 m3 π2w1 m1 (6.40)
π2m2 = w2 π2m1 w4 π2m2 w3 π2m2 w1 π
2
w2
= m3 π2w1 m4 π2w2 m1 π2w2 m2 (6.41)
π2m3 = w3 π2m1 w4 π2m3 w1 π2m3 w2 π
2
w3
= m1 π2w1 m4 π2w3 m2 π2w3 m3 (6.42)
π2m4 = w4 π2m1 w1 π2m4 w2 π2m4 w3 π
2
w4
= m4 π2w1 m1 π2w4 m2 π2w4 m3 (6.43)
Claim 2: For each j ∈ {1, 3} there is an ωj ∈ Ω such that f(Mj,Π2, ωj) > f(M2,Π2, ωj).
By symmetry, assume j = 1. Since f is monotonic and INS, f(M1,Π2, ω) = f(M1,Π1, ω)
and f(M2,Π1, ω) ≥ f(M2,Π2, ω). By Claim 1, there is an ω1 ∈ Ω such that f(M1,Π1, ω1) >
f(M2,Π
1, ω1). Thus ω1 is such that f(M1,Π2, ω1) = f(M1,Π1, ω1) > f(M2,Π1, ω1) ≥
f(M2,Π
2, ω1) and Claim 2 holds.
Given Claims 1 and 2, we can now construct a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ with
respect to the sincere preferences Π2 where M2 is selected by r. This is a contradiction
since r always selects an egalitarian stable marriage and thus no such r can exist.
The preference Π̄ below has the unique stable marriage M2 and corresponds to a mini-
mally dishonest equilibrium with respect to the sincere profile Π2, a contradiction sinceM2
is not an egalitarian stable marriage with respect to Π2.
π̄m1 = w1 π̄m1 w4 π̄m1 w2 π̄w1 = m2 π̄w1 m4 π̄w1 m3 (6.44)
π̄m2 = w2 π̄m2 w4 π̄m2 w3 π̄m2 w1 π̄w2 = m3 π̄w2 m4 π̄w2 m1 π̄w2 m2 (6.45)
π̄m3 = w3 π̄m3 w4 π̄m3 w1 π̄m3 w2 π̄w3 = m1 π̄w3 m4 π̄w3 m2 π̄w3 m3 (6.46)
π̄m4 = w4 π̄m4 w1 π̄m4 w2 π̄m4 w3 π̄w4 = m4 π̄w4 m1 π̄w4 m2 π̄w4 m3 (6.47)
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With respect to Π̄,M2 is the only stable marriage and therefore is both man and woman-
optimal. By [20, Theorem 17] no man can alter his preferences to obtain a marriage he
prefers to his man-optimal partner. Since the sincere and putative preferences agree up to
each man’s partner in M2, no man can alter his putative preferences to obtain a marriage he
sincerely prefers. A symmetric argument holds for the women and Π̄ is an equilibrium.
It remains to show that everyone is minimally dishonest. Onlym1 and w1 are dishonest.
Examine m1. To be more honest, man m1 can only change Π̄ to Π̄′ = δ(Π̄,m1, {w3, u}).
However, this makes M3 stable. By Claim 2 and since f is a monotonic and INS, there is
an ω3 ∈ Ω such that f(M3, Π̄′, ω3) = f(M3,Π2, ω3) > f(M2,Π2, ω3) = f(M2, Π̄′, ω3).
Thus, the alteration would generate a worse solution for m1. A symmetric argument holds
for w1 with M1 and ω1. Hence m1 and w1 are both minimally dishonest. The minimally
dishonest equilibrium Π̄ has the unique stable marriage M2, a contradiction since M2 is not
an egalitarian stable marriage for Π2. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.3.15.
6.4 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms
In Section 6.3.1, we examined pure strategy minimally dishonest Nash equilibria of the
SSM game. However, such an equilibrium may not exist. In this section, we first establish
that not every mechanism has a minimally dishonest equilibrium. We then characterize
the set of minimally dishonest equilibria for the Gale-Shapley algorithm and never-one-
sided mechanisms and show both types of mechanisms always have minimally dishonest
equilibria.
Proposition 6.4.1. If r in SSM uniformly randomly selects an egalitarian stable marriage,
then it is possible that no minimally dishonest equilibrium exists.
Proof. In Theorem 6.3.13, r was shown to be monotonic and INS representable. Consider
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the set of sincere preferences Π.
πm1 = w1 πm1 w2 πm1 w3 πw1 = m3 πw1 m1 πw1 m2 (6.48)
πm2 = w2 πm2 w3 πm2 w1 πw2 = m1 πw2 m2 πw2 m3 (6.49)
πm3 = w3 πm3 w1 πm3 w2 πw3 = m2 πw3 m3 πw3 m1 (6.50)
Π is perfectly symmetric between genders and among individuals. Each gender’s set of
preferences is a standard Condorcet cycle. By Theorem 6.3.14, one of the sincerely stable
marriages,M1 = {{m1, w1}, {m2, w2}, {m3, w3}} andM2 = {{m3, w1}, {m1, w2}, {m2, w3}},
is selected at equilibrium. Suppose Π̄ is a minimally dishonest equilibrium. By the gender
symmetry of Π, without loss of generality marriage M1 is selected. By Lemma 6.6.8, π̄mi
and πmi agree on the first element and π̄wi and πwi agree on the first two elements.
The idea of the proof is that minimal dishonesty leads the men to admit that they are
willing to marry their second choice. They remain assured of outcome M1 by dishonestly
ranking a second choice third, which makes M1 the unique egalitarian stable marriage,
because the women are honest about their second choices. However, once Π̄ shows that all
three men are so willing, equilibrium is lost. Any woman can make M2 the unique stable
marriage, simply by purporting to be willing to wed only her first choice. By symmetry
between the genders, no such equilibrium exists.
To show that each man admits he is willing to marry his second choice, we show π̄mi
omits no wj for each i. By symmetry, it suffices to only analyze π̄m1 .
Claim 1: w3 π̄m1 u.
Suppose instead that u π̄m1 w3. Consider Π̄
′ = δ(Π̄,m1, {w3, u}). If any new stable
marriages appear, then m1 weds w3 in the new marriage. However, by Lemma 6.6.8 m3
(w3) is honest about the first (respectively two) element(s) in the submitted profile Π̄ and
{m3, w3} still blocks any marriage that weds m1 to w3 with respect to Π̄′ and no new
stable marriages appear implying m1’s partner does not change, a contradiction to minimal
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dishonesty. Thus w3 π̄m1 u.
Claim 2: w2 π̄m1 u.
Suppose that this is not the case and, by Claim 1,m1’s preferences are given byw1 π̄m1
w3. Consider Π̄′′ = δ(Π̄,m1, {w2, u}). The only new stable marriage that can appear in Π̄′′
is M2. Using f2 from Example 6.2.7, the value of M1 is more than the value of M2 (since
w3 appears prior to w2 in π̄′′m1). SinceM1 andM2 are the only marriages stable with respect
to Π̄′′, m1’s outcome does not change contradicting minimal dishonesty. Thus, w2 π̄m1 u.
Since Claims 1 and 2 hold, π̄mi contains every wj . By Lemma 6.6.8, π̄wj agrees with
πwj on the first two elements and M2 is also stable with respect to π̄. Thus, if there is an
equilibrium Π̄ then there are two stable marriages. This contradicts Corollary 6.6.7 and
there can be no such equilibrium.
We now consider two types of mechanisms that always have equilibria: the Gale-
Shapley algorithm and more fair never-one-sided mechanisms.
6.4.1 Gale-Shapley Algorithm
In this section, we characterize the set of minimally dishonest equilibria obtained when r
is the Gale-Shapley algorithm. We prove that the woman-optimal sincerely stable marriage
will always be obtained.
Theorem 6.4.2. If r always selects the man-optimal marriage (Gale-Shapley algorithm),
there exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium for any sincere preference profile Π. More-
over, all minimally dishonest equilibria yield the woman-optimal sincerely stable marriage.
Proof. To show existence of an equilibrium that yields the woman-optimal sincerely stable
marriage M with respect to Π, consider the preference profile Π̄M obtained by having
men be honest and having women truncate their sincere profiles after their woman-optimal
partner. By construction, M will be the only stable marriage with respect to Π̄M .
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In 6.6.2, an algorithm is presented to find a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ given
Π̄M where r(Π̄) = M . Each iteration of the algorithm corrects a violation to minimal
dishonesty and decreases the distance between an individual’s putative and sincere pref-
erences. Since the distances are finite and integer, the algorithm terminates in finite time
(Lemma 6.6.10). Next we show that if Π̄ is the profile obtained at the end of an iteration,
then Π̄ is an equilibrium and M is the unique stable marriage with respect to Π̄ (Lemma
6.6.11). This implies the algorithm outputs an equilibrium Π̄ that yields the sincerely sta-
ble marriage M . We show that the equilibrium is minimally dishonest by showing that
the algorithm does not terminate until all violations to minimal dishonesty are corrected
(Lemma 6.6.12). Thus there is at least one minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ that yields
the woman-optimal M .
It remains to show that no other marriage can be obtained at an equilibrium. In Section
6.3.1 we showed that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is monotonic and INS representable and
thus any equilibrium must yield a sincerely stable marriage. Suppose the sincerely stable
M is obtained given the equilibrium Π̄.
We begin by showing that the minimally dishonest refinement implies that all men
will be honest at equilibrium. For contradiction suppose man m is not honest and that
π̄m 6= πm. By Lemma 6.6.8, π̄m and πm agree up to m’s partner in M . Thus, any disparity
between π̄m and πm must appear after sM(m). However, by Lemmas 6.6.2 and 6.6.3, the
marriage M remains stable (and man-optimal) after m corrects the disparity. Since the
Gale-Shapley algorithm always selects the man-optimal marriage, man m obtains the same
result contradicting minimal dishonesty. Thus all men are honest at a minimally dishonest
equilibrium.
Now since the men are honest and, by Lemma 6.6.8, every woman is honest up to her
partner in M , the woman-optimal marriage is stable with respect to the putative prefer-
ences. By Corollary 6.6.7, there is only one marriage stable with respect to the putative
preferences and M is the woman-optimal marriage.
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6.4.2 Never-One-Sided Mechanisms
Fairness is often a legitimate concern in decision-making. The Gale-Shapley algorithm
is arguably the most unfair way to select a stable marriage, because it exclusively favors
one side – the group that is sexually identified as men. Therefore, until now, concern for
sincere stability has in a sense maximized unfairness! Our next result offers a broad set of
less unfair mechanisms that are sure to yield sincere stability, and do so in every minimally
dishonest equilibrium.
Definition 6.4.3. r is never-one-sided if for all Π̄ that admit more than one stable marriage,
there exist M1,M2 ∈ r(Π̄) (possibly M1 = M2) where M1 is not man-optimal and M2 is
not woman-optimal.
Theorem 6.4.4. Let r be an arbitrary monotonic, INS and never-one-sided representable
stable marriage algorithm. Let M be a marriage and let Π be a sincere preference profile.
Then M is sincerely stable if and only if there exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄
in the strategic stable marriage game where r(Π̄) = M .
The proof of existence follows in the same fashion as Theorem 6.4.2. For a sincerely
stable M , when given Π̄M obtained by having every individual truncate Π̄ after their M -
partner, Algorithm 2 in 6.6.2 returns a minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ where r(Π̄) =
M . Furthermore, every outcome is guaranteed to be stable by Theorem 6.3.14.
6.5 Extensions
In this section, we consider extensions to the Stable Marriage Problem. We first consider
the college Admissions Problem. In this setting we label the women as “colleges” and
men as “students”. Unlike the Stable Marriage Problem, each college is allowed to marry
multiple students. Each college has a quota indicating the maximum number of students
that they are willing to marry. We show that our positive results fail to hold in this setting.
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The Student Placement Problem is a special case of the college Admissions Problem
where each college is assumed to be honest. Since the college Admissions Problem can be
modeled by a Stable Marriage Problem by duplicating the colleges, the Student Placement
Problem is also a special case of the Stable Marriage Problem where all women are honest.
We consider a more general model of the Stable Marriage Problem where any subset of
individuals are allowed to be honest. Furthermore, we show that the positive results still
hold in this setting.
6.5.1 College Admissions Problem
Roth has long claimed that the Admissions Problem is significantly different than the Sta-
ble Marriage Problem by showing that unlike the Stable Marriage Problem, a single college
is able to alter their preferences to obtain a marriage that they prefer to the college-optimal
marriage [60]. Very few of our results extend to the college Admissions Problem. We
provide the unsettling result that no stable marriage mechanism can guarantee a sincerely
stable marriage is selected at a minimally dishonest equilibrium and, like Roth, we must
emphasize that the college Admissions Problem is different than the Stable Marriage Prob-
lem.
Without knowing colleges’ preferences between groups of students, we cannot can-
not guarantee that a marriage is deterministically selected at every equilibrium (Corollary
6.3.3). Consider a set of preferences where a college has a 50% chance of obtaining their
1st and 4th choice in students and a 50% chance of obtaining their 2nd and 3rd choice in
students. If the college is indifferent between these two outcomes, these preferences may
correspond to an equilibrium. However, Corollary 6.3.3 does hold if every college has strict
preferences between every mixture of students.
The most unsettling disparity between the Stable Marriage Problem and the College
Admissions Problem is that we may obtain a marriage at an equilibrium that is not sincerely
stable, as shown in Theorem 6.5.1. Mimicking Roth, Theorem 6.5.1 demonstrates there is
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a set of preferenes where a college can alter their preferences to obtain a marriage that
they prefer to the college-optimal marriage even at a minimally dishonest equilibrium,
regardless of the stable marriage mechanism used. This implies that no stable marriage
mechanism guarantees that a sincerely stable marriage is selected.
Theorem 6.5.1. There is a sincere profile Π for the college admissions strategic game
where for every stable marriage mechanism r, no minimally dishonest equilibrium yields a
sincerely stable marriage.
Proof. Consider the sincere preferences
πc1 = s1 πc1 s2 πc1 s3 πc1 s4 πs1 = c3 πs1 c1 πs1 c2 (6.51)
πc2 = s1 πc2 s2 πc2 s3 πc2 s4 πs2 = c2 πs2 c1 πs2 c3 (6.52)
πc3 = s3 πc3 s1 πc3 s2 πc3 s4 πs3 = c1 πs3 c3 πs3 c2 (6.53)
πs4 = c1 πs4 c2 πs4 c3 (6.54)
where college c1 has capacity for two students and colleges c2 and c3 have room for
only one student. The only stable marriage with respect to these preferences is M =
{{c1, s3}, {c1, s4}, {c2, s2}, {c3, s1}}.
For contradiction, suppose there is a minimally dishonest Π̄ where r(Π̄) = M . We
now that show there are enough completely honest colleges and students to guarantee that
c1 is able to alter π̄c1 to obtain a marriage that c1 prefers to the college-optimal marriage,
contradicting that Π̄ is an equilibrium.
Claim 1: M is the only marriage stable with respect to Π̄.
Suppose that M ′ is stable with respect to Π̄. Lemma 6.3.2 still applies in this setting
and every individual must sincerely like their M -partner(s) as much as their M ′-partner(s).
By Lemma 6.6.1, every college is married to the same number of students in every stable
marriage. Thus, c1 is always wed to two students. Students s3 and s4 are c1’s least preferred
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partners and {c1, s3}, {c1, s4} ∈ M ′ since otherwise c1 prefers M ′ to M . This implies
that either {c2, s1} or {c2, s2} is in M ′. Since c2 sincerely prefers s1 to s2 = sM(c2),
{c2, s2} ∈M ′ implying that M ′ = M .
Claim 2: Colleges c2 and c3 and all students are honest up to theirM -partner. Furthermore,
c1 is completely honest.
Suppose this isn’t true for some individual y 6= c1 (student or college). Lemma 6.6.5
and Lemma 6.6.8 describe a process for correcting disparities between π̄y and πy where
(1) M remains stable, (2) any newly created stable marriage will be sincerely preferred by
the individual updating their preferences, and (3) by monotonicity and INS, the values of
marriages that y sincerely likes as much asM will not decrease while the values of all other
marriages will not increase. These three properties together imply that each individual is
honest up to their M -partner. In this setting we have assumed neither monotonicity nor
INS and thus only (1) and (2) apply. However, by Claim 1, M is the only stable marriage
with respect to Π̄ and therefore after correcting a disparity, the mechanism will still select a
marriage that y sincerely likes as much asM and we can still apply the results from Lemma
6.6.5 and Lemma 6.6.8. Thus each individual is honest up to their partner in M .
Unfortunately, Lemmas 6.6.5 and 6.6.8 only apply to individuals that are allowed only
a single spouse. We now show that c1 is honest. If c1 is dishonest, it implies that c1 receives
a less preferred marriage M ′ if they submit the more honest πc1 . However, this implies
that c1 is married to at most one student since s3 and s4 are their least preferred partners.
Without loss of generality, suppose that c1 is not married to s3. By the first part of Claim
2, s3 indicates that college c1 is their first choice. This implies {c1, s3} is a blocking pair
contradicting that M ′ was obtained after c1 updated their preferences to πc1 . Therefore c1
is honest and Claim 2 holds.
Claim 3: All college are honest.
Suppose that c2 is not honest and submitting the more honest πc2 yields a worse result
for c2. This implies there is a stable marriage M ′ where c2 is married to neither s1 nor s2.
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However by Claim 2, s2 indicates c2 is their most preferred partner and {c2, s2} blockM ′, a
contradiction. Thus c2 is honest. An identical argument using c3 and s1 shows c3 is honest.
Claim 4: Students s1 and s3 are honest.
Once again suppose there is a stable M ′ when s1 submits πs1 that is worse for s1.
By Claim 3, college c3 is honest and indicates that they only prefer s3 to s1. Thus,
{c3, s3} ∈ M ′ since otherwise {c3, s1} blocks M ′. Similarly using Claim 2, this implies
that {c1, s1}, {c1, s2} ∈M ′ since otherwise {c1, s3} blocks M ′. However, this implies that
{c2, s2} blocksM ′, a contradiction implying that s1 is honest. Similarly for s3, if πs3 yields
a worse result M ′ for s3, then {c1, s1}, {c1, s2} ∈ M ′ and {c2, s2} blocks M ′. Therefore
Claim 4 holds.
Claims 2-4 imply that Π̄ is similar to
π̄c1 = s1 π̄c1 s2 π̄c1 s3 π̄c1 s4 π̄s1 = c3 π̄s1 c1 π̄s1 c2 (6.55)




π̄c3 = s3 π̄c3 s1 π̄c3 s2 π̄c3 s4 π̄s3 = c1 π̄s3 c3 π̄s3 c2 (6.57)
π̄′s4 = c1 (6.58)
where π̄s2 (π̄s4) and π̄
′
s2
(π̄′s4) agree on the first element. However, these preferences are not
an equilibrium since college c1 can update their preferences to s1  s4 in order to obtain
the marriage M ′ = {{c1, s1}, {c1, s4}, {c2, s2}, {c3, s3}} – a marriage that c1 prefers to M .
This contradicts that Π̄ is an equilibrium. Therefore there is no mechanism that guarantees
a sincerely stable marriage for the college Admissions Problem.
6.5.2 Truth-Tellers and the Student Placement Problem
In practice, some individuals may prefer to be honest regardless of whether they can ma-
nipulate their preferences to obtain a partner they strictly prefer. Such individuals are often
called truth-tellers, and there is experimental evidence that they exist [29, 32]. The Student
188
Placement Problem is an instance of the Stable Marriage (College Admissions) Problem
where all women (colleges) are truth-tellers and where all the men (students) are strategic.
Corollary 6.3.3 does not hold in this setting and a marriage is not always selected de-
terministically at an equilibrium. If all individuals are truth-tellers and the decision mecha-
nisms selects a marriage uniformly at random, then at the unique equilibrium π̄ = π every
sincerely stable marriage has positive probability of being selected. As a result, we do not
treat r(Π̄) as a singleton in this section. However, through the same proof technique in
Corollary 6.3.3, we can prove that if an individual is strategic then their partner is selected
deterministically at every equilibrium.
Corollary 6.6.7 also does not hold in this setting and there may be more than one mar-
riage stable with respect to the equilibrium preferences. While the proof of Theorem 6.3.14
relies on Corollary 6.6.7, the positive result that every equilibrium stable marriage is also a
sincerely stable marriage does apply to this setting.
Theorem 6.5.2. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. If r is monotonic and INS
representable, then for every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄, every marriage in r(Π̄) is
stable with respect to the sincere preferences Π.
The proof of Theorem 6.5.2 can be found in 6.6.3. Theorem 6.5.2 immediately implies
that a sincerely stable marriage will be selected in the the Student Placement Problem since
the Student Placement Problem is an instance of the Stable Marriage Problem where all
women are honest.
Without making conditions on the number of truth-tellers we still cannot guarantee
that there is a mechanism that always selects a sincere egalitarian stable marriage or that
there always exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium and our negative results still hold.
The never-one-sided property still ensures that an equilibrium exists that selects a sincerely
stable marriage but it is not guaranteed there is an equilibrium for each sincerely stable mar-
riage. When running the Gale-Shapley algorithm an equilibrium exists and every strategic
woman receives her sincere woman-optimal partner at every equilibrium. However, the
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selected marriage is not necessarily woman-optimal.
Theorem 6.5.3. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. Suppose r always selects
the man-optimal marriage. Then there exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium for any
sincere preference profile Π, and in every minimally dishonest equilibrium every strategic
woman receives her woman-optimal partner.
Theorem 6.5.4. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. If r is monotonic, INS and
never-one-sided representable, then there exists at least one minimally dishonest equilib-
rium Π̄. Moreover for every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ and every M ∈ r(Π̄), M
is sincerely stable.
No additional techniques are required to prove these results and we defer the proofs to
6.6.3.
6.5.3 Coalitions
Gale and Sotomayor also specifically motivate the study of manipulation when collusion is
allowed [31]. In this section we consider coalitions and strong equilibria – equilibria where
no group of individuals can collude such that every member of the group obtains a strictly
better outcome. We show that for any monotonic INS representable stable marriage mech-
anism, every minimally dishonest equilibrium is also a strong equilibrium. This implies
that all the results from previous sections apply even when collusion is allowed. In addi-
tion, it implies that the core of the SSM game is non-empty when using the Gale-Shapley
algorithm or a monotonic INS never-one-sided representable stable marriage mechanism
even when we refine the set of equilibria to those where everyone is minimally dishonest.
Theorem 6.5.5. Let r be a monotonic and INS representable stable marriage mechanism
and let Π be arbitrary. Every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ is a strong equilibrium.
Proof. By Corollary 6.6.7, r(Π̄) = M is the unique putatively stable marriage and there-
fore is putatively both man and woman-optimal. By [18], no coalition of men and women
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can alter Π̄ such that every one of them prefers the outcome to M . By Lemma 6.6.8, each
individual prefers M with respect to Π̄ if and only if he/she prefers M with respect to
Π. Therefore no coalition can alter Π̄ to obtain a marriage they all sincerely prefer to M .
Therefore Π̄ is a strong equilibrium.
The converse does not necessarily hold, as discussed previously.
Lemma 6.5.6. Let r and Π be arbitrary. For any strong equilibrium Π̄, r(Π̄) is a sincerely
stable marriage.
Proof. The profile Π̄ is a Nash equilibrium and by Corollary 6.3.3 and Lemma 6.3.4,
r(Π̄) = M is a sincerely rational marriage. If M is not stable with respect to Π then
there is a blocking pair {m,w}. Moreover, m and w could obtain a strictly better solution
by indicating that they are only willing to marry each other contradicting that Π̄ is a strong
equilibrium. Thus, M is sincerely stable.
Theorem 6.5.5 and Lemma 6.5.6 also allow us to construct a slightly different proof
of Theorem 6.3.14. Since every minimally dishonest equilibrium of a monotonic INS rep-
resentable r is a strong equilibrium and since every strong equilibrium yields a sincerely
stable marriage, every minimally dishonest equilibrium of a monotonic INS representable
r yields a sincerely stable marriage.
If a mechanism has a minimally dishonest equilibrium, then it also has a strong equi-
librium and the core is non-empty. For instance, when using the Gale-Shapley algorithm
or a monotonic INS never-one-sided representable r, the SSM game has a non-empty core.
Corollary 6.5.7. Let Π be arbitrary and r be the Gale-Shapley algorithm or a monotonic
INS never-one-sided representable stable marriage mechanism. The SSM game with r and
the minimally dishonest refinement has a non-empty core.
Corollary 6.5.7 follows immediately from Theorems 6.4.2, 6.4.4 and 6.5.5.
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6.5.4 Locally Minimal Dishonesty
In this section we consider a weaker version of minimal dishonesty for which our results
apply. To be locally minimally dishonest there may not be a pairwise change to the putative
preference list that is more honest and results in as good an outcome.
Definition 6.5.8. Let Π be the sincere preferences and let Π̄ be an equilibrium in the Strate-
gic Stable Marriage game. Manm is locally minimally dishonest if a {w, z} ∈ ×W×{W∪
{u}} where d(δ(Π,m, {w, z})m, π′m) < d(π̄m, π′m) implies r(Π̄) = M πm M ′ for some
M ′ ∈ r(δ(Π̄,m, {w, z})).
Once again, if the condition fails to hold, then m could obtain at least as good a re-
sult when the more honest δ(Π̄,m, {w, z})m is submitted. Woman w is locally minimally
dishonest if symmetric conditions hold for her.
A Nash equilibrium is a locally minimally dishonest equilibrium if every individual
is locally minimally dishonest and a marriage M is a locally minimally dishonest stable
marriage with respect to r and Π if there is a locally minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄
where M = r(Π̄).
Recall Example 6.3.8. Both π̄′m3 and π̄
′′
m3
suffice to show that m3 is not minimally
dishonest. However, π̄′m3 does not indicate that m3 is locally minimally dishonest because




by correcting a single discrepancy, it does show that m3 is not locally minimally dishonest.
If an individual is not locally minimally dishonest then the individual is also not mini-
mally dishonest. However, an individual may be locally minimally dishonest without being
minimally dishonest. Thus every minimally dishonest equilibrium is also a locally mini-
mally dishonest equilibrium but the converse does not necessarily hold. Now we explain
why all of our results hold for both minimally dishonest equilibria and locally minimally
dishonest equilibria. If a result describes a property of all minimally dishonest equilibria
it suffices to show this when individuals are locally minimally dishonest. We have rigged
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the proofs of such results in this paper to rely only on pairwise changes to Π̄. On the other
hand, when we have shown that an equilibrium with a certain property exists, it sufficed to
show this when individuals are minimally dishonest.
6.6 Additional Proofs
6.6.1 Equilibria of the Strategic Stable Marriage Game
Lemma 6.6.1 (Rural Hospitals Theorem [61]). Let Π̄ be a profile. If there exists a marriage
M that is stable with respect to Π̄ where sM(y) = u, then y is unmarried in every stable
marriage with respect to Π̄.
For the following proofs let Qy(z, Π̄) := {z′ : z′ π̄y z}, the set of individuals that y
prefers over z with respect to the preference Π̄. If {y, z} is a blocking pair of marriage M
with respect to Π̄ then y ∈ Qz(sM(z), Π̄) and z ∈ Qy(sM(y), Π̄).
We begin by establishing how the set of stable marriages changes when an individuals
swaps two individuals in their putative preference list Π̄.
Lemma 6.6.2. Suppose M is a marriage such that sM(y) = z3 where z1 π̄y z2 π̄y u
and either z2 π̄y z3 or z3 π̄y z1. Then M is stable with respect to Π̄ if and only if M is
stable with respect to Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {z1, z2}).
Proof. Consider individual rationality first. Since π̄y and π̄′y do not differ as to which
individuals y is willing to marry, and Π̄′ differs from Π̄ only at y’s preferences, M is
individually rational with respect to Π̄ iff M is rational with respect to Π̄′.
Second, consider blocking pairs. The pair {y, z} blocks M with respect to Π̄ iff z ∈
Qy(z3, Π̄) and y ∈ Qz(sM(z), Π̄). With respect to Π̄, by hypothesis either y strictly prefers
both z1 and z2 to z3, or y does not strictly prefer either z1 or z2 to z3. Swapping z1 and z2
in π̄y cannot not affect Qy(z3, Π̄). Hence Qy(z3, Π̄) = Qy(z3, Π̄′). Also, Qz(sM(z), Π̄) =
Qz(sM(z), Π̄
′) since π̄z = π̄′z. Therefore, {y, z} blocks M with respect to Π̄ iff it blocks
M with respect to Π̄′.
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Lemma 6.6.3. Suppose M is a marriage such that sM(y) = z3 where z3 π̄y u, and
suppose u π̄y z1. Then M is stable with respect to to Π̄ iff M is stable with respect to
Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {z1, u}).
Proof. (⇒) Suppose to the contrary that M is stable with respect to Π̄ but not with respect
to Π̄′. Since Π̄′ is created by adding an element to Π̄, if M is individually rational with
respect to Π̄ then it is also individually rational with respect to Π̄′. Therefore there exists
a blocking pair {y, z} with respect to Π̄′. However, as in Lemma 6.6.2, both Qy(z3, Π̄) =
Qy(z3, Π̄
′) and Qz(sM(z), Π̄) = Qz(sM(z), Π̄′). Therefore {y, z} must also block M with
respect to Π̄, a contradiction.
(⇐) Suppose by the contrapositive that M is not stable with respect to Π̄. Then M
is not individually rational or it admits a blocking pair with respect to Π̄. Suppose the
former. Since Π̄ and Π̄′ only differ as to whether or not z1 is acceptable to y, and sM(y) =
z3 π̄y u π̄y z1 implies z3 6= z1, M is not individually rational with respect to Π̄′. If
the pair {y, z} blocks M with respect to Π̄, then as above Qy(z3, Π̄) = Qy(z3, Π̄′) and
Qz(sM(z), Π̄) = Qz(sM(z), Π̄
′) imply that {y, z} blocks M with respect to Π̄′. Hence M
is not stable with respect to Π̄′.
Lemma 6.6.4. At a minimally dishonest equilibrium if y is unmarried, then π̄y = πy.
Proof. We begin by showing there is no z such that z π̄y u but u πy z. For contradiction,
let Z be the set of z such that z π̄y u but u πy z. Furthermore let z∗ ∈ Z be such that
z π̄y z∗ for all z ∈ Z. Suppose that y considers being more honest by removing z∗ from
their preference list and updating the preference profile to Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {z, u}). Since y is
minimally dishonest, this must generate a worse outcome for y. However, y was unmarried
before the update and M must wed y to some individual z′ ∈ Z for some M ∈ r(Π̄′).
This implies there is a x where {y, x} blocks M with respect to Π̄ but not with respect
to Π̄′. Therefore x π̄y z′ and y π̄z′ sM(z




′) and {y, x} blocks M with respect to Π̄′, a contradiction.
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Since stable marriages mechanisms select a marriage that is individaully rational and
π̄y contains no individual y is unwilling to marry, if y becomes more honest then y will
prefer any newly created marriage to being unmarried. Thus y is completely honest.
Lemma 6.6.5. At any minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ for a monotonic INS repre-
sentable stable marriage mechanism, if y is married to the kth member of πy, then the
first k elements of π̄y are a permutation of the first k elements of πy.
Proof. We show this in two steps. By Corollary 6.3.3, r(Π̄) = M is a singleton.
Claim 1: If x πy sM(y) then x π̄y u.
For contradiction, assume this is not the case. LetM be the set of marriages stable with
respect to Π̄. Now suppose that y is more honest and adds x to the end of π̄y updating Π̄ to
Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {x, u}). By the “if” part of Lemma 6.6.3, for all M ′ ∈M, M ′ remains stable
and since the decision mechanism is INS representable the value ofM ′ remains unchanged.
Furthermore, by Lemma 6.6.1 [61], y is married in every stable marriage with respect to
Π̄′. Then by the “only if” part of Lemma 6.6.3, appending x to π̄y can only create new
stable marriages that weds y and x. Hence, r(Π̄′) can only consist of marriages that wed y
to sM(y) or x. Since x πy sM(y), y is not worse off, contradicting minimal dishonesty.
Thus Claim 1 holds.
Claim 2: If x πy sM(y) πy z then x π̄y z.
Assume to the contrary that z π̄y x, and select x and z so that they appear as close as
possible in π̄y. This selection forces x and z to be adjacent in π̄y, for if z π̄y α π̄y x then
either α can replace x or α can replace z.
Now suppose that y is more honest and switches x and z, updating Π̄ to Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {x, z}.
For x 6= sM(y), since z and x are adjacent, Lemma 6.6.2 applies, hence M remains sta-
ble. If x = sM(y), similar to Lemma 6.6.2, M remains stable since Q(sM(y), Π̄′) ⊂
Q(sM(y), Π̄).
By monotonicity and INS, the values of marriages that wed y to x (respectively z) do
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not decrease (respectively increase) and the values of all other marriages are unchanged.
By Lemma 6.6.2 all new stable marriages wed y to x. Consequently, r(Π̄′) can only consist
of marriages that wed y to sM(y) or x. Since x πy sM(y), y is not worse off with r(Π̄′),
contradicting minimal dishonesty.
Since both claims hold, the first k elements of π̄y are a permutation of the first k ele-
ments of πy.
Lemma 6.6.6. At any minimally dishonest equilibrium for a monotonic INS representable
stable marriage mechanism, the man-optimal stable marriage M̃ with respect to the puta-
tive preferences Π̄ is selected.
Proof. Suppose this is not the case and there is a stable M = r(Π̄), where M 6= M̃ . Then
there exists a manm such that sM̃(m) π̄m sM(m). By Lemma 6.6.5, sM̃(m) πm sM(m),
a contradiction to Lemma 6.3.2.
Corollary 6.6.7. At any minimally dishonest equilibrium for a monotonic INS representable
stable marriage mechanism, there is only one stable marriage with respect to the putative
preferences.
Proof. Symmetric to Lemma 6.6.6, the marriage selected must also be woman-optimal
with respect to the submitted preferences. Since the man-optimal (woman-optimal) mar-
riage is simultaneously the best (respectively worst) stable marriage for every man [25, 58],
there can be only one stable marriage with respect to the putative preferences.
Lemma 6.6.8. At any minimally dishonest equilibrium for a monotonic INS representable
stable marriage mechanism, if y is married to the kth member of πy, then the first k elements
of π̄y are identical to and appear in the same order as the first k elements of πy.
Proof. Let M = r(Π̄). For contradiction, suppose there are x and z such that x πy
z πy sM(y) but z π̄y x. As in the proof of Lemma 6.6.5, select x and z such that they
are adjacent in π̄y. Suppose that y is more honest by switching x and z, updating Π̄ to
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Π̄′ = δ(Π̄, y, {x, z}). By Lemma 6.6.2, any newly created stable marriages wed y to x. By
Corollary 6.6.7, there is only one stable marriage with respect to Π̄. Therefore, r(Π̄′) weds
y to x or sM(y). This contradicts minimal dishonesty since y does no worse.
Lemma 6.6.9. For preference profiles Π and Π̄, and a marriage M that is stable with
respect to Π̄, if πy agrees with π̄y up to y’s M -partner, then M is stable with respect to Π.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that M is stable with respect to Π̄ but not with respect to
Π. Either (1) there exists a married man or woman y such that u πy sM(y) (M is not
individually rational) or (2) there is an unmarried pair {m,w} such that m πw sM(w) and
w πm sM(m) (there is a blocking pair). If (1) then u π̄y sM(y) since πy and π̄y agree
up to sM(y), contradicting that M was stable with respect to Π̄. If (2) then m π̄w sM(w)
and w π̄m sM(m) since πy and π̄y agree up to sM(y) for each y, contradicting that M was
stable with respect to Π̄. Thus, M must be stable with respect to Π.
6.6.2 The Gale-Shapley Algorithm and Never-One-Sided Mechanisms




{y, π̄′y} : d(π̄′y, πy) < d(π̄y, πy) and r([Π̄−y, π̄′y]) πy r(Π̄)
}
. (6.59)
Let Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) be the set of {y, π̄′y} ∈ Inv(r, Π̄,Π) where π̄′y agrees with πy up to
y’s partner in r([Π̄−y, π̄′y]).
We now have sufficient definitions to give an algorithm than finds a minimally dishonest
equilibrium that yields a sincerely stable marriage for the Gale-Shapley algorithm. Let M
be the woman-optimal marriage with respect to the sincere preferences. For each man m,
let π̄Mm = πm. For each woman w, if w is married in M then let π̄
M
w be the formed by
truncating πw after sM(w). If w is unmarried then let π̄
M
w = πw. When given the Gale-
Shapley algorithm r, sincere preferences Π and the putative preferences Π̄M , Algorithm 2
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will output a minimally dishonest equilibrium for Π that yields the since woman-optimal
marriage M .
Furthermore if r is instead monotonic, INS representable and never-one-sided then for
any sincerely stable marriage M , Algorithm 2 can output a minimially dishonest equilib-
rium that yields M . For individual y let π̄My be the preferences obtained after y truncates
πy after their M partner. This process was decribed above for the women and the woman-
optimal marriage M . Algorithm 2 will output a minimally dishonest equilibrium for Π that
yields the marriage M .
Algorithm 2 Equilibrium Finding Algorithm for Gale-Shapley and never-one-sided Mech-
anisms
1: procedure EQUILIBRIUMFIND
2: while Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) 6= ∅ do
3: Select {y, π̄′y} ∈ Inv′(r, Π̄,Π)




We first show that the algorithm terminates regardless of the input.
Lemma 6.6.10. Algorithm 2 terminates.









where φ(r, Π̄,Π) ≥ 0 in each iteration of Algorithm 2. If individual y updates their
preferences in an iteration then d(π̄y, πy) decreases by at least one and d(π̄z, πz) remains
unchanged for z 6= y. Thus Algorithm 2 must terminate. Furthermore, d(π̄m, πm) ≤(|W |+1
2
)




and Algorithm 2 terminates in O(|V ||W |2 + |V |2|W |)
iterations.
Next we show that at the end of each iteration, Π̄ is a equilibrium and that M is the
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only marriage stable with respect to Π̄. Thus, when Algorithm 2 terminates, it outputs an
equilibrium that yields the sincerely stable marriage M .
Lemma 6.6.11. Suppose Algorithm 2 is given input Π, Π̄M whereM is the woman-optimal
sincerely stable marriage and the Gale-Shapley algorithm r. At the end of each iteration,
Π̄ is an equilibrium and M is the only marriage stable with respect to Π̄.
Proof. By construction of Π̄M , M is the only stable marriage at the beginning of the first
iteration. Thus M is both man and woman-optimal. No man can alter his preferences to
obtain an outcome he prefers to the man-optimal marriage [20, Theorem 17]. Thus no man
m can alter π̄Mm to obtain a marriage he prefers with respect to Π̄
M . By construction of Π̄M ,
m also cannot alter π̄Mm to obtain a marriage he prefers with respect to Π. Symmetrically,
no woman can alter her preference to obtain a better outcome and Π̄M is an equilibrium.
We now show that if Π̄ is an equilibrium with the unique stable marriage M at the
beginning of an iteration, then the condition holds at the end of the iteration completing the
proof of the lemma.
Suppose that {y, π̄′y} ∈ Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) is updated in an iteration. Let Π̄′ = [Π̄−y, π̄′y]
be the preference profile at the end of the iteration. Since Π̄ is an equilibrium, y does not
receive a better partner with respect to Π̄′. Since {y, π̄′y} ∈ Inv′(r, Π̄,Π), y does not obtain
a worse partner with respect to Π̄′ and y is married to sM(y) in every marriage in r(Π̄′).
Let M ′ be any marriage stable with respect to Π̄′. We first claim that sM ′(y) = sM(y).
Since every man is honest, y is a woman. By construction, both π̄y and π̄′y match πy up
to sM(y). Since Π̄ is an equilibrium that weds y to sM(y), sM(y) is y’s woman-optimal
partner with respect to Π̄′. Thus if there was a M ′ such that sM ′(y) 6= sM(y) then y would
would obtain worse result since r always selects a marriage that is not woman-optimal1.
1Lemma 6.6.11 also applies to a never-one-sided r for any stable marriageM (not just the woman-optimal
M ). However, the individual y who is updating π̄y can be either a man or a woman. Like the Gale-Shapley
algorithm, if any new marriage is created when an individual becomes more honest, the resulting marriage
will be worse for the individual updating their preferences. Since r is never-one-sided, it will yield a worse
outcome for the individual updating their preferences. Therefore no new stable marriages can be created in
an iteration of Algorithm 2.
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Therefore sM ′(y) = sM(y) for any stable M
′.
We now claim that M is the only marriage stable with respect to Π̄′. Suppose instead
M ′ 6= M is stable with respect to Π̄′ but not Π̄. Individual y is married to sM(y) in M ′.
Since only y alters his/her preferences, M ′ is individually rational with respect to Π̄ if and
only ifM ′ is rational for Π̄′. Thus assume there is a pair {m,w} that blocksM ′ with respect
to Π̄ but not Π̄′. Once again since y is the individual that alters her preferences, y = w.
However, by construction of Inv′, {m, y} must also block M ′ with respect to Π̄′ since the
set of individuals y prefers to sM(y) is the same given Π̄ and Π̄
′. This is a contradiction
and M is the only stable marriage with respect to Π̄′.
It remains to show that Π̄′ is an equilibrium. This again follows directly from [20,
Theorem 17] and the lemma holds.
It only remains to show that each individual is minimally dishonest. All individuals are
minimally dishonest if and only if Inv(r, Π̄,Π) = ∅. Thus it suffices to show that in each
iteration Inv(r, Π̄,Π) = ∅ if and only if Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) = ∅.
Lemma 6.6.12. Suppose Algorithm 2 is given input Π, Π̄M and a monotonic INS repre-
sentable r. In each iteration, Inv(r, Π̄,Π) = ∅ if and only if Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) = ∅.
Proof. Since Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) ⊆ Inv(r, Π̄,Π), one direction holds immediately. Suppose that
{y, π̄′y} ∈ Inv(r, Π̄,Π) and let Π̄′ = [Π̄−y, π̄′y].
Let k be such that y’s M -partner is the kth individual in πy. First we claim there is
a {y, π̄′′y} ∈ Inv(r, Π̄,Π) such that the first k elements π̄′′y are a permutation of the first
k elements of πy. This claim follows in the same fashion as Lemma 6.6.5. Suppose the
first k elements of π̄′y are not a permutation of the first k elements πy, then one of the
two disparities in the proof of Lemma 6.6.5 can be corrected. For each disparity corrected
y becomes more honest and, since r is monotonic and INS representable, any new stable
marriages created yield at least as good an outcome (with respect to the sincere preferences)
for y. Let π̄′′y be the preference list obtained from π̄
′
y after correcting all disparities described
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in Lemma 6.6.5. Since π̄′′y is more honest than π̄
′
y and yields the same outcome for y,
{y, π̄′′y} ∈ Inv(r, Π̄,Π) as desired. Now without loss of generality we may assume the first
k elements of π̄′y are a permutation of the first k elements of πy.
Next we claim we there is a {y, π̄∗y} ∈ Inv(r, Π̄,Π) such that the first k elements π̄∗y
appear in the same order as the first k elements of πy. Similar to Lemma 6.6.11, M is
unique marriage stable with respect to π̄′y. The remainder of this claim follows in the same
fashion as Lemma 6.6.8. By correcting the disparities highlighted in Lemma 6.6.8, the
preferences π̄′y can be altered to generate a more honest π̄
∗
y that produces the same outcome
for y as π̄′y. Moreover, this implies that {y, π̄∗y} ∈ Inv′(r, Π̄,Π) completing the proof of
the lemma.
As mentioned in the Section 6.4, Lemmas 6.6.10, 6.6.11 and 6.6.12 imply that there is
a minimally dishonest equilibrium that yields the woman-optimal sincerely stable marriage
M .
Only Lemma 6.6.11 is specific to the Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, as mentioned
in the proof of Lemma 6.6.11, the result can easily be modified for a never-one-sided r and
any stable marriageM . Instead of starting with Π̄M , Algorithm 2 is given the putative pref-
erence profile Π̄M where π̄My is obtained from truncating πy after y’sM -partner. Algorithm
2 then outputs a minimally dishonest Π̄ that yields the sincerely stable marriage M .
6.6.3 Truth-Tellers and the Student Assignment Problem
Theorem 6.5.2. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. If r is monotonic and INS
representable, then for every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄, every marriage in r(Π̄) is
stable with respect to the sincere preferences Π.
Proof. Let Π̄ be the preferences at equilibrium and let Π correspond to the sincere prefer-
ences. For contradiction, assume there is a M ∈ r(Π̄) such that M is not sincerely stable.
For each individual y we may assume y is willing to marry sM(y). If this was not the case
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for some individual y then y indicates that he/she is willing to marry sM(y). This implies
that y is strategic. Similar to Corollary 6.3.3, y’s partner is deterministically selected and
y could obtain a better result by reporting an empty preference list. Thus M is sincerely
individually rational.
Since M is individually rational but not sincerely stable there is a man m and a woman
w such that w πm sM(m) and m πw sM(w). The pair {m,w} remains a blocking pair
regardless of all other individuals’ sincere and putative preferences. Thus, without loss of
generality assume all other individuals are truth-tellers and thus honest. We now break the
problem into three cases.
Case 1: m and w are both truth-tellers. Since Π̄ = Π, M must be a sincerely stable
marriage completing this case.
Case 2: m and w are both strategic. Since both individuals are strategic, their partner
must be selected deterministically and thus for all M ′ ∈ r(Π̄), m and w are married.
Assume that w is the kth element in πm. Lemma 6.6.5 still applies in this setting and the
first k elements of π̄m are a permutation of the first k elements of πm. Thus, similar to
Lemma 6.6.6, man m is assigned his man-optimal partner. Similarly w is assigned her
woman-optimal partner and, similar to Corollary 6.6.7, m and w must be married in every
putatively stable marriage. Thus, similar to Lemma 6.6.8, the first k elements of π̄m must
appear in the same order as the first k elements of πm and by Lemma 6.6.9 the marriage M
is stable with respect to the sincere preferences.
Case 3: m is strategic but w is a truth-teller. Man m is the only individual that is
dishonest and he can obtain his man-optimal w′ by submitting a preference list consisting
only of w′. As a result, m must like sM(m) at least as much as w′. By [20, Theorem 17],
m cannot alter his preference to get someone he prefers to w′ and thus sM(m) = w′ and M
is sincerely stable.
In all three cases we determine that M is sincerely stable and the theorem holds.
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Theorem 6.5.3. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. Suppose r always selects
the man-optimal marriage. Then there exists a minimally dishonest equilibrium for any
sincere preference profile Π, and in every minimally dishonest equilibrium every strategic
woman receives her woman-optimal partner.
Proof. The proof that every strategic woman receives her woman-optimal partner at every
equilibrium is identical to the proof of Theorem 6.4.2. To determine at least one equilibrium
exists, we start with the preference Π̄ obtained from Π by having every strategic woman
truncate her list after her woman-optimal partner. In the same fashion as Theorem 6.4.2,
when given Π̄ Algorithm 2 returns a minimally dishonest equilibrium.
Theorem 6.5.4. Let a subset of players in SSM be truth-tellers. If r is monotonic, INS
representable and never-one-sided, then there exists at least one minimally dishonest equi-
librium Π̄. Moreover for every minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ and M ∈ r(Π̄), M is
sincerely stable.
Proof. Let M be a sincerely stable marriage and let Q(πy,M) be the preference list ob-
tained by truncating πy after y’s M -partner. Let π̄M be such that π̄My = πy for every
truth-teller y and such that π̄My = Q(πy,M) for all other y. We now claim that we can se-
lect a sincerely stable marriage M such that sM(y) = sM ′(y) for each strategic individual
y and each marriage M ′ that is stable with respect to Π̄M .
Let k > 0 be the minimum integer for which this does not always hold for k strategic
individuals. Let y be such an individual and let M ′ be such a marriage. Furthermore,
assume M ′ is such that sM ′(y) is y’s optimal partner with respect to Π̄M . By Lemma 6.6.9,
M ′ is sincerely stable. By construction of Π̄M and Π̄M ′ , every marriage stable with respect
to Π̄M ′ is also stable with respect to Π̄M . Furthermore, by selection of M ′ individual y is
married to sM ′(y) in every marriage stable with respect to Π̄M
′ and no new stable marriages
are created by the additional truncation. However this contradicts the minimality of k and
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thus we can select a sincerely stable marriage M such that for each strategic individual y
and for each marriage M ′ that is stable with respect to π̄My that sM(y) = sM ′(y).
In the same fashion as Theorem 6.4.4, when given the input Π̄M Algorithm 2 finds a
minimally dishonest equilibrium Π̄ such that every M ′ ∈ r(Π̄) is sincerely stable. Further-
more, for everyM ′ ∈ r(Π̄) and every strategic individual y, y is married to theirM -partner
in M ′.
The second part of the theorem statement follows directly from Theorem 6.5.2.
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